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The Law, Economics and Politics of Retaliation in WTO Dispute Settlement

Details

  • Page extent: 692 pages
  • Size: 228 x 152 mm
  • Weight: 1.18 kg

Hardback

 (ISBN-13: 9780521119979)

The WTO allows its members to retaliate in the face of continued non-compliance. After more than ten years' operation and ten arbitration disputes, this volume assesses the law, economics and politics of trade sanctions in WTO dispute settlement. Including more than thirty contributions from leading academics, trade diplomats and practitioners, it offers a thorough analysis of the legal rules on permissible WTO retaliation as well as an assessment of the economic rationale and calculations behind the mechanism. In addition, it provides first hand experiences of those countries that have obtained WTO authorisation to retaliate, ranging from the United States and the EC to Mexico and Antigua. In this assessment, the question of how to make the system work also for small countries is paramount. Finally, the volume spells out lessons that could be learned from related fields such as remedies for non-compliance in investment arbitration and competition or anti-trust regimes.

• Includes contributions by more than thirty of the world's leading law and economics professors specialising in trade • Practitioners and diplomats speaking on behalf of countries involved in trade retaliation make this a crucial tool for practitioners wanting to learn about the law and economics of trade sanctions as well as about the practical experience and lessons learned by other countries • Introduction brings together the different parts of the book and offers an overall picture, rather than simply summarising the contributions

Contents

Introduction: trade retaliation in WTO dispute settlement: a multi-disciplinary analysis Chad P. Bown and Joost Pauwelyn; Part I. Background and Goal(s) of WTO Retaliation: 1. The nature of WTO arbitrations on retaliation Giorgio Sacerdoti; 2. The calculation and design of trade retaliation in context: what is the goal of suspending WTO obligations? Joost Pauwelyn; Comment John Jackson; Comment Alan Sykes; 3. Extrapolating purpose from practice: rebalancing or inducing compliance Gregory Shaffer and Daniel Ganin; Part II. A Legal Assessment after Ten Arbitration Disputes: 4. The law of permissible WTO retaliation Thomas Sebastian; Comment Nicolas Lockhart; 5. From bananas to Byrd: damage calculation coming of age? Yves Renouf; Part III. An Economic Assessment after Ten Arbitration Disputes: 6. The economics of permissible WTO retaliation Chad P. Bown and Michele Ruta; Comment Alan Winters; 7. Sticking to the rules: quantifying the market access protected by WTO retaliation Simon Evenett; Part IV. The Domestic Politics and Procedures for Implementing Trade Retaliation: 8. The United States' experience and practice in suspending WTO obligations Scott Andersen and Justine Blanchet; 9. The European Community's experience and practice in suspending WTO obligations Lothar Ehring; 10. The politics of selecting trade retaliation in the EC: a view from the floor Hakan Nordström; 11. Canada's experience and practice in suspending WTO obligations Vasken Khabayan; 12. Is retaliation useful? Observations and analysis of Mexico's experience Jorge Huerta Goldman; 13. Procedures for the design and implementation of trade retaliation in Brazil Luiz Salles; 14. Retaliation in the WTO: the experience of Antigua and Barbuda in US - gambling Mark Mendel; Part V. Problems and Options for Reform: 15. Evaluating the criticism that WTO retaliation rules undermine the utility of WTO dispute settlement for developing countries Hunter Nottage; 16. Optimal sanctions in the WTO: the case for decoupling (and the uneasy case for the status quo) Alan Sykes; Comment: money talks the talk (but does it walk the walk?) Petros Mavroidis; 17. Sanctions in the WTO: problems and solutions William Davey; 18. The case for multilateral regulation of the domestic decision-making process Reto Malacrida; 19. The WTO secretariat and the role of economics in panels and arbitrations Chad P. Bown; Comment: some reflections on the use of economic analysis in WTO dispute settlement proceedings Reto Malacrida; 20. The equivalence standard under Article 22.4 DSU: a 'tariffic' misunderstanding? Simon Schropp; Comment: a general equilibrium interpretation of some WTO dispute settlement cases - 4 EU-US trade conflicts Fritz Breuss; Part VI. New Frontiers and Lessons from Other Fields: 21. Cross-retaliation and suspension under the GATS and TRIPS agreements Werner Zdouc; 22. Cross-retaliation in TRIPS: issues of law and practice Frederick Abbott; 23. Preliminary thoughts on WTO retaliation in the services sector Arthur Appleton; 24. Compensation assessments: perspectives from investment arbitration Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler; 25. Reforming WTO retaliation: any lessons from competition law? Simon Evenett.

Contributors

Chad P. Bown, Joost Pauwelyn, Giorgio Sacerdoti, John Jackson, Alan Sykes, Gregory Shaffer, Daniel Ganin, Thomas Sebastian, Nicolas Lockhart, Yves Renouf, Michele Ruta, Alan Winters, Simon Evenett, Scott Andersen, Justine Blanchet, Lothar Ehring, Hakan Nordström, Vasken Khabayan, Jorge Huerta Goldman, Luiz Salles, Mark Mendel, Hunter Nottage, Petros Mavroidis, William Davey, Reto Malacrida, Simon Schropp, Fritz Breuss, Werner Zdouc, Frederick Abbott, Arthur Appleton, Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Simon Evenett

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