¹ Efforts were made by a number of delegates at the conference at Lima to have the five year interval between inter-American conferences reduced; and it does not appear that the advocates of the shorter interval were aware that the meetings of Foreign Ministers might serve the same purpose.

² The declaration refers to “the standards of conduct, which, in conformity with international law and their respective internal legislation, the American Republics propose to follow, in order to maintain their status as neutral states and fulfill their neutral duties, as well as require the recognition of the rights inherent in such a status, . . .”

³ Department of State Bulletin, May 25, 1940, Vol. II, p. 568.Google Scholar

⁴ See Fenwick, C. G., “The Inter-American Neutrality Committee,” this Journal , Vol. 35 (1941), p. 12.Google Scholar

⁵ For the texts of the declarations and resolutions approved at Havana, see this Journal , Supp., Vol. 35 (1941), pp. 1–32.Google ScholarPubMed

⁶ For the controversy on the question of justification, see Borchard, , “War, Neutrality, and Non-Belligerency,” this Journal , Vol. 35 (1941), p. 618 Google Scholar, and Wright, E., this Journal , Vol. 34 (1940), p. 680, and Vol. 36 (1942), p. 8.Google Scholar

⁷ Third Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics: Special Handbook Prepared by the Pan American Union, p. 1.

The day following the communication from Chile, the Government of the United States addressed a similar communication to the Director General of the Pan American Union, to which was attached a statement of the reasons for the meeting, reading in part as follows:

“The American Republics, at the Inter-American Conferences held in Buenos Aires, Lima, Panama, and Habana have jointly recognized that a threat to the peace, security, or territorial integrity of any American Republic is of common concern to all.

“In the Fifteenth Resolution adopted by the American Republics at the Consultative Meeting held in Habana in July of 1940, and entitled ‘Reciprocal Assistance and Cooperation for the Defense of the Nations of the Americas,’ the American Republics declared that ‘any attempt on the part of a non-American state against the integrity or inviolability of the territory, the sovereignty, or the political independence of an American state shall be considered as an act of aggression against the states which sign[ed] this declaration,’ and further declared that in case such acts of aggression are committed against an American state by a non-American nation ‘the nations signatory to the present declaration will consult among themselves in order to agree upon the measure[s] it may be advisable to take.’

“On December 7, 1941, without warning or notice, and during the course of negotiations entered into in good faith by the Government of the United States for the purpose of maintaining peace, territory of the United States was treacherously attacked by armed forces of the Japanese Empire.

“The course of events since the outbreak of war in Europe in 1939 clearly demonstrates that the fate of every free and peace-loving nation of the world hinges upon the outcome of the present struggle against the ruthless efforts of certain Powers, including the Japanese Empire, to dominate the entire earth by the sword.

“The wave of aggression has now broken upon the shores of the New World.

“In this situation that menaces the peace, the security and the future independence of the Western Hemisphere, a consultation of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs appears to be of urgent desirability.”

⁸ For the text of the Program, see Third Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics: Program and Regulations, Pan American Union, 1941. The regulations under which the meeting was held were prepared by the Governing Board of the Pan American Union in pursuance of a resolution (XVII) adopted at the Havana meeting in 1940; and after submission to the governments were approved on June 4, 1941. English version in this Journal , Supp., Vol. 35 (1941), p. 181.Google ScholarPubMed The Diario of the meeting, Vol. I, No. 1, also contains the program and the regulations, in Portuguese.

⁹ The texts of the addresses at the opening session may be found, in Portuguese, in the Diario of the meeting, Vol. I, No. 2. The texts used in this article from the Final Act are taken from the Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 7, 1942, Vol. VI, pp. 117–141, and reprinted in this Journal , Supp., p. 61 et seq.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Diario, Vol. I, No. 3, p. 2 Google Scholar.

