² See for example, Burns, James M., Congress on Trial (New York, 1949)Google Scholar and Bailey, Stephen K., Congress Makes a Law (New York, 1950)Google Scholar.

³ “Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System,” Supplement to this Review, Vol. 44 (Sept., 1950)Google Scholar. For a more recent statement of a similar point of view and for a plea for an outright scrapping of the separation of powers in this country in favor of cabinet government as essential to responsible democracy, see McMurray, Howard J., “The Responsible Majority—Some Reflections on Political Parties,” Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 11 (June, 1958), pp. 175–182CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴ For the most part the study was confined to the first decade following the Second World War, although in a few instances materials have been drawn from later years.

⁵ Note that in selecting British government for this study, we are taking the example and type of parliamentary government that should, according to orthodox theory, present the sharpest contrast to the presidential system.

⁶ Between 1938 and 1957 national income in the United Kingdom increased by 266 per cent, while farming net income increased by 461 per cent. On a per capita basis, national income increased approximately 237 per cent, while farming net income went up by 475 per cent (for persons engaged in agriculture). In the United States, contrasting 1957 with the 1935–39 average, the total net income of the farm population from farming sources increased by 141 per cent (150 per cent from all sources), and their per capita income from farm sources rose by 215 per cent (from all sources 285 per cent), while the personal income of all persons was increasing by 285 per cent, on a per capita basis. In other words, in the United States, the average income from farming failed to keep pace with that of the rest of the population, while in the United Kingdom the farm population advanced at about double the rate of the country as a whole. (Calculations are based on figures from the Annual Abstract of Statistics [1958] and the “Annual Review and Determination of Guarantees, 1958” [Cmnd. 390], for the United Kingdom; and, for the United States, from The Farm Income Situation, No. 169, July, 1958Google Scholar, United States Department of Agriculture, and the Economic Report of the President, January, 1962.)Google Scholar

⁷ They reason (1) that stockpiling can probably meet the challenge of a blockade, especially in view of the probability that a major war in the future will not be extended over many years, and (2) that in any case continuing dependence on foreign sources for food supplies is the best means of assuring the maintenance of a large merchant marine, which in the past has proved invaluable in the event of attempted blockade.

⁸ My justification for this statement is partly that government economists themselves, in private conversation, lay little stress on this argument and freely admit that subsidies should be lowered; and partly it is that economists generally, even agricultural economists, are divided on the validity of the argument, with the weight of opinion perhaps on the side of doubting it. Austin Robinson has argued the case for subsidies to save foreign exchange; see “The Problem of Living Within Our Foreign Exchange,” The Three Banks Review, March, 1954, pp. 3–19Google Scholar. Other economists have disputed his interpretation and contend that, if anything, the balance of payments argument calls for limitation of agricultural subsidies; see Healey, Derek T., “Increased Agriculture or Increased Exports?,” Westminster Bank Review, May, 1955, pp. 10–12Google Scholar, and Colin Clark, “Britain's Dependence Upon Agricultural Imports,” loc. cit., November, 1956 pp. 9–11.

⁹ The difference can easily be exaggerated if we are thinking about the general level of subsidy. Both organizations favored expenditure of government funds for disposal of farm surpluses in a variety of ways. Both favored price supports. The Farmers Union favored continuation of rigid supports at 90 per cent of parity for “basic” commodities. The Farm Bureau favored supports on a sliding scale, depending upon the supply situation. The Farm Bureau program, a modification of which was enacted in 1954, almost certainly involved a somewhat lower subsidy rate than would have been entailed by the Farmers Union program. On the other hand, in view of falling commodity prices, the Farm Bureau shortly after this date supported the “Soil Bank” program, which was enacted and which involved a much greater subsidy than any possible saving that might have been brought about by the lower support rates.

¹⁰ Until about 1953–54 the Government bought all farm products at fixed prices. Although these prices were much above the level charged for the food (the Government paying the difference), it is possible that no subsidy would have been needed during this period of food shortage had prices been allowed to find their own level. In other words, it might be argued that the subsidies during this period were really consumer subsidies, redistributing the available food among consumers rather than income among producers. For our purposes, then, the elections of 1955 and 1959 are of greatest significance, for by that time free market conditions prevailed and farmers depended heavily upon direct subsidy.

¹¹ Evans, a Labour M.P., was forced to resign as Parliamentary Secretary for the Ministry of Food for persisting in this kind of criticism, including such charges as that the taxpayers had had to pay £12 million during the last year for the production of surplus potatoes. Parliamentary Debates (Commons), Vol. 475, col. 1042. The promptness with which the Government called for Evans' resignation and publicly disavowed his views made it clear that they had no intention of being tagged as favoring any diminution of agricultural support.

¹² Farmer and Stock-Breeder, Vol. 67, p. 57, April 14–15, 1953Google Scholar. And see The Times, April 4, 1953, p. 3Google Scholar, col. a.

¹³ Farmers Weekly, April 30, 1954, p. 42Google Scholar.

¹⁴ Butler, D. E. and Rose, Richard, The British General Election of 1959 (London, 1960), pp. 260 and 275Google Scholar.

¹⁵ This does not mean he would necessarily elect to use it. To vote his convictions on price supports might mean going contrary to his beliefs on other matters which he deemed more important.

¹⁶ However, the writer was present in Westminster one day when a delegation of lobbyists for higher old age pensions called a large number of M.P.s, one by one, from the floor of the House, asked their position on the question and, if the reply was not fully satisfactory, informed them that canvassers would cover their constituencies informing the voters of their weakness on this matter. There is evidence to suggest that this kind of pressure was not without effect.

