Are children of equal, lesser, or perhaps even greater moral importance than adults? This work of applied moral philosophy develops a comprehensive account of how adults as moral agents ascribe moral status to beings - ourselves and others - and on the basis of that account identifies multiple criteria for having moral status. It argues that proper application of those criteria should lead us to treat children as of greater moral importance than adults. This conclusion presents a basis for critiquing existing social practices, many of which implicitly presuppose that children occupy an inferior status, and for suggesting how government policy, law, and social life might be different if it reflected an assumption that children are actually of superior status.
• Flips the historical belief that adults are superior in status to children • Offers a general theory that could help resolve debates over other moral issues, such as abortion, animal rights, and environmental protection • Draws upon recent work in the field of moral psychology in a way that other philosophers have not
Contents
1. What is moral status and why does it matter?; 2. How is moral status determined?; 3. Selecting criteria of moral status; 4. Problems in applying a multi-criterial approach; 5. Applying a multi-criteria moral status test to adults and children; 6. Legal, policy, and moral implications of children's superiority.
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