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Lawyers, Organized Interests, and the Law of Obscenity: Agenda Setting in the Supreme Court

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 September 2013

Kevin T. McGuire
Affiliation:
University of Minnesota
Gregory A. Caldeira
Affiliation:
Ohio State University

Abstract

Each year thousands of cases and litigants come to the Supreme Court. How can the Court find the most important cases to decide? The law of obscenity illustrates particularly well the Court's problem as it constructs its plenary agenda. Using data drawn from petitions for certiorari and jurisdictional statements filed with the Supreme Court from 1955 to 1987, we formulate and test a model of case selection in which professional obscenity lawyers and organized interests figure as critical elements in the process of agenda building. We also encounter strong evidence of the Court's differential treatment of several different litigants. Moreover, the calculus of selection changed markedly over time, as the Court itself changed; the Burger Court and Warren Court weighed several of the criteria quite differently.

Type
Research Note
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1993

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