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The Legal Status of American Political Parties, I

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 September 2013

Joseph R. Starr
Joseph R. Starr
Affiliation:
University of Minnesota
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Extract

The legal status of political parties in the United States is far from being clearly defined. On the one hand, we do not have a mass of legislation and court decisions clearly constituting the political party as a branch of the government, as in the leading fascist countries of Europe; and, on the other hand, we do not have a situation similar to that of Great Britain or France, where political parties are practically unregulated except for laws designed to control subversive groups. To gain a concept of the legal position of American political parties, a great deal of legislation which differs widely in many particulars among the forty-eight states must be surveyed, and certain categories of common and public law must be explored. Even when the many branches of the law that seem to impinge upon the subject have been brought into view, the legal position of our political parties still seems elusive and indefinite. Yet the subject is one of considerable practical importance, since the near future is likely to bring insistent demands for new and more drastic regulation of political parties. A consideration of the rights of American political parties, and the scope of the powers of the legislature to interfere with parties in the public interest, therefore seems appropriate at the present time.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 34 , Issue 3 , June 1940 , pp. 439 - 455
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1940

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References

1 See Steiner, H. A., “The Constitutional Position of the Partito Nazionale Fascista,” in this Review, Vol. 31, pp. 227–242 (April, 1937)Google Scholar, and A. B. Boerner, “The Position of the NSDAP in the German Constitutional Order,” ibid., Vol. 32, pp. 1059–1081 (December, 1938).

2 See K. Loewenstein, “Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights,” ibid., Vol. 31, pp. 417–432, 638–658 (June, August, 1937).

3 Constitution of the United States of America, Art. I, Sec. 2; cf. Willoughby, W. W. and Rogers, L., Introduction to the Problem of Government (New York, 1921), pp. 132, 145–148.Google Scholar

4 On the early distrust of political parties, see McLaughlin, A. C., The Courts, the Constitution, and Parties (Chicago, 1912), pp. 112–113, 116, 152–153.Google Scholar

5 See remarks on this habit of constitution-makers in Munro, W. B., The Governments of Europe (1st ed., New York, 1925), p. 648.Google Scholar There are, of course, excellent arguments against the establishment of political parties on a constitutional basis, a good statement of which may be found in MacDonald, W., A New Constitution for a New America (New York, 1921), pp. 140–141.Google Scholar

6 Article 124 of the constitution of the German Republic, adopted August 11, 1919, came about as close to an open recognition of political parties as any democratic constitution. The constitution of the Soviet Union, adopted on December 5, 1936, is unique in that it establishes the Communist party in a privileged position. In Articles 126 and 141, it states that the Communist party is “the vanguard of the workers in their struggle to strengthen and develop the Socialist system” and “the leading nucleus of all organizations of the workers,” and it grants the right to nominate candidates to only one political party—the Communist.

7 Alabama, California, Georgia, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Virginia, and Utah.

8 Constitution of Delaware (1897), Art. V, Sec. 7.

9 Constitution of Maryland (amendment adopted 1936), Art. III, Sec. 13.

10 Constitution of New York (1938), Art. II, Sec. 8.

11 Constitution of Louisiana (1921), Art. VIII, Sec. 4.

12 Constitution of Oklahoma (1907), Art. VII, Sec. 3.

13 Constitutions of: California (amendment adopted 1900), Art. II, Sec. 2½; Louisiana (1921), Art. VIII, Sec. 4; Mississippi (1890), Art. XII, Sec. 247; Ohio (amendment adopted 1912), Art. V, Sec. 7, which also relates to the presidential preference primary; Oklahoma (1907), Art. III, Sec. 5; South Carolina (1895), Art. II, Sec. 10.

14 Constitution of California (amendment adopted 1900), Art. II, Sec. 2½.

15 Ibid.

16 Constitution of Oregon (amendment adopted 1908), Art. II, Sec. 16. It appears that no legislation was ever passed to implement this provision.

17 Constitution of New York (1938), Art. XIII, Sec. 1.

18 Constitutions of: New Mexico (1911), Art. VII, Sec. 1; New York (1938), Art. II, Sec. 8; Oklahoma (1907), Art. III, Sec. 4; Pennsylvania (1873), Art. VIII, Sec. 16; Virginia (1902), Art. II, Sec. 31.

