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Sovereignty and International Co-operation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 March 2017

Kael Loewenstein*
Affiliation:
Amherst College

Extract

At first sight, the terms “sovereignty” and “international co-operation” as bracketed together in the title, may seem to imply the contrast, if not conflict, between an individual state's sovereign self-determination and the co-operation, for mutual benefits derived therefrom, between several sovereign states.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of International Law 1954

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References

1 U.N. General Assembly, Official Becords, 4th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (A/925), June 24, 1949; this Journal, Supp., Vol. 44 (1950), p. 15.

2 This rule is formulated even more strictly than the corresponding provision (Art. 15 (8)) of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

3 See, for example, the Convention for European Economic Co-operation, Paris, April 16, 1948, this Journal, Supp., Vol. 43 (1949), p. 94.

4 See Charter of the Organization of the American States, signed at Bogotá, April 30, 1948, in force Dec. 13, 1951, Art. 4 (e); this Journal, Supp., Vol. 46 (1952), p. 44.

5 Examples abound: refusal of international atomic inspection or control of armament reduction; non-admission of observation teams in the Balkan satellite states and North Korea. For the theoretical approach, see Kulski, W. W., this Journal, Vol. 45 (1951), p. 556 Google Scholar.

6 Illustrations likewise abound, as, for example, the campaign of the American Bar Association against the ratification of the Genocide Convention; the objections of the U. S. representatives against the Covenant on Human Rights under preparation; the rejection by the United States of the ethical code for journalists voted on by the Sub-Commission on Freedom of Information of the Human Rights Commission; the attacks against UNESCO as an alleged instrument of internationalism threatening American traditions; the Senate Joint Resolution No. 1 (January, 1953) of Senator John W. Bricker and sixty-three other Senators proposing a Constitutional Amendment to prevent supersession of State and Federal law by a treaty; the move was stimulated by the decision of the California courts in Sei Fujii v. The State, in which a California statute prohibiting the acquisition of land by aliens ineligible for citizenship was declared unconstitutional in view of the racial equality and human rights clauses of the United Nations Charter. In the decision of the Supreme Court of California (April, 1952) the issue was evaded by declaring that none of the apposite clauses of the United Nations Charter were self-executing and, therefore, not immediately binding on U. S. courts. 242 Pac. (2d) 617; this Journal, Vol. 46 (1952), p. 559.

7 See France, Constitution of 1946, preamble; Italy, Constitution of 1947, Art. 11; Bonn Basic Law, Art. 24, sec. 1. The Netherlands likewise amended their Constitution in 1952 to permit the transfer of sovereignty to international bodies as required by participation in the European Coal and Steel Community (Schuman Plan); see Law of May 8, 1952, Staatsblad No. 247. Likewise in Denmark the new Constitution, approved by plebiscite on May 28, 1953, authorizes the Government, with the approval of five-sixths of the Parliament, to transfer matters traditionally reserved for the sovereign self-determination of the state, to international organizations for the purpose of promoting world co-operation (see New York Times, May 29, 1953).

In Belgium a constitutional amendment is under way permitting participation in international organizations in case such participation requires partial transfer of sovereign rights; see Ganshof van der Meersch, J. W., “Le Plan Schuman et la Constitution Belge,” Revue de l'Université de Bruxelles, Vol. IV (1951/52), pp. 5 Google Scholar ff.; idem, “La Constitution Belge et l'Evolution de l'Ordre International,” Annales de Droit et de la Science Politique, Vol. XII (1952), pp. 331 ff.

It should be noted that unless amended Art. 25 of the Constitution of Norway, stating that “army and navy must not be transferred to the service of foreign powers,” prohibits Norway's membership in a European federation; see Hiorthoy, F., Grundlov og suverenitet, Samtiden, Vol. 61 (1952), pp. 397 Google Scholar ff. (summarized in International Political Science Abstracts, Vol. 2 (1952), No. 1320, p. 44).

7a However, Pakistan, in February, 1954, aligned itself with the Western bloc by agreeing to accept U. S. military assistance.

8 Western Germany, at that time still under military occupation and not a sovereign state, was represented by the Military Governors.

9 See Sec. 105 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948 (22 U.S.C. 1501, this Journal, Supp., Vol. 43 (1949), p. 64).

10 See, for example, Art. I of the United States-France Economic Cooperation Agreement of June 28, 1948 (Department of State, Treaties and Other International Acts Series, No. 1783, Pub. 3251; this Journal, Supp., Vol. 43 (1949), p. 111).

11 This was a “rider attached to the Third Supplementary Appropriation Act of 1951 (H.R. 3587, P.L. 45; see Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Vol. VII (1951), pp. 154 ff., at 156); President Truman strongly objected to it without wishing to veto the entire Appropriation Act.

12 H.R. 4450, P.L. 213; see also Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Vol. VII (1951), pp. 211 ff.

13 In this way in 1952 Holland was authorized to furnish oil-drilling equipment to Poland, and Denmark was permitted to deliver two tankers to the Soviets for which she had contracted several years ago and which were built with Russian-furnished materials. New York Times, July 4 and 5, 1952.

14 American funds of the Swiss banking firm, Baer & Co., were frozen in the United States because of alleged use thereof for trading with Red China. The blocking order was taken under the Emergency Powers (Continuation) Act of 1950.