¹¹ Each of the two subcommittees of the First Committee consisted of ten Ministers, selected by lot, with Brazil, in the person of the chairman of the committee, represented on both. The members of the five subcommittees of the Second Committee were fewer in number and were selected by the chairman of the committee. While the membership of the subcommittees was fixed, delegates and technical assessors were free to attend meetings of any subcommittee, and to speak, but not to vote. Diario, Vol. I, No. 4, p. 3. For the membership of the two main committees and their respective subcommittees, see Diario, No. 6.Google Scholar

The fact that each of the subcommittees of the First Committee had a number of topics assigned to it made it necessary for the chairman to nominate “sub-reporters” who became responsible for the particular topic assigned to them. Diario, No. 5, p. 9.Google Scholar

The Secretariat of the meeting was elaborately organized, having at its head, as Secretary General, an experienced Brazilian diplomat, Sr. José de Paula Rodrigues Alves. Special secretaries were assigned to each of the committees and subcommittees and to each of the separate delegations.

¹² For comment on this feature of the meeting, see below, pp. 198–199.

¹³ The meeting was well along before it was possible to find out the particular committee and subcommittee to which certain projects had been assigned. The distribution may be found in the Diario, Vol. I, No. 7, p. 4.Google Scholar The physical task of mimeographing so many projects and the fact that the time limit fixed by the regulations for their presentation was extended delayed considerably the work of the subcommittees.

¹⁴ In order to accomplish their work in so short a time the subcommittees were obliged to work fast and furiously. Great credit is to be given to the reporters for their skillful handling of the projects. But unfortunately, as will be pointed out later, it was often impossible for one subcommittee to know what another was doing even when their objects were closely related; nor was it physically possible for delegates interested in more than one problem to attend different subcommittee meetings held simultaneously. See the complaint of El Salvador on this point. Diario, No. 3, p. 6.Google Scholar

¹⁵ The Uruguayan project (No. 57) contains a preamble reciting the action taken by the American Republics prior to the meeting at Rio. Compare, on this point, Fenwick, C. G., “Intervention by way of propaganda,” this Journal , Vol. 35 (1941), p. 626.Google Scholar Other projects considered by the subcommittee were those presented by Venezuela (2), and Peru (78).

¹⁶ For the text of the resolution, see this Journal, Supplement, p. 76. While the distinction between a resolution of the meeting and a mere recommendation is not strictly observed in the “conclusions” of the meeting presented in the Final Act, in general a “resolution” relates to a matter in which the Ministers meant to assume some degree of legal obligation however loosely formulated, while a “recommendation” is merely that and nothing more. In one case (II. Production of Strategic Materials: see below, p. 193), the document is in part a recommendation and in part a resolution.

On Feb. 25, the Governing Board of the Pan American Union, acting in accordance with the provisions of the Resolution on Subversive Activities, decided that the Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense should be composed of members designated by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, United States, Uruguay and Venezuela. Montevideo was designated as the seat of the committee, and its first meeting fixed for the following April 15.

¹⁷ For the text of the resolution, see this Journal, Supplement, p. 80.

¹⁸ For the background of this problem, see Fenwick, C. G., “The Monroe Doctrine and the Declaration of Lima,” this Journal , Vol. 33 (1939), p. 257.Google Scholar The continued reiteration of the “principle” to which the Chilean project referred is an indication how strongly a number of States feel on the subject.

¹⁹ On the scope of the Buenos Aires convention, see Fenwick, C. G., “The Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace,” this , Journal, Vol. 32 (1937), p. 201; Perkins, Hands Off: A History of the Monroe Doctrine, p. 351.Google Scholar

²⁰ For the text of the declaration, see this Journal , Supp., Vol. 34 (1940), p. 199.Google Scholar

²¹ See Fenwick, , American Neutrality: Trial and Failure, p. 129 ff.Google Scholar

²² For the text, see this Journal , Supp., Vol. 35 (1941), p. 15.Google ScholarPubMed It is a question whether the sovereignty of the United States over Hawaii and the Philippines was in the thought of the delegates at Havana. Certainly an attack was not looked for from that quarter at the time. But this issue was closed by the fact that Germany and Italy had joined Japan in the war.

²³ Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama.

