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Monotonicity in Electoral Systems

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

David Austen-Smith  and
Jeffrey Banks
David Austen-Smith
Affiliation:
University of Rochester
Jeffrey Banks
Affiliation:
University of Rochester
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Abstract

Much of the literature concerning the relative merits of alternative electoral rules is centered around the extent to which particular rules select “representative” legislatures. And an important concern in evaluating the “representativeness” of an electoral rule is whether or not the rule responds positively to changes in individuals' preferences, that is, whether or not the rule is monotonic. By explicitly considering electoral rules in the context of a complete electoral system—voting, selection of legislature, and legislative choice of policy—we argue that monotonicity in electoral systems is a nonissue: depending on the behavioral model governing individual decision making, either everything is monotonic or nothing is monotonic.

Type
Research Notes
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 85 , Issue 2 , June 1991 , pp. 531 - 537
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1991

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References

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