19 Constitutions of: New Mexico (1911), Art. VII, Sec. 1; New York (1938), Art. II, Sec. 8. While commonly nominated by party committees, the members of registration boards (and, we may presume, the members of election boards also) are state officers, and not the agents of the political parties or the municipality. See Board of Registration Commissioners v. Campbell (1933), 251 Ky. 597, 65 S.W. (2nd) 713.

20 Constitutions of: Alabama (1901), Art. VIII, Sec. 183; Georgia (1877), Art. II, Sec. 1, Paragraph 8; Louisiana (1921), Art. VIII, Sec. 4.

21 Constitution of Louisiana (1921), Art. VIII, Sec. 4.

22 Constitutions of: Maryland (amendment adopted 1936), Art. III, Sec. 13; Nevada (1922), Art. IV, Sec. 63.

23 Constitution of Louisiana (1921), Art. VIII, Sec. 15.

24 Constitution of Nebraska (amendment adopted 1934), Art. III, Sec. 7.

25 Constitution of Utah (1895), Art. XI, Sec. 5.

26 Constitution of Louisiana (amendment adopted 1934), Art. VIII, Sec. 15.

27 Ex parte Wilson (1912), 7 Okla. Crim. Rep. 610, at p. 620, 125 Pac. 739, at p. 744.

28 This contrast between Anglo-Saxon and Continental law seems plainer to the English authorities than to the American. See Smith, H. A., The Law of Associations, Corporate and Unincorporate (Oxford, 1914), p. 1Google Scholar; Jenks, E., The Book of English Law (Boston and New York, 1929), pp. 180–181.Google Scholar Associations, other than corporations, do not as a rule depend upon statutory provisions, but are formed by the voluntary association of individuals under the common-law right of contract. See 5 Corp. Jur. 1335–1336.

29 “It must now be considered as well settled that persons have a right to enter into such [i.e., benevolent and social] associations, and to bind themselves as to their membership and rights in such societies, and the funds of the same, by the constitution and by-laws of the association which they adopt, or subscribe to after adoption.” Brown v. Stoerkel and Gregory (1889), 74 Mich. 269, at p. 276, 41 N.W. 921, at p. 923.

30 See the dissenting opinion of Davis, J., in People ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman (1925), 213 N. Y. App. 414, at p. 424 seq. A state legislature may, however, apply to associations having an oath-bound membership such reasonable regulations as are calculated to confine their activities within limits which are consistent with the rights of others and the public welfare. See Same v. Same (1928), 278 U. S. 63. Secret political organizations are illegal in North Carolina. See constitution of North Carolina (1868), Art. I, Sec. 25, and Code (Michie), 1935, Sec. 4180.

31 American history contains such well-known examples as the Know-Nothing party, the Ku Klux Klan, and the Molly Maguires. Since 1933, an organization known as the United Units, which was at first a secret organization, has played a large part in the local politics of the Iron Range area of Minnesota.

32 Bell v. Hill (1934), 123 Tex. 531, 74 S.W. (2nd) 113. The holding of political conventions comes under the right of public meeting. In Britton v. Board of Election Commissioners of San Francisco (1900), 129 Cal. 337, at p. 342, 61 Pac. 1115, at p. 1117, the court said: “Political conventions are, after all, but public assemblages of the people, having for their end the discussion of ways and means for the public good.”

33 Riter v. Douglas (1910), 32 Nev. 400, 109 Pac. 444.

34 State ex rel. McGrael v. Phelps (1910), 144 Wis. 1, at pp. 5, 33, 128 N. W. 1041, at p. 1054. See also Ex parte Wilson (1912), 7 Okla. Crim. Rep. 610, 125 Pac. 739.

35 Riter v. Douglas (1910), 32 Nev. 400, 109 Pac. 444.

36 In Britton v. Board of Election Commissioners of San Francisco (1900), 129 Cal. 337, at p. 344, 61 Pac. 1115, at p. 1117, it was said: “No expression is needed in the declaration of rights to the effect that electors holding certain political principles in common may freely assemble, organize themselves into a political party and use all legitimate means to carry their principles of government into active operation through the suffrages of their fellows. It is inherent in the very form and substance of our government, and needs no expression in its constitution.” See also Phelps v. Piper (1896), 48 Neb. 724, 67 N.W. 755; Davidson v. Hanson (1902), 87 Minn. 211, 91 N.W. 1124; State ex rel. Punch v. Kortjohn (1912), 246 Mo. 34, 150 S.W. 1060; State ex rel. Mills v. Stewart (1922), 64 Mont. 453; Sarlis v. State ex rel. Trimble (1929), 201 Ind. 88, 166 N.E. 270; Craig v. Bond (1932), 160 Okla. 34, 15 Pac. (2nd) 1014.