²⁴ While this question constituted the dramatic interest of the meeting, it was not specifically on the program, coming there only as one of the measures that might be taken for the defense of the hemisphere.

²⁵ For the text of the address, see Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 17, 1942, Vol. VI, p. 55.Google Scholar Inasmuch as a right to engage in the subversive activities referred to by Mr. Welles was not included in the privileges accorded to diplomatic agents, it was theoretically possible to suppress them without actually closing the embassies and legations. But the practical difficulties would doubtless have been insuperable. Compare the statement made by Secretary Hull at the Havana Conference of 1940, Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 3, 1940, Vol. III, p. 65.Google Scholar The Resolution on Subversive Activities (XVII) does not appear to extend to the embassies and legations of the Axis Powers so as to restrict their use to purely diplomatic functions—due doubtless to the concentration of interest upon a rupture of diplomatic relations which would have prevented their use altogether.

²⁶ For reasons not found in the record, the preamble of the project, putting the resolution in its proper setting, disappeared in the course of the discussions. This happened in the case of several other important resolutions which appear in the Final Act in somewhat truncated form. In the subcommittee meetings the procedure followed was to seek agreement first upon the substance of the resolution (matéria propriamente resolutiva) and to leave it to the reporter to formulate the preamble expressing the “doctrinal matter.” See Diario, Vol. I, No. 6, p. 11.Google Scholar

²⁷ The submission of the problem by the subcommittee to the full committee did not actually result in general discussion of the question in that committee, but rather left it to an informal subcommittee of the States whose interests were more deeply involved.

²⁸ It is not clear whether this saving phrase preceded or followed the proposal of Argentina to change “cannot continue” (no podrán continuar) relations to “can not-continue” (podrán no continuar), which brought impatient comments from the Mexican delegate at a plenary session on Jan. 23.

²⁹ Had the article been drafted under less pressure, the inconsistency would doubtless have been avoided of a collective recommendation by the American Republics to do what 80% of them had already done, apart from the fact that some of them were actually at war. The Costa Rican delegate, Sr. Echandi Montero, felt it necessary to state that his vote for the recommendation did not mean any lessening of the responsibilities of Costa Rica as a belligerent. Diario, Vol. I, No. 13, p. 5.Google Scholar

³⁰ For the text of the address, see Diario, Vol. I, No. 15, p. 12.Google Scholar

³¹ In point of law, however, Argentina and Chile might still assert that an indefinite obligation, such as that taken at Havana, could only be made definite by the individual decision of the parties obligated. Technically speaking, there was no more legal obligation to break off diplomatic relations than there was to declare war. But, under the circumstances, “legal” obligations were not being too meticulously considered; it was a question of the spirit in which agreements were made and of what each nation felt it must do in accordance with its own interpretation of them. Argentina’s position was set forth in a letter of Vice-President Castillo, which was read at the second plenary session of the meeting on Jan. 16. See Diario, Vol. I, No. 3, p. 2.Google Scholar

³² See Diario, Vol. I, No. 15, p. 14, where, however, the address is not reported verbatim, the specific mention of Argentina and Chile being omitted.Google Scholar

³³ For the text of the declaration, see this Journal, Supplement, p. 82.

³⁴ The Peruvian delegation called attention to the fact that the regulations of the meeting, approved by all of the governments, prescribe the necessity of unanimous agreement to changes in the program.

³⁵ Compare the reservation made by Peru to the resolution on the Inter-American Juridical Committee, below, note 49; as well as the reservation made by Peru at Havana to the resolution on the peaceful solution of conflicts, this Journal , Supp., Vol. 35 (1941), p. 28.Google Scholar

³⁶ The declaration well illustrates the tendency in Latin America to take a broad conception of legal principles and to find in the moral law between individuals a basis of law between States. It may be noted, however, that the phrase “positive international law” in the Ecuadorean project became “international law” in the declaration.

