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Handbook of Computational Social Choice

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  • 41 b/w illus. 9 tables
  • Page extent: 0 pages

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 (ISBN-13: 9781316490631)

The rapidly growing field of computational social choice, at the intersection of computer science and economics, deals with the computational aspects of collective decision making. This handbook, written by thirty-six prominent members of the computational social choice community, covers the field comprehensively. Chapters devoted to each of the field's major themes offer detailed introductions. Topics include voting theory (such as the computational complexity of winner determination and manipulation in elections), fair allocation (such as algorithms for dividing divisible and indivisible goods), coalition formation (such as matching and hedonic games), and many more. Graduate students, researchers, and professionals in computer science, economics, mathematics, political science, and philosophy will benefit from this accessible and self-contained book.

• Chapters were written by many prominent members of the computational social choice community • Accessible to readers from a variety of disciplines, especially computer science, economics, and mathematics • The authoritative reference work on computational social choice

Contents

Foreword Hervé Moulin; 1. Introduction to computational social choice Felix Brandt, Vincent Conitzer, Ulle Endriss, Jérôme Lang and Ariel D. Procaccia; Part I. Voting: 2. Introduction to the theory of voting William S. Zwicker; 3. Tournament solutions Felix Brandt, Markus Brill and Paul Harrenstein; 4. Weighted tournament solutions Felix Fischer, Olivier Hudry and Rolf Niedermeier; 5. Dodgson's rule and Young's rule Ioannis Caragiannis, Edith Hemaspaandra and Lane A. Hemaspaandra; 6. Barriers to manipulation in voting Vincent Conitzer and Toby Walsh; 7. Control and bribery in voting Piotr Faliszewski and Jörg Rothe; 8. Rationalizations of voting rules Edith Elkind and Arkadii Slinko; 9. Voting in combinatorial domains Jérôme Lang and Lirong Xia; 10. Incomplete information and communication in voting Craig Boutilier and Jeffrey S. Rosenschein; Part II. Fair Allocation: 11. Introduction to the theory of fair allocation William Thomson; 12. Fair allocation of indivisible goods Sylvain Bouveret, Yann Chevaleyre and Nicolas Maudet; 13. Cake cutting algorithms Ariel D. Procaccia; Part III. Coalition Formation: 14. Matching under preferences Bettina Klaus, David F. Manlove and Francesca Rossi; 15. Hedonic games Haris Aziz and Rahul Savani; 16. Weighted voting games Georgios Chalkiadakis and Michael Wooldridge; Part IV. Additional Topics: 17. Judgment aggregation Ulle Endriss; 18. The axiomatic approach and the internet Moshe Tennenholtz and Aviv Zohar; 19. Knockout tournaments Virginia Vassilevska-Williams.

Review

'The book offers to noneconomists an outstanding self-contained introduction to normative themes in contemporary economics and to economists a thorough discussion of the computational limits of their art. But I also recommend it to anyone with a taste for axiomatics: it is replete with new and open questions that will be with us for some time.' Hervé Moulin, from the Foreword

Contributors

Hervé Moulin, Felix Brandt, Vincent Conitzer, Ulle Endriss, Jérôme Lang, Ariel D. Procaccia, William S. Zwicker, Markus Brill, Paul Harrenstein, Felix Fischer, Olivier Hudry, Rolf Niedermeier, Ioannis Caragiannis, Edith Hemaspaandra, Lane A. Hemaspaandra, Toby Walsh, Piotr Faliszewski, Jörg Rothe, Edith Elkind, Arkadii Slinko, Lirong Xia, Craig Boutilier, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein, William Thomson, Sylvain Bouveret, Yann Chevaleyre, Nicolas Maudet, Bettina Klaus, David F. Manlove, Francesca Rossi, Haris Aziz, Rahul Savani, Georgios Chalkiadakis, Michael Wooldridge, Moshe Tennenholtz, Aviv Zohar, Virginia Vassilevska-Williams

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