15 See the application of the “escape clause” in reciprocal trade agreements (Sec. 6 (a) of Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, P.L. 50, 82d Congress, Ch. 141, 1st Sess., H.B. 1612) concerning imports of Swiss watches and Danish dairy products; see also Art. XIX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

16 The Defense Production Act (H.R. 9176, P.L. 774) was amended in 1951 (S. 1717, P.L. 96; see Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Vol. VII (1951), p. 438) to the effect that the import of fats, certain oils, rice, peanuts and dairy products be prohibited until June 30, 1953, if the Secretary of Agriculture deems such imports injurious to the defense effort (see the Magnuson amendment, Congressional Quarterly Almanac, loc. cit., p. 445; the amendment was confirmed by the House, loc. cit., p. 451). By the Defense Production Act Amendments of 1952 (S. 2194, P.L. 429), the import controls on the products mentioned were continued (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Vol. VIII (1952), pp. 304 ff.). President Truman in his statement (ibid., p. 311) noted “a slight improvement of the so-called ‘cheese amendment’ which had been so harmful to our relations with friendly nations.”

17 Act for International Development (Title IV of the Act of June 5, 1950, 64 Stat. 204 as amended, 22 U.S.C. 1557 et seq.).

18 For texts of such agreements, see First Report to Congress on the Mutual Security Program, Supplement (U. S. Government Printing Office, 1952).

18a Resolution of the First Congress of the Philippines (concerning Arts. XIII (1) and XIV (8) of the Constitution of 1935), Official Gazette, Vol. 42, November, 1946, No. 11-A.

18b See the so-called Romulo-Snyder Agreement of Nov. 6, 1950, for the text of which the author is indebted to the Embassy of the Philippines.

19 On the Molotov Plan, see Economic Survey of Europe since the War, A Reappraisal of Problems and Prospects, prepared by the Research and Planning Division of the European Economic Commission for Europe, United Nations Publications 1953.II.E., Geneva, 1953, pp. 216 ff.; see also Erich Josephson, “East Europe's New Trade Potential,” The Nation, April 19, 1952, pp. 366 ff.; Newsweek, May 5, 1953.

20 When the new (1952) Constitution of Puerto Rico was under discussion in the U. S. House of Representatives, the approval resolution was delayed because of strong objections to Art. 20, containing social and economic rights, on the ground that these were incompatible with the United States constitutional principles because they required state intervention and would “lead to slavery.” See New York Times, May 14, 1952.

21 For example, Sec. 516 of the Mutual Security Act of 1951 (65 Stat. 373) declares it to be the policy of the United States “that this Act shall be administered in such a way as (1) to eliminate the barriers to, and provide the incentives for, a steadily increased participation of free private enterprise in developing the resources of foreign countries consistent with the policies of this Act, (2) … to discourage the cartel and monopolistic business practices prevailing in certain countries receiving aid under this Act which result in restricting production and increasing prices, and to encourage where suitable competition and productivity, and (3) to encourage where suitable the development and strengthening of the free labor union movements as the collective bargaining agencies of labor within such countries.” This Journal, Supp., Vol. 46 (1952), p. 25.

22 For a critical appraisal of these efforts to date see Loewenstein, Karl, “The Union of Western Europe, Illusion and Reality,” 52 Columbia Law Review (1952) 55 CrossRefGoogle Scholar ff., 209 ff.

23 An interesting and, in its potential implications for the future, regrettably neglected illustration was the Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense, established on the basis of Resolution XVII of the Rio de Janeiro Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the American Republics (January, 1942) in Montevideo. It successfully co-ordinated the internal defense of the participating states against Nazi-Fascist subversion. The resolutions jointly elaborated by the American states represented in the Committee were binding on the member states, involving, therefore, a voluntary limitation of their sovereignty in the interest of common defense. See Spaeth, Carl B. and Sanders, William, “The Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense,” this Journal, Vol. 38 (1944), pp. 218 Google Scholar ff.; Loewenstein, Karl, “Pan-Americanism in Action,” Current History, Vol. 5 (1943), pp. 229 Google Scholar ff. The Committee published its impressive legislative accomplishments in two volumes under the title “Legislatión para la Defensa Político de las Repúblicas Americanos” (Montevideo, 1947).

24 Examples: the withdrawal of the ambassadors from Franco Spain as collective manifestation of international disapproval of a Fascist regime; the allegation of discrimination against foreign minorities by, and tie segregation policies of, the Union of South Africa; the latter's refusal to subordinate the former mandate of South West Africa, later (1950) annexed by the Union, to the trusteeship system of the United Nations; the violation of the human rights guarantees of the Paris Peace Treaties of 1947 by the three Soviet satellites of Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria; the non-admission of United Nations observation teams in the Balkan states and in Northern Korea; the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia and the ease of Cardinal Mindszenty; the submission of the internal situation in the French protectorates of Morocco and Tunisia to the United Nations.

25 See James Reston, “Intervention by U. S. Raises a Sharp Issue,” New York Times, March 24, 1952.

26 See New York Times, January 28, 1953.

27 See New York Times, Oct. 17, 1952.

28 See, for example, the reservation attached by the United States to the Bogotá Charter of the Organization of American States (this Journal, Supp., Vol. 46 (1952), p. 43), and Fenwick's, C. G. current note, this Journal, Vol. 46 (1952), p. 317 Google Scholar; on the federal clause see also Max Soerensen, “Federal States and the International Protection of Human Rights,” ibid., p. 195.

29 H.R. 5080 of the 82nd Congress (Representative Wood) even proposed rescission of the membership of the United States in the United Nations.

30 See New York Times, April 9, 1953.