³⁷ In the preamble of the Mexican project reference had been made to the Joint Declaration of Continental Solidarity, adopted at Panama, the third paragraph of which read as follows:

“That these principles are free from any selfish purpose of isolation, but are rather inspired by a deep sense of universal coöeration, which impels these nations to express the most fervent wishes for the cessation of the deplorable state of war which today exists in some countries of Europe, to the grave danger of the most cherished spiritual, moral and economic interests of humanity, and for the reëstablishment of peace throughout the world —a peace not based on violence, but on justice and law.”

The project had thus an anti-isolationist tendency.

³⁸ No record of the discussions is available to indicate whether exception was taken to the articles of the charter on their own merits. They are obviously open to constructive criticism, and there was reason enough why, in the shorttime available for discussion, many of the delegates would have preferred an original statement of peace aims of a more comprehensive character. Compare Resolution (XXV) on Post-War Problems, below, p. 187.The Diario, No. 11, p. 15, speaks of a special “Committee of Five” appointed to revise the draft of the subcommittee.Google Scholar

The omission of the elaborate preamble of the original project, which had been reported intact by the subcommittee, was unfortunate; for the preamble set forth the connection between inter-American principles and those of the Atlantic Charter. A number of delegates were heard to observe that the resolution, as adopted, was so little of a compliment to the authors of the charter that it might better have been omitted altogether.

Consistently with its attitude taken at previous meetings, Guatemala entered a reservation announcing that, while it accepted fully the principles of the Atlantic Charter, in respect to its rights to Belize it made the same reservation made at Panama (see Declaration of Panama); and that it stood by the resolutions and the convention adopted at Havana (see Act of Havana; The Question of Belize; and Convention on the Provisional Administration of European Colonies and Possession in the Americas, Art. XVIII, this Journal , Supp., Vol. 35 (1941), pp. 18, 28).Google Scholar For the question of Belize, see Gustavo S. Gálvez, El Caso de Belice, a la Luz de la Historia y el Derecho Internacional, Guatemala, C. A. 1941; F. Asturias, Belice, Guatemala, C. A. 1941.

³⁹ The recommendation puts the burden of refusal upon the American State which has broken relations rather than upon the State which is requested by the non-American State to represent its interests and which in turn makes a request to be permitted to do so. Panama and Nicaragua argued in favor of the provisions of the project as presented. See Diario, Vol. I, No. 13, p. 7.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ See, on the subject on non-belligerency Wilson, R. R., “Non-belligerency in relation to the terminology of neutrality,” this Journal , Vol. 35 (1941), p. 121;Google ScholarPubMed and articles cited in note 6, above.

⁴¹ The correct literal translation obviously being, “with another State, not American” (“con otro Estado no Americano,” the master text being in Spanish).

⁴² The omission of the elaborate preamble approved by the subcommittee was regarded by a number of the delegates as unfortunate. Doubtless those who were opposed to including Great Britain with the American States in the treatment as non-belligerents felt it necessary to eliminate references in the preamble that led up to its inclusion. The resolution was voted without discussion in the plenary session of the committee; the chairman, however, asking for a vote of thanks to the Government of Uruguay for initiating the idea of extending the privileges of non-belligerency to other than American States.

⁴³ With this resolution must be associated a project presented by Bolivia (No. 10), entitled, “Affirmation of the traditional theory of law in face of a deliberate disregard of international justice and morality,” in which, after an elaborate preamble on the place of law and justice in international relations, the American Republics reaffirm their faith in international law. The project was referred to the Inter-American Juridical Committee, by Agreement XXVIII.

⁴⁴ Albania and the Baltic States were apparently overlooked in the discussions.

⁴⁵ Diario, Vol. I, No. 13, p. 8.Google Scholar The omission of the preamble of the project reported by the committee suggests that here again, as in the case of the Atlantic Charter, some element of “continental isolationism” appears to have been in evidence, the basis for which does not appear in the record.