^16a Hatschek, Julius, Englisehes Staatsrecht, Vol. II (1905), pp. 8 ffGoogle Scholar. Hatschek's law is described and discussed in Carl J. Friedrich, Constitutional Government and Democracy, revised edition (Boston, 1950), p. 417.

¹⁷ In an editorial entitled “The Electoral Auction,” the London Economist bemoaned the fact that “election manifestoes have been corrupted into expensive shrimping nets for farmers', pensioners', tenants', cotton workers', shipbuilders', shipworkers', and cinema interests' votes ….” The Economist, September 26, 1959, p. 998Google Scholar.

¹⁸ Farmer's Weekly, December 18, 1953, p. 26Google Scholar; Parliamentary Debates (Commons), Vol. 521, cols. 2235–2237 and 2251.

¹⁹ For an analysis of the voting on the first of these occasions, the Agricultural Act of 1954, see Pennock, J. Roland, “Party and Constituency in Postwar Agricultural Price-Support Legislation,” Journal of Politics, Vol. 18 (1956), pp. 167–210CrossRefGoogle Scholar, esp. pp. 184–210. The situation was decidedly complicated by the fact that the largest of the farm organizations, the American Farm Bureau Federation, was opposing the “pro-farmer” policy of the Democratic Party. Consequently it is not a clear instance of a “general interest” prevailing over the organized special interest. Of the 47 Democrats who went contrary to their party policy at this time, however, over half were from metropolitan areas. Their defection can hardly be charged to the position of the Farm Bureau. Similarly the 23 Republicans who voted against the position of their Party and of the Farm Bureau were clearly voting for what they considered to be the special interest of their constituencies in high price supports.

²⁰ Agriculture Act, 1947; 10 and 11 Geo. 6, ch. 48. The relevant provision reads, in a passage reminiscent of an American party platform, that powers under the Act shall be used, through the devices of guaranteed prices and assured markets, to promote and maintain “a stable and efficient agricultural industry capable of producing such part of the nation's food and other agricultural produce as in the national interest it is desirable to produce in the United Kingdom, and of producing it at minimum prices consistently with proper remuneration and living conditions for farmers and workers in agriculture and an adequate return on capital invested in the industry.” [Part I, 1, (1)] Full power to carry out the purposes of this Act are vested in the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (now the Ministry of Agriculture, Food, and Fisheries), subject only to being laid before Parliament as an Order, which, theoretically, either House could veto.

²¹ One of the top Government economists dealing with these matters has been quoted as saying that the annual determinations of agricultural subsidy levels are “primarily political” and hardly susceptible of being explained or justified in terms of “statistical measurements.” Private correspondence from J. H. Kirk, quoted in Mollett's, J. Anthony “Britain's Postwar Agricultural Expansion: Some Economic Problems and Relationships Involved,” Journal of Farm Economics, Vol. 41 (1959), pp. 3–15CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at p. 9, note 15.

²² See “Annual Review and Determination of Guarantees, 1955” Cmd. 9406; and The National Farmers Union of England and Wales, “Information Service,” Vol. 10, No. 1, January/February, 1955Google Scholar.

²³ “Resentment on the Farm,” The Economist, Vol. 174, Jan. 29, 1955, p. 345Google Scholar.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Parliamentary Debates (Commons), Vol. 540, col. 1622, May 3, 1955Google Scholar.

²⁶ Ibid., col. 1532.

²⁷ In referring to the “general interest” base of the veto power I do not mean to obscure the fact that the veto may be used in support of special interests. It should be pointed out, too, that the peculiarities of our electoral college system are generally thought to operate in such a way as to favor certain special groups. It is arguable, however, that in a crude fashion, this inequality is offset by the rural orientation of the legislative branch.

²⁸ Computed from official data. See Parliamentary Debates (Commons), Fifth series, Vol. 618, cols. 21–22, Feb. 22, 1960Google Scholar; ibid., Vol. 617, cols. 35–36, Feb. 9, 1960; and ibid., Vol. 634, col. 71, Feb. 8, 1961.

²⁹ During World War II it may be recalled, the entire accumulation of price-supported farm surpluses from the depression years was disposed of at an over-all profit to the Government.

³⁰ It must be emphasized that we are considering the cost of agricultural subsidies to the taxpayer. Much of this sum is expended for Btorage and other costs that do not go to the farmer. Whether the farmers profit more or less than the cost of the program is, fortunately, not a question that need be answered for the purpose of this article. Incidentally, it would be a difficult question to answer for Britain as well, although there most of the costs of the program go directly into the farmers' pockets.

³¹ This calculation includes all farm programs classified by the Department of Agriculture as “primarily for stabilization of farm prices and income” and also the item for Agricultural Conservation Payments. The latter is included to make the total comparable to the figures used for the United Kingdom where so-called “production grants” (e.g., for lime and fertilizer) are used more or less interchangeably with “deficiency payments” and other forms of direct subsidy. Costs of the soil bank “acreage reserve program” are included but, following the practice of the Department of Agriculture, the soil bank “conservation reserve program” is excluded. If the latter were included, the average annual cost figure would be increased by $112.5 million, or about five per cent.

³² It may be that, under exceptional circumstances, some public opinion can be stirred up against a particular program on the basis of its presumed effect in raising prices. The case of butter before Secretary Benson's cut in the support level of dairy products in the spring of 1954 may be a case in point.

³³ This basis of comparison, of course, leaves out of account the fact that per capita income in the United States is far in excess of that in Great Britain; hence the subsidy bears less heavily on the American taxpayer.