37 Britton v. Board of Election Commissioners of San Francisco (1900), 129 Cal. 337, 61 Pac. 1115; Davidson v. Hanson (1902), 87 Minn. 211, 91 N. W. 1124; State ex rel. Punch v. Kortjohn (1912), 246 Mo. 34, 150 S.W. 1060; Ex parte Wilson (1912), 7 Okla. Crim. Rep. 610, 125 Pac. 739; State ex rel. Mills v. Stewart (1922), 64 Mont. 453; Sarlis v. State ex rel. Trimble (1929), 210 Ind. 88, 166 N.E. 270; Craig v. Bond (1932), 160 Okla. 34, 15 Pac. (2nd) 1014; Bell v. Hill (1934), 123 Tex. 531, 74 S.W. (2nd) 113; State ex rel. Ekem v. Dammann (1934), 215 Wis. 394, 254 N.W. 759.

38 See infra.

39 See Lipsig, J., Sedition, Criminal Syndicalism, Criminal Anarchy Laws (New York, American Civil Liberties Union, 1937), p. 5.Google Scholar

40 Britton v. Board of Election Commissioners of San Francisco (1900), 129 Cal. 337, 61 Pac. 1115.

41 Hopper v. Stack (1903), 69 N. J. L. 562, 56 A. 1; Riter v. Douglas (1910), 32 Nev. 400, 109 Pac. 444.

42 Sarlls v. State ex rel. Trimble (1929), 201 Ind. 88, 166 N.E. 270.

43 Schafer v. Whipple (1898), 25 Colo. 400, 55 Pac. 180; Davidson v. Hanson (1902), 87 Minn. 211, 91 N.W. 1124; State ex rel. Ekern v. Dammann (1934), 215 Wis. 394, 254 N.W. 749.

44 “The primary law, from first to last, teems with recognition of political parties….” Riter v. Douglas (1910), 32 Nev. 400, at p. 418; 109 Pac. 444, at p. 449. The statutory recognition began with the adoption of the Australian ballot laws in 1888 and after. See Ostrogorski, M., Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties (New York, 1922; first pub. 1902), Vol. 2, p. 507Google Scholar; Merriam, C. E. and Overacker, Louise, Primary Elections (Chicago, 1928), p. 24.Google Scholar

45 State ex rel. McCarthy v. Moore (1902), 87 Minn. 308, 92 N.W. 4; Hopper v. Stack (1903), 69 N. J. L. 562, 56 A. 1; State ex rel. Nebraska State Central Committee v. Wait (1912), 92 Neb. 313, 138 N.W. 159.

46 Morrow v. Wipf (1908), 22 S.D. 146, at p. 158; 115 N.W. 1121, at p. 1126.

47 Riter v. Douglas (1910), 32 Nev. 400, 109 Pac. 444; People ex rel. Kelly v. Kramer (1928), 328 111. 512, 160 N.E. 60; People ex rel. Linstrand v. Emerson (1929), 333 111. 606, 165 N.E. 217.

48 Morrow v. Wipf (1908), 22 S.D. 146, 115 N.W. 1121; Beene v. Waples (1916), 108 Tex. 140, 187 S.W. 191; Ferguson v. Montgomery (1921), 148 Ark. 83, 231 S.W. 30.

49 Brown v. Costen (1918), 176 N.C. 63, 96 S.E. 659; Love v. Taylor (Texas Court of Civil Appeals, 1928), 8 S.W. (2nd) 795.

50 Merriam and Overacker, op. cit., p. 35.

51 State ex rel. Kimbrell v. Becker (1922), 291 Mo. 409, 237 S.W. 117; Dastugue v. Cohen (1930), 14 La. App. 475, 131 So. 746.

52 People ex rel. Kelley v. Kramer (1928), 328 111. 512, 160 N.E. 60.

53 State ex rel. Kimbrell v. Becker (1922), 291 Mo. 409, 237 S.W. 117.

54 McKane v. Adams (1890), 123 N. Y. 609, 25 N.E. 1057; Raines v. Stone (1919), 112 S. C. 147, 99 S.E. 353.

55 People ex rel. Coffey v. Democratic General Committee of King's County (1900), 52 N.Y. App. 170, 65 N.Y. Supp. 57; (1900), 164 N.Y. 347, 58 N.E. 124.