⁴⁶ For a survey of the functions of the Neutrality Committee, see Fenwick, C. G., “The Inter-American Neutrality Committee,” this Journal , Vol. 35 (1941), p. 12.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ The committee is also authorized, in exceptional cases, to have recourse to the services of technical experts when considered indispensable for the most efficient performance of its duties. The resolution also provides that the members “will have no other duties than those pertaining to the committee,” thus excluding the appointment of members of the diplomatic service resident in Rio de Janeiro.

⁴⁸ The first thirty articles of the Draft Code of Neutrality had already been forwarded to the Pan American Union before the United States was at war.

⁴⁹ In spite of the clear language of the text, Peru entered a reservation to this function of the committee, stating that: “Peru votes in favor of this project, with the reservation that, in accordance with the express purpose of this meeting, the enemy State referred to in paragraph ‘c’ must be a non-American State. Furthermore, it places on record the fact that the Third Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs gave it this true interpretation.” Compare the reservation entered by Peru to Declaration XXI, above p. 179.

⁵⁰ The work of codifying international law, as provided for in successive resolutions of inter-American conferences, is distributed among numerous bodies: the National Committees, appointed by the separate governments; the Permanent Committees (of Rio de Janeiro, for Public International Law; of Montevideo, for Private International Law; and of Havana, for Comparative Law and Unification of Legislation); the Committee of Experts; and the Inter-American Conference of Jurists.

See Agencies for the Codification of International Law, Third Edition, Pan American Union, 1940.Google Scholar

⁵¹ For the text of the address, see Department of State Bulletin, ibid.

⁵² The preamble of the Ecuadorean project read as follows:

“Whereas:“

“1. It is necessary to study with the greatest care the reorganization and improvement of the legal-political bases of international life, in order that the coming peace may be permanent and may be built upon sound foundations of justice, for the benefit of mankind;

“2. America should present itself at the peace conference with uniform plans and ideals, so that it may be able to influence effectively the deliberations and avoid the recurrence of the causes which brought on the present conflict and the chaos in which the world finds itself.”

⁵³ Additional functions were assigned to the Juridical Committee in consequence of a project (No. 6) introduced by El Salvador recommending that in the program of future meetings of Foreign Ministers there be included the “coördination of the resolutions, declarations and other acts of previous Meetings of Ministers of Foreign Affairs,” which was adopted as Resolution XXVII. The Bolivian project (No. 10), calling for a reaffirmation of the traditional theory of international law in the face of the deliberate disregard of justice and morality, was also referred to the committee. See above, note 43.

⁵⁴ See above, p. 184.

⁵⁵ The selection of the Declaration of Lima as the standard to which the non-American country must conform is not clear, inasmuch as the declaration is directed against threats from abroad. Possibly the intention was to avoid the difficulty encountered in the resolution (XXXVII) extending the privileges of non-belligerency to other than American States.

⁵⁶ So drastic were the provisions that the United States itself could not have accepted them if it had not been at war. Brazil asked for changes due to the fact that it had already passed domestic legislation on the subject.

⁵⁷ No formal reservation was made; merely a statement in the record.

⁵⁸ The last article (4) of the resolution, not appearing in either project, is reminiscent of the sharp controversies among the women’s groups at Buenos Aires in 1936 and at Lima in 1938. It provides, “That, when they [Governments of the American Republics] deem it desirable, they consider whether the services rendered by women to the Red Cross in times of peace or war can be given equal weight within the framework of their respective domestic legislation to those of a military nature rendered by men.”

⁵⁹ During the discussions in subcommittee a telegram was received from General Sikorski, President of the Interallied Conference for the Repression of War Crimes, setting forth the declaration drawn up in London on Jan. 13, 1942, in which the governments of the occupied countries pledged themselves to try before a special tribunal those guilty of war crimes. See Diario, Vol. I, No. 7, p. 17.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ The legal points at issue were highly complicated, involving the rule of uti possidetis, the question of succession to treaties, the effect of war upon treaties, prescription and selfdetermination. See “The Ecuador-Peru Boundary Controversy,” by Woolsey, L. H., this Journal , Vol. 31 (1937), p. 97.Google Scholar Professor Ulloa of Peru is of the opinion that the principle of self-determination was continuously asserted during the whole course of the controversy. See “El principio de la Libre Determinatión de los pueblos en la Historia International del Peru ” Revista Peruana de Derecho International, Tomo I (1941), No. 1, p. 43.Google Scholar For a brief bibliography of the controversy, see Pastoriza, Flores, History of the Boundary between Ecuador and Peru, doctoral dissertation, Columbia University, New York, 1921, pp. 83–89.Google Scholar

