Empirical Studies in Institutional Change is a collection of nine empirical studies by fourteen scholars. Dealing with issues ranging from the evolution of secure markets in seventeenth-century England to the origins of property rights in airport slots in modern America, the contributors analyse institutions and institutional change in various parts of the world and at various periods of time. The volume is a contribution to the new economics of institutions, which emphasises the role of transaction costs and property rights in shaping incentives and results in the economic arena. To make the papers accessible to a wide audience, including students of economics and other social sciences, the editors have written an introduction to each study and added three theoretical essays to the volume, including Douglass North's Nobel Prize address, which reflect their collective views as to the present status of institutional analysis and where it is headed.
• Brings together, from various sources, empirical studies that reveal the practical relevance of the new institutionalism • Three theoretical and methodological essays, and a special introduction for each study, provide the reader with the required theoretical background and an introduction to the new economics of institutionalism • Contains the 1993 Nobel Prize lecture by Douglass C. North
Introduction; A note on theory Thráinn Eggertsson; Empirical work in institutional economics Lee J. Alston; 1. Towards an understanding of property rights Gary D. Libecap; 2. Impediments to institutional change in the Soviet system Jan Winiecki; 3. Transaction costs and economic development Andrew Stone, Brian Levy and Ricardo Paredes; 4. The evolution of the modern institutions of growth Douglass C. North and Barry R. Weingast; 5. Regulation in a dynamic setting Anne O. Krueger; 6. Price controls, property rights and institutional change Steven N. S. Cheung; 7. Regulating natural resources: the evolution of perverse property rights Robert Higgs; 8. The politics of institutional change in a representative democracy William H. Riker and Itai Sened; 9. The economics and politics of institutional change Lee J. Alston and Joseph P. Ferrie; Epilogue: Economic performance through time Douglass C. North.