56 Francis v. Sturgill (1915), 163 Ky. 650, 174 S.W. 7539.

57 Coovert v. Olcott (1916), 81 Ore. 415, 159 Pac. 974; Gilmore v. Waples et al. (1916), 108 Tex. 167, 188 S.W. 1037.

58 Macdonald v. Lyon (Texas Court of Civil Appeals, 1906), 95 S.W. 67.

59 People ex rel. Garvey v. Democratic General Committee of New York County (1903), 39 N.Y. Misc. 724, 81 N.Y. Supp. 784.

60 Phelps v. Piper (1896), 48 Neb. 724, 67 N.W. 755; Davis v. Hambrick (1900), 109 Ky. 276, 58 S.W. 779; People ex rel. Coffey v. Democratic General Committee of King's County (1900), 52 N.Y. App. 170, 65 N.Y. Supp. 57; Ex parte Wilson (1912), 7 Okla. Crim. Rep. 610, 125 Pac. 739; State ex rel. Mills v. Stewart (1922), 64 Mont. 453.

61 Beene v. Waples (1916), 108 Tex. 140, 187 S.W. 191; State ex rel. Smith v. County Court (1916), 78 W.Va. 168, 88 S.E. 662.

62 Merriam and Overacker, op. cit., pp. 19–20.

63 See as examples: Ladd v. Holmes (1901), 40 Ore. 167, 66 Pac. 14; Morrow v. Wipf (1908), 22 S.D. 146, 115 N.W. 1121; State ex rel. Webber v. Felton (1908), 77 Ohio St. 554, 84 N.E. 85; Socialist Party v. Uhl (1909), 155 Cal. 776, 103 Pac. 181; Supper v. Stauss (1909), 39 Pa. Super. Ct. 388; Riter v. Douglas (1910), 32 Nev. 400, 109 Pac. 444; Ex parte Wilson (1912), 7 Okla. Crim. Rep. 610, 125 Pac. 739; Baer v. Gore (1916), 79 W.Va. 50, 90 S.E. 530; Kelso v. Cook (1916), 184 Ind. 173, 110 N.E. 987; Brown v. Costen (1918), 176 N.C. 63, 96 S.E. 659.

64 State ex rel. Smith and Mellott v. Beggs (1928), 126 Kan. 811, 271 Pac. 400; In re Newkirk (1931), N.Y. Misc. 765, 259 N.Y. Supp. 434; Brekhus v. Steele, (1932) 59 S.D. 638, 242 N.W. 353.

65 State ex rel. Smith and Mellott v. Beggs (1928), 126 Kan. 811, 271 Pac. 400.

66 Ferguson v. Montgomery (1921), 148 Ark. 83, 231 S.W. 30; McLain v. Fish (1923), 159 Ark. 199.

67 It appears that the courts have not been called upon frequently to rule upon the question of what is the supreme authority of a political party within a state, but the weight of opinion is in favor of saying that it is the state convention. See to that effect: State ex rel. Buttz v. Lindahl (1903), 11 N.D. 320, 91 N.W. 950; State ex rel. Mills v. Stewart (1922), 64 Mont. 453. In Nixon v. Condon (1932), 286 U.S. 73, it was held that the state central committee is not the supreme authority, and in Grovey v. Townsend (1935), 295 U.S. 45, it is implied that the state convention is the supreme authority. In State ex rel. Cook v. Hauser (1904), 122 Wis. 534, 100 N.W. 964, it was held that the supreme authority within the state party is not the national convention, while in State ex rel. Nebraska Republican State Central Committee v. Wait (1912), 92 Neb. 313, 138 N.W. 159, it was held that the supreme authority within the state is the national convention or the national committee.

68 Dupre v. St. Jacques (1931), 51 R.I. 189, 163 A. 240.

69 Gilmore v. Waples et al. (1916), 108 Tex. 167, 188 S.W. 1037; Morris v. Mims (Texas Court of Civil Appeals, 1920), 224 S.W. 587.

70 Beene v. Waples (1916), 108 Tex 140 187 S.W. 191.

71 State ex rel. Reibold v. Duncan (1918), 55 Mont. 380, 177 Pac. 250; State ex rel. Burtness v. Hall (1917), 37 N.D. 259, 163 N.W. 1055; People ex rel. Stewart v. Crowe (1922), 226 Ill. App. 454; Clary v. Humphrey (1925), 124 N.Y. Misc. 529, 208 N.Y. Supp. 607.