⁶¹ The most recent summary of Ecuador’s position is to be found in Dictamem Juridicos acerca del problema ecuatoriano-peruano dados por ilustres internationalistas americanos. Quito, Imprenta del Ministerio de Gobierno, 1942.

⁶² Diario, Vol. I, No. 15, p. 14.Google Scholar The announcement was somewhat premature, and it must be interpreted as an expression of what the President of the meeting felt was an accomplished fact even if the agreement had not been reduced to legal form. The agreement was actually signed at 2:00 o’clock the following morning.

For the text of the agreement, see Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 28, 1942, Vol. VI, p. 195.Google Scholar

⁶³ At the close of his report, the chairman of the committee, Sr. Turbay, gave a résumé of the work, listing the “fundamental principles” and “postulates” which, when acceptedby the meeting, would become new sources of American international law. Diario, Vol. I,No. 13, p. 10.Google Scholar

⁶⁴ These were the first and fifth items under Section II of the program.

⁶⁵ Reservations were entered to this recommendation by Argentina and by Chile. “The Argentine delegation requests that it be recorded in the minutes, as well as at the end of this draft resolution, that the Argentine Republic agrees with the necessity of adopting economic and financial control measures with regard to all foreign and domestic activities offirms or enterprises which may, in one way or another, affect the welfare of the republics of America or the solidarity or defense of the continent. It has adopted and is prepared to adopt further measures in this respect, in accordance with the present resolution, extending them, however, to firmsor enterprises managed or controlled by aliens or from foreign belligerent countries not in the American continent.” The minutes of the sessions of the Second Committee on Jan. 19 and 20 ( Diario, No. 10, pp. 8, 10 Google Scholar), make it clear that Argentina was seeking to avoid any commitment which would force it to make a distinction between the belligerents.

The Chilean reservation read: “The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile gives his approval to these agreements in so far as they do not conflict with the provisions of the Political Constitution of Chile, declaring further that such agreements will only be valid, with respect to his country, when approved by the National Congress and ratified by its constitutional agencies.” The reservation would appear to be technically superfluous in view of the fact that the “agreement” was only in the form of a recommendation, and referred to measures to be adopted “in a manner consistent with the usual practices and the legislation of the respective countries.” The views of the Chilean delegation were further expressed in the minutes of the subcommittee on Jan. 20. Diario, No. 10, p. 9.Google Scholar

⁶⁶ The point was brought out in the discussions in subcommittee that the definition of “strategic materials” was limited by the United States to those necessary for the prosecution of the war, whereas the other American countries included in the term materials needed for civilian industries. See Diario Vol. I, No. 7, p. 15.Google Scholar

⁶⁷ For the text of the document, see this Journal, Supplement, p. 63.The passage ofthe document from recommendation to resolution was doubtless due to the fact that new powers were being given to the Financial and Economic Advisory Committee.

⁶⁸ The minutes of the discussions in the third subcommittee go into greater detail than those of other subcommittees and give a good indication of the divergent points of view. See Diario Vol. I, No. 10, p. 11 ff.; No. 11, p. 9 ff.Google Scholar Many American States, cut off from their normal imports from Europe, were in a difficult position. The opening address of Under Secretary Welles was quoted at length as indicating the recognition by the United States of “the important rô1e which imported materials and articles play in the maintenance of the economies of your nations,” and that the United States “was making every effort consistent with the defense program to maintain a flow to the other American Republics of materials to satisfy the minimum essential import requirements of your economies” —the further assurance being given that the United States would provide for the “essential civilian needs” of the American States “on the basis of equal and proportionate consideration with our own.”

