Drawing on a wealth of new evidence from all sides, Triumph Forsaken overturns most of the historical orthodoxy on the Vietnam War. Through the analysis of international perceptions and power, it shows that South Vietnam was a vital interest of the United States. The book provides many new insights into the overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963 and demonstrates that the coup negated the South Vietnamese government's tremendous, and hitherto unappreciated, military and political gains between 1954 and 1963. After Diem's assassination, President Lyndon Johnson had at his disposal several aggressive policy options that could have enabled South Vietnam to continue the war without a massive US troop infusion, but he ruled out these options because of faulty assumptions and inadequate intelligence, making such an infusion the only means of saving the country.
• Overturns most of the dominant interpretations of the Vietnam War • Shows that the United States could have won the war • Makes extensive use of previously untapped Vietnamese Communist sources
Contents
Preface; 1. Heritage; 2. Two Vietnams, July 1954-December 1955; 3. Peaceful coexistence, 1956–1959; 4. Insurgency, 1960; 5. Commitment, 1961; 6. Rejuvenation, January-June 1962; 7. Attack, July-December 1962; 8. The battle of Ap Bac, January 1963; 9. Diem on trial, February-July 1963; 10. Betrayal, August 1963; 11. Self-destruction, September-November 2, 1963; 12. The return of the twelve warlords, November 3-December 1963; 13. Self-imposed restrictions, January-July 1964; 14. Signals, August-October 1964; 15. Invasion, November-December 1964; 16. The prize for victory, January-May 1965; 17. Decision, June-July 1965.
Reviews
'Thoroughly researched and richly informative … A valuable appraisal.' Booklist
'The most noteworthy aspect of Triumph Forsaken is surely the depth and range of its research … Moyar has provided those who take their history seriously with a stunning performance, and plenty to think about.' Times Literary Supplement