72 Coovert v. Olcott (1916), 81 Ore. 415, 159‖Pac. 974; Gilmore v. Waples et al. (1916), 108 Tex. 167, 188 S.W. 1037.

73 Morrissey v. Wait (1912), 92 Neb. 271, 138 N.W. 186; State ex rel. Punch v. Kortjohn (1912), 246 Mo. 34, 150 S.W. 1060; Morris v. Mims (Texas Civil Court of Appeals, 1920), 224 S.W. 587; State ex rel. Mills v. Stewart (1922), 64 Mont. 453. See contra, but a five to four decision: Craig v. Bond (1932), 160 Okla. 34, 15 Pac. (2nd) 1014.

74 The numerical element in the definitions were as follows before the 1939 output of legislation became available: Alabama, 20%; Arizona, 5%; Arkansas, none; California, 3%; Colorado, 10%; Connecticut, .5%; Delaware, 10%; Florida, 15%; Georgia, none; Idaho, 10%; Illinois, 5%; Indiana, 10%; Iowa, 2%; Kansas, none; Kentucky, 20%; Louisiana, 5%; Maine, 1%; Maryland, 10%; Massachusetts, 3%; Michigan, 2%; Minnesota, 5%, with some votes in each county; Mississippi, none; Missouri, 3%; Montana, 3%; Nebraska, 5%; Nevada, 5%; New Hampshire, 3%; New Jersey, 10%; New Mexico, none; New York, 50,000; North Carolina, 3%; North Dakota, 5%; Ohio, 10%; Oklahoma, 5%; Oregon, 20%; Pennsylvania, 2%, with not less than 2% in at least 10 counties; Rhode Island, 2%; South Carolina, none; South Dakota, 10%; Tennessee, 10%; Texas, 100,000; Utah, 2%; Vermont, 5%; Virginia, one fourth of the total vote; Washington, 10%; West Virginia, 10%; Wisconsin, 1%; Wyoming, 10%.

75 Arizona Rev. Code (Struckmeyer), 1928, Sec. 1278.Google Scholar

76 California Gen. Laws (Deering), 1937, Act 2256, Sec. 1 (b), (c).Google Scholar

77 Nebraska Comp. Stat, 1929Google Scholar, Secs. 1135, 1136, 1137.

78 Nevada Comp. Laws (Hillyer), 1929Google Scholar, Secs. 2404 (g), 2405 (2).

79 Ohio Gen. Code (Page), 1938Google Scholar, Sec. 4785–61, and 1932 A. G. Opns. No. 4587.

80 South Dakota Comp. Laws., 1929Google Scholar, Sec. 7096 (A).

81 Wisconsin Stat., 1937, Sec. 5.05 (6) (e).

82 Except, of course, in South Carolina, which has no Australian ballot, and in any state which prohibits the party designation of candidates on the official ballot. It appears that there is now only one state (Virginia) which has no party designations on its ballots. See Albright, S. D., “General Election Ballots in 1934,” Southwestern Social Science Quarterly, Vol. 16, pp. 85–96 (March, 1936)Google Scholar, reprinted as Research Paper No. 422, Journal Series, University of Arkansas.

83 See in general: Ladd v. Holmes (1901), 40 Ore. 167, 66 Pac. 714; State ex rel. Fitz v. Jensen (1902), 86 Minn. 19, 89 N.W. 1126; State ex rel. Gulden v. Johnson (1902), 87 Minn. 221, 91 N.W. 604, 840; Independence Party Nomination (1904), 208 Pa. 109, 57 A. 344; Matter of Freund (1907), 53 N.Y. Misc. 354, 103 N.Y. Supp. 420; State ex rel. Hagendorf v. Blaisdell (1910), 20 N.D. 622, 127 N.W. 720.

84 Kenneweg v. County Commissioners of Allegany County (1905), 102 Md. 119, 62 A. 249; State ex rel. Webber v. Felton (1908), 77 Ohio St. 554, 84 N.E. 85.

85 State ex rel. Merrill v. Gerow (1920), 79 Fla. 804.

86 State ex rel. Adair v. Drexel (1905), 74 Neb. 776, 105 N.W. 174.

87 State ex rel. Rogers v. Howell (1916), 92 Wash. 381, 59 Pac. 118.