The American delegate on the subcommittee explained the functions of the Board of Economic Warfare and of the Office of Price Administration. A number of delegates were concerned lest their own needs of raw materials might be overlooked in the satisfaction of the war needs of the United States, for which preferential contracts had been made. The problem of maintaining a parity between the prices of exported raw materials and of imported finished goods was discussed at length. Different standards of living had to be taken into account; and countries exporting raw materials were naturally desirous of obtaining prices which would put them in a more favorable positionas buyers of consumers’ goods. If the resolution was evasive on a number of points, it was so of necessity.

⁶⁹ The resolution closes with the recommendation that the Inter-American Financial and Economic Advisory Committee and the Inter-American Maritime Technical Commission “examine the desirability of applying the 'cash and carry system' to the transportation of commodities.” But no light is thrown upon the matter in the reported discussions of the subcommittee. The Peruvian project (No. 71) recommended “that the desirability be examined of applying the system of insurance and freight for the account of the purchaser for products which may be seriously affected by the shortage and disorganization of maritime transportation.” But that is far from the “cash and carry system.”

⁷⁰ This was but another way of giving a somewhat broader interpretation of the program, which, according to the regulations, could not be enlarged without first obtaining unanimous consent. Diario Vol. I, No. 4, p. 2.Google Scholar

⁷¹ The United States entered a reservation to this resolution, as well as to Resolution XIV on Commercial Facilities for the Inland Countries of the Americas, as follows:

“The Government of the United States of America desires to have recorded in the Final Act its reservation to Resolution VII (Development of Commercial Interchange) and Resolution XIV (Commercial Facilities for the Inland Countries of the Americas), since the terms of these resolutions are inconsistent with the traditional policy of liberal principles of international trade maintained by the United States of America and as enunciated and reaffirmed at the recent International Conferences of American States and the First and Second Meetings of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics.”

The discussions in subcommittee (Diario No. 9, p. 15 Google ScholarPubMed) indicate an interesting difference of opinion between delegations, such as that of El Salvador, seeking to develop a more highly integrated system of inter-American commerce, and those, designated as “internationalists” by the Brazilian delegate, who looked to the restoration of normal world trade afterthe war.

⁷² The “inland” countries appear as “paises mediterraneos” in Spanish, “paises centrais” in Portuguese. Emphasis was put upon their geographical situation as entitling them to special privileges which could not readily be extended to other countries. The United States delegate voted against the proposal in subcommittee ( Diario No. 11, p. 21 Google ScholarPubMed); and a formal reservation was entered in the Final Act. See above, note 71. Apparently the position taken was that, while war-time agreements of a restrictive character might be made, the general principle of most-favored-nation treatment must be maintained in postwar commerce.

⁷³ The preamble of the recommendation recites the advantages of “ a more effective mobilization and utilization of foreign exchange resources,” and the fact that the American Republics “which are combined in a common effort to maintain their political and economic independence can coöperate in the creation of an organization to promote stability of foreign exchange rates, encourage the international movement of productive capital, facilitate the reduction of artificial and discriminatory barriers to the movement of goods, assist in the correction of the maldistribution of gold, strengthen monetary systems, and facilitate the maintenance of monetary policies that avoid serious inflation or deflation.”

The Venezuelan assessor pointed out that the larger part of the functions of the proposed stabilization fund had already been attributed to the Inter-American Bank. The fact that the bank was not yet functioning led to the adoption of a recommendation (X) calling upon the governments which had not already adhered to the Convention for the Establishment of an Inter-American Bank to come to a decision as soon as possible.

⁷⁴ Notable advances in inter-American legal as well as economic relationships may develop if that part of the recommendation which requests the various governments to adopt the measures necessary to facilitate the “protection” as well as the flow of such investments should be put into effect. Thus far little progress has been made in the codification of the law of foreign investments.

