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Lobbyists and the Legislative Process: The Impact of Environmental Constraints*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

John M. Bacheller
John M. Bacheller*
Affiliation:
Kirkland College
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Abstract

In this study of lobbyists' techniques and perceptions of the legislative process, the impact of several aspects of the legislative environment is examined, including group competition and the use of issues by candidates in presidential campaigns. Data from a sample of lobbyists indicates that nonconflictual issues are treated differently by lobbyists and the Congress from issues involving group conflict. Similarly, issues used in presidential campaigns are treated differently from those developed outside them. Finally, group size is shown to be a further influence on lobbyists' techniques in dealing with Congress.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 71 , Issue 1 , March 1977 , pp. 252 - 263
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1977

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Footnotes

*

The author is indebted to Thomas Patterson and Robert deVoursney for their criticisms of the author's doctoral dissertation, from which this article has been adapted. The author is also indebted to Eugene Lewis, David Rosenbloom, Robert Kweit and Jeffrey Ross and two anonymous editorial readers for their criticisms and advice. Financial support was provided by the Syracuse University Department of Political Science and the Huber Foundation through Kirkland College. Computing was done using the facilities of Hamilton and Kirkland Colleges and Cornell University.

References

1 Berman, Daniel, A Bill Becomes A Law (New York: Macmillan, 1962)Google Scholar. See also Eidenburg, Eugene and Morey, Roy D., An Act of Congress (New York: Norton, 1969)Google Scholar. In describing the enactment of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, the authors describe in detail floor action on crucial amendments raised by opponents.

2 Wilson, Woodrow, Congressional Government (New York: World, 1956), pp. 57–98 Google Scholar.

3 Rieselbach, Leroy, Congressional Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973), p. 237 Google Scholar.

4 Fenno, Richard, Congressmen in Committees (Boston: Little-Brown, 1973), p. 237 Google Scholar.

5 Milbrath, Lester, The Washington Lobbyists (Chicago: Rand-McNally, 1963), pp. 209–252, 328–354 Google Scholar.

6 See for example, Lowi, Theodore, “American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies, and Political Theory,” World Politics, 16 (July, 1964), 677–715 CrossRefGoogle Scholar. More recently, Lowi has proposed a refined version of this argument. See Lowi, , “Four Systems of Policy, Politics and Choice,” Public Administration Review, 32 (July/August 1972), 298–310 CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Also see Salisbury, Robert, “The Analysis of Public Policy: A Search for Theories and Roles,” in Political Science and Public Policy, Ranney, Austin, ed. (Chicago: Markham, 1968)Google Scholar.

7 Bauer, Raymond, de Sola Pool, Ithiel and Dexter, Lewis A., American Business and Public Policy (New York: Aldine, 1963), pp. 444–458 Google Scholar.

8 Fenno, , Congressmen in Committees, p. 45 Google Scholar.

9 McConnell, Grant, Private Power and American Democracy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966), pp. 298–335 Google Scholar.

10 McConnell, , Private Power and American Democracy, pp. 196–245, 298–335 Google Scholar; also see Greenstone, J. David, Labor in American Politics (New York: Random House, 1969), pp. 39–89 Google Scholar, and Milbrath, Washington Lobbyists.

11 Schattschneider, E. E. makes essentially the same argument in The Semi-Sovereign People (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960)Google Scholar.

12 The organizational memberships of those who did not respond were similar to those who did.

13 Congressional Record, 91st Congress, Volume 116, pp. H2970–H2991, H7337–H7365, H12432–H12436 Google Scholar.

14 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1970 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1971)Google Scholar.

15 This method of measuring respondents interests could conceivably generate measurement error, since the interests of some lobbyists may fall in more than one category. To investigate the possibility of this sort of error, responses to the question were examined. Eighty-eight per cent of the respondents answering the open ended question answered exclusively with subject areas defined as falling within only one category. Thus, the activities of lobbyists appear to be rather specialized; and the amount of error introduced by this method of measurement should be small.

16 New York Times Index, 1968 (New York: New York Times, 1969)Google Scholar. Statements made by a candidate in response to questions posed by the New York Times were excluded from the tabulation of campaign issues because they were responses to questions from a specific organization rather than attempts to inform the public of his position initiated by the candidate. Thus, they may not represent areas emphasized in the campaign. In addition, because they were initiated by the Times, responses in these areas are particularly unlikely to represent the issues covered by the media nationally.

17 Although questions were asked in the same form in both the interviews and the questionnaire, those from the interviews allowed open ended responses, while those from the questionnaire were closed. Responses from the interviews were coded twice, independently. See Appendix A.

18 Milbrath, Washington Lobbyists, calls these techniques “direct” and “indirect.”

19 See Appendix A for the exact wording of the questions. Responses taken exclusively from the mail questionnaire. Lobbyists were also questioned as to differences between the houses of Congress during the interviews. No significant differences were found in focus of activity or techniques used.

20 Nonmass groups were distinguished from mass groups on the basis of whether the memberships of the groups studied were individuals or organizations.

21 Responses taken exclusively from the mail questionnaire.

22 Of course committee recruitment as well as leadership patterns affect integration, as well. See Fenno, Richard, “The House Appropriations Committee as a Political System,” American Political Science Review, 56 (June, 1962), 310–324 CrossRefGoogle Scholar and idem, “The House of Representatives and Federal Aid to Education,” in New Perspectives on the House of Representatives, ed. Peabody, Robert L. and Polsby, Nelson, 2nd ed. (Chicago: Rand-McNally, 1969), pp.283–323 Google Scholar.

23 Miller, Warren and Stokes, Donald, “Constituency Influence in Congress,” The American Political Science Review, 57 (March, 1963), 45–56 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.