The use of Arab oil as an instrument of pressure for the revival of dormant efforts to restore peace in the Middle East was already a popular demand in many Arab countries before the outbreak of Arab-Israeli hostilities in October 1973. The political argument was simple. Production of oil beyond certain limits did not make economic sense for many Arab countries. Their depleting crude was increasingly converted into depreciating dollars and pounds yielding in fact a lower economic return than that achieved by simply keeping it in the ground. Worse still, this conversion was taking place in countries with few alternative resources and with a rather limited absorption capacity for the generated funds. Unchecked production was thus an economic sacrifice that could only be interpreted as a political favor to the consuming countries. Instead of responding positively to such a favor, the United States and most of its Western allies continued to ignore the vital interests of the Arab states. In particular, they either acquiesced in or actually encouraged the continuation of Israel's territorial expansion at the expense of its neighboring Arab states,1 and of its refusal to implement the United Nations resolutions on the rights of the Arab Palestinian people

The object of this article is to examine the role of insurance in international claims,and in particular the relationship of subrogation to the traditional rules of diplomatic protection and nationality of claims. Among the questions to be examined is that of locus standi of insurers in international claims (meaning in this context the standing of a state to present a claim of an insurer to an international tribunal, or to espouse it through diplomatic channels), the nationality of the insurers in relation to that of the insured, and the effect upon an international claim of payment by insurers possessing the nationality of State A to victims of an international wrong possessing the nationality of either State A or of State B. Can State C, which has caused the injury in circumstances involving its international responsibility towards State B, invoke the performance of the insurance contracts, in accordance with which the payments have been made, to deny its responsibility on the ground that the rules of nationality of claims have not been respected? If the insurers have covered the damage suffered in part only, would the quantum of the claim be affected&

Time is a fundamental component of all social organization. Any component may be manipulated to achieve preferred outcomes, but time is particularly malleable. The concept of linear time, which allows complex sequential and conditional planning and deferred allocation of resources, is a critical part of Western political theory, for it facilitatesthe extension of present control far into the future. A peculiar genius of the law has been the elaboration of this linearism and the manipulation and supervision of different phases of future activity. Manipulation of time ia mundane legal activities has a utility per se in that it permits order and eflBciency in the complex, adversarial, but necessarily collaborative operations of groups and individuals. It is also a prerequisite to the realization of many other procedural privileges; without “enough” time, the privileges may be meaningless and even tavinting.

The questions which will be examined in this paper relate to the provisions of Articles 11 to 15, contained in Part II, Section I ( “Conclusion of Treaties” ) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. These articles deal with “the means of expressing consent to be bound by a treaty” (as enumerated in Art. 11): signature (Art. 12), exchange of instruments constituting a treaty (Art. 13), ratification, acceptance, or approval (Art. 14) and accession (Art. 15).

[Ed. Note: Since World War II the administration of international monetary, financial, and commodity agreements has been performed by institutions operating on weighted voting principles, the weight dependent largely on the stake of various countries in the assetsdisposed of through the agreement. There is much discussion now concerning the adoption of such a system for the trade field, perhaps through amendment of the GATT, or in codesof trade liberalization among developed countries. Mr. Gold's article, relating the limitations and problems attendant upon the operation of the weighted voting system in the International Monetary Ftmd, is therefore particularly timely. Stanley D. Metzger.]