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  • Page extent: 1072 pages
  • Size: 253 x 177 mm
  • Weight: 1.82 kg


 (ISBN-13: 9780521612746)

This interdisciplinary work is a collection of major essays on reasoning: deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible (non-monotonic), cross cultural, conversational, and argumentative. They are each oriented toward contemporary empirical studies. The book focuses on foundational issues, including paradoxes, fallacies, and debates about the nature of rationality, the traditional modes of reasoning, as well as counterfactual and causal reasoning. It also includes chapters on the interface between reasoning and other forms of thought. In general, this last set of essays represents growth points in reasoning research, drawing connections to pragmatics, cross-cultural studies, emotion and evolution.

• Includes an introductory overview of the foundations of reasoning which provides a survey to readers encountering the topic for the first time • Includes key new contributions from major figures in the field as well as original work giving breadth and depth of coverage • Covers new sub-fields not previously documented and identifies where new research is likely to appear


Preface; List of contributors; Introduction: philosophical foundations; Part I. Foundations of Reasoning: Section 1. Some Philosophical Viewpoints: 1. Change in view: principles of reasoning; 2. Belief and the will; 3. Internal and external reasons; 4. Paradoxes; Section 2. Fallacies and Rationality: 5. When rationality fails; 6. Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: the conjunction fallacy in probability judgment; 7. Can human irrationality be experimentally demonstrated?; 8. Breakdown of will; Part II. Modes of Reasoning: Section 3. Deductive Reasoning: 9. Logical approaches to human deductive reasoning; 10. Mental modes and deductive reasoning; 11. Interpretation, representation, and deductive reasoning; 12. Reasoning with quantifiers; 13. The problem of deduction; Section 4. Induction: 14. Patterns, rules, and inferences; 15. Inductive logic and inductive reasoning; 16. Reasoning in conceptual spaces; 17. Category-based induction; 18. When explanations compete: the role of explanatory coherence on judgments of likelihood; 19. Properties of inductive reasoning; Section 5. Dual and Integrative Approaches: 20. Human reasoning and argumentation: the probabalistic approach; 21. Individual differences in reasoning and the algorithmic/intentional level distinction in cognitive science; 22. Reasoning, decision making, and rationality; Section 6. Abduction and Belief Change: 23. Defeasible reasoning; 24. Explanatory coherence; 25. Belief revision; 26. Belief, doubt, and evidentialism; 27. Reflections on conscious reflection: mechanisms of impairment by reasons analysis; 28. Belief change as propositional update; Section 7. Causal and Counterfactual Reasoning: 29. Causal thinking; 30. Causation; 31. Propensities and counterfactuals: the loser that almost won; Section 8. Argumentation: 32. The layout of arguments; 33. The skills of argument; 34. Reasoning and conversation; Part III. Interactions of Reasoning in Human Thought: Section 9. Reasoning and Pragmatics: 35. Specificationism; 36. Presupposition, attention, and why-questions; 37. Further notes on logic and conversation; 38. The social context of reasoning: conversational inference and rational judgment; Section 10. Domain-Specific, Goal-Based, and Evolutionary Approaches: 39. Domain-specific knowledge and conceptual change; 40. Pragmatic reasoning schemas; 41. Beyond intuition and instinct blindness: toward an evolutionarily rigorous cognitive science; 42. Use or misuse of the selection task? Rejoinder to Fiddick, Cosmides, and Tooby; 43. Why we are so good at catching cheaters; 44. The modularity of mind: an essay on faculty psychology; 45. Commitment Brian Skyrms; 46. Evolution of inference; Section 11. Reasoning across Cultures: 47. Reasoning across cultures; 48. Culture and systems of thought: holistic versus analytic cognition; 49. On the very idea of a conceptual scheme; 50. The truth in relativism; Section 12. Biology, Emotions, and Reasoning: 51. Logic and biology: emotional inference and emotions in reasoning; 52. Distinct brain loci in deductive versus probabilistic reasoning; 53. The emotional dog and its rational tail: a social intuitionist approach to moral judgment; Index.


Jonathan E. Adler, Gilbert Harman, Bas C. van Fraassen, Bernard Williams, R. M. Sainsbury, Jon Elster, Amos Tversky, Daniel Kahneman, L. Jonathan Cohen, George Ainslie, Lance J. Rips, Philip N. Johnson-Laird, Keith Stenning, Michael van Lambalgen, Bart Geurts, Achille C. Varzi, Henry E. Kyburg, Jr., Peter Gardenfors, Daniel N. Osherson, Edward E Smith, Ormond Wilkie, Alejandro Lopez, Eldar Shafir, Steven A. Sloman, Evan Heit, Mike Oaksford, Nick Chater, Ulrike Hahn, Keith E. Stanovich, Jonathan St. B. T. Evans, David E. Over, Ken I. Manktelow, John Pollock, Paul Thagard, Hans Rott, Issac Levi, Jamin Halberstadt, Timothy D. Wilson, Reneé Elio, Frances Je, Lance J. Rips, David Lewis, Robert C. Stalnaker, Daniel Kahneman, Carol A. Varey, Stephen Edelston Toulmin, Deanna Kuhn, Lance J. Rips, Elijah Milligram, Jonathan Adler, H. Paul Grice, Dennis J. Hilton, Susan Carey, Elizabeth Spelke, Patricia W. Cheng, Keith J. Holyoak, Leda Cosmides, John Tooby, Dan Sperber, Vittorio Girotto, Jerry Fodor, Jerry Fodor, Brian Skyrms, Russell C. Burnett, Douglas L. Medin, Richard E. Nisbett, Kaiping Peng, Incheol Choi, Ara Norenzayan, Donald Davidson, Bernard Williams, Ronald de Sousa, Jonathan Haidt, Daniel Osherson, Daniella Perani, Stefano Cappa, Tatiana Schnur, Franco Grassi, Ferruccio Fazio

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