How viable is the resolution of nuclear non-proliferation disputes through the International Court of Justice and international arbitration? James Fry examines the compromissory clauses in the IAEA Statute, IAEA Safeguards Agreements and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material that give jurisdiction to these fora and analyses recent jurisprudence to demonstrate how legal resolution can handle such politically sensitive disputes. In sum, legal resolution of nuclear non-proliferation disputes represents an option that States and commentators have all too often ignored. The impartiality and procedural safeguards of legal resolution should make it an acceptable option for target States and the international community, especially vis-à-vis the procedural shortcomings and general heavy-handedness of Security Council involvement under UN Charter Chapter VII.
• Presents a new option for settling nuclear non-proliferation disputes which will be welcomed by those who fear that nuclear non-proliferation disputes cannot be resolved through negotiation • Compares the legal resolution of nuclear non-proliferation disputes with resolution by the UN Security Council, and demonstrates that legal resolution provides a fairer process through its structural impartiality and due process safeguards • Provides numerous examples of how the International Court of Justice and international arbitral tribunals have handled politically sensitive disputes similar to nuclear non-proliferation disputes in the past
Contents
Part I. Introduction: 1. Foundational elements of the study; 2. Definitions, delimitations and disclaimers of the study; Part II. Security Council Involvement with Nuclear Non-Proliferation Disputes under UN Charter Chapter VII: 3. Exploring potential problems with Security Council involvement; Part III. Legal Resolution and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Disputes: 4. The history of legal resolution with similarly sensitive disputes as nuclear non-proliferation disputes; 5. Jurisdiction over nuclear non-proliferation disputes; 6. Justiciability of nuclear non-proliferation disputes; Part IV: 7. Conclusion.
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