Element contents
Series: Elements in Ethics
Moral Psychology
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 May 2021
Summary
This Element provides an overview of some of the central issues in contemporary moral psychology. It explores what moral psychology is, whether we are always motivated by self-interest, what good character looks like and whether anyone has it, whether moral judgments always motivate us to act, whether what motivates action is always a desire of some kind, and what the role is of reasoning and deliberation in moral judgment and action. This Element is aimed at a general audience including undergraduate students without an extensive background in philosophy.
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- Element
- Information
- Series: Elements in EthicsOnline ISBN: 9781108581011Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication: 03 June 2021
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