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Seniority in Legislatures

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 September 2013

Richard D. McKelvey  and
Raymond Riezman
Richard D. McKelvey
Affiliation:
California Institute of Technology
Raymond Riezman
Affiliation:
University of Iowa
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Abstract

We construct a stochastic model of a legislature with an endogenously determined seniority system. We model the behavior of the legislators as well as their constituents as an infinitely repeated divide-the-dollar game. The game has a stationary equilibrium with the property that the legislature imposes on itself a non-trivial seniority system, and that incumbent legislators are always reelected.

Type
Articles
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 86 , Issue 4 , December 1992 , pp. 951 - 965
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1992

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