In Money and Banks in the American Political System, debates over financial politics are woven into the political fabric of the state and contemporary conceptions of the American dream. The author argues that the political sources of instability in finance derive from the nexus between market innovation and regulatory arbitrage. This book explores monetary, fiscal and regulatory policies within a political culture characterized by the separation of business and state, and mistrust of the concentration of power in any one political or economic institution. The bureaucratic arrangements among the branches of government, the Federal Reserve, executive agencies, and government sponsored enterprises incentivize agencies to compete for budgets, resources, governing authority and personnel.
• Covers a wide range of political and financial topics for non-specialists • Forward-looking explanation of politics of finance, written so readers can judge the best possible course of action for themselves • Integrates nontechnical understanding of financial markets, banks and financial products with the practical aspects of the political system
Contents
1. The institutional foundations of financial politics in the United States; Part I. A Historical Background: 2. Developing state capacity for the conduct of American finance; 3. Creating increasingly complex financial products; Part II. The Bureaucratic Politics and Finance: 4. Making financial policy in Congress; 5. Making financial policy in the executive branch and the federal bureaucracy; 6. Making financial policy in the federal reserve system; Part III. The Operation of the Financial Political Economy: 7. The process in motion: political institutions, money, and the business cycle; 8. The process approaches collapse: politics in the financial crisis of 2008; 9. The process in its international context: political in international institutions; Part IV. Conclusions: 10. Governing the US financial system.
Reviews
'Why are banks politically powerful in the United States? The novel argument of Lavelle's important book is that banks are powerful because they have allies within the American political system that need banks in order to further their own bureaucratic objectives. For example, the Federal Reserve needs banks to help preserve its independence from the Congress, Congress needs banks to help allocate resources to favored constituents (e.g., homeowners), and financial regulators need banks to help preserve their jurisdictions and budgets. Lavelle's exploration of the bureaucratic politics of financial policy making provides a new understanding of regulation, deregulation, innovation, and crises in American finance.' J. Lawrence Broz, University of California, San Diego
'In this concise volume, Professor Lavelle masterfully dissects and evaluates the politics and institutional drivers of America's evolving banking system. A must-read for political scientists and lawyers alike.' Chris Brummer, Georgetown University
'Lavelle's book usefully illuminates how politically created fragmentation of financial regulation in the United States creates the conditions for recurrent crises. She fills in a huge lacuna in the literature on financial regulation by shifting attention from its effects to its origins and real-world operation in the interaction of Congress and the regulatory agencies.' Herman Schwartz, University of Virginia
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