⁷⁵ The objections to the assumption of rigid obligations in respect to the manufacture of synthetic products were pointed out by one of the Brazilian assessors, who stated that the position taken by Brazil was the same as that taken by the delegate of the United States. Diario No. 9, p. 16.Google ScholarPubMed

⁷⁶ The distribution of the projects was not completed until the fourth day, and it was expected that the committees would complete their work by the ninth day, in advance of which the subcommittees had to present their reports.

⁷⁷ Illustrations of the effect of the pressure of time may be found in the decisions taken on the Atlantic Charter, the status of non-belligerency, and relations with the governments of occupied countries.

⁷⁸ The projects which were adopted practically without change by the subcommittees were not necessarily those which were intrinsically better in substance or in form, but rather those which dealt with a single topic of a non-controversial character.

The project presented by El Salvador (No. 6) calling for the coordination of the resolutions, declarations and other acts of previous consultative meetings, which was forwarded to the Juridical Committee for study, should do much to correct the present confusion.

⁷⁹ Resolution XXXIV, entitled “Regulations of the Meetings of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics” proposes amendments on minor points only.

⁸⁰ While the subcommittee meetings were confidential, their discussions appear in the Diario in more or less abridged form. Unfortunately, the abridged form gives at times an inadequate impression of the position taken by a particular delegate.

⁸¹ The sessions of the committees are reported in full in the Diario as well as theplenary sessions of the meeting itself.

⁸² The history of recent meetings and conferences shows clearly that the smaller States—the stars of lesser magnitude in what the Mexican delegate called the continental firmament, have no desire to press the principle of equality to the point of overlooking the practical realities of the political and economic situation before them. But they regard the principle itself as sacred; and the procedure of free consent should be strictly observed.

⁸³ Plans for remodeling the formal conferences and for creating a closer union of the American Republics have had considerable support of recent years. At the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace, held at Buenos Aires in 1936, the delegations of Colombia and the Dominican Republic had introduced a project on the Creation of a League of American Nations. The project was referred (Resolution X) to the Lima Conference of 1938, where, upon a statement that the two delegations “preferred to wait until sentiment had more definitely crystallized,” the project was referred to the consideration of the International Conference of American Jurists, whose report was to be considered at the Ninth International Conference, to be held at Bogota in 1943.

⁸⁴ Compare the attitude of the United States at the Conference at Buenos Aires in 1936, when the principle of equal treatment of belligerents, in accordance with its domestic neutrality legislation of that year, was proposed. In signing the Convention to Coordinate, Extend and Assure the Fulfillment of the Existing Treaties between the American States, Argentina and Paraguay, and particularly Colombia, entered reservations permitting themto make a distinction between an aggressor State and the State attacked. “The Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace,” this journal , Vol. 31 (1937), p. 201.Google ScholarPubMed

⁸⁵ In his address at the opening session, Under Secretary Welles referred to the American nations as “Trustees for Christian civilization” and spoke of the part they must play in the post-war world:

“When peace is restored it is to the interest of the whole world that the American Republics present a united front and be able to speak and act with the moral authority to which, by reason of their own enlightened standards, as much as by reason of their number and their power, they are entitled.”

⁸⁶ At the plenary session of Jan. 27 the Argentine Minister put chief emphasis upon economic solidarity, observing that “close coördination of economic interests is thefirmest basis of the good neighbor policy.” It is to be hoped, however, that his further observations to the effect that “only the economic solutions are fundamental” are not to be takentoo literally. Diario No. 13, p. 6.Google Scholar

⁸⁷ In the Resolution (XXV) on “Economic and Financial Coöperation,” adopted at the Meeting of Foreign Ministers at Havana in 1940, it is declared:

“(a) That the American nations continue to adhere to the liberal principles of international trade, conducted with peaceful motives and based upon equality of treatment and fair and equitable practices;

“(b) That it is the purpose of the American nations to apply these principles in their relations with each other as fully as present circumstances permit;

“(c) That the American nations should be prepared to resume the conduct of trade with the entire world in accordance with these principles as soon as the non-American nations are prepared to do likewise; . . .”