¹ MÉGRET, Frederic, “What Sort of Global Justice is ‘International Criminal Justice’?” (2015) 13(1) Journal of International Criminal Justice 77 at 77–8Google Scholar.

² Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998 (entered into force 1 July 2002) [ICCSt], Preamble. The preamble is an integral part of the Statute. Both the preamble and the operative part of the Statute shall be treated equally, and it is “intended to assist in the interpretation and application of the Statute”; TRIFFTERER, Otto and AMBOS, Kai, The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Article-by-Article Commentary, 3rd ed. (Beck, Hart, Nomos, 2015) at 4–6Google Scholar.

³ STAHN, Carsten, “Justice Civilisatrice? The ICC, Post-Colonial Theory, and Faces of ‘the Local’” in Christian DE VOS, Sara KENDALL and Carsten STAHN, eds., Contested Justice: The Politics and Practice of International Criminal Court Interventions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 46Google Scholar at 61, 71–2.

⁴ KOSKENNIEMI, Martti, “Hersch Lauterpacht and the Development of International Criminal Law” (2004) 2(3) Journal of International Criminal Justice 810 at 825Google Scholar; KOSKENNIEMI, Martti, “Constitutionalism as Mindset: Reflections on Kantian Themes About International Law and Globalization” (2007) 8(1) Theoretical Inquiries in Law at 9–36Google Scholar.

⁵ According to the school of realism in international relations, realpolitik means states only pursue their self-interest within the international arena, take no notice of international law, or have recourse to international legal mechanisms only as a veneer for states’ “self-interests”. Therefore, law and moral ideals play no role; at best, they only play a limited part in achieving their international self-interests. This can be embodied in one phrase: “[t]he law of the strong is the determining factor in politic”, BEW, John, Realpolitik: A History (United States of America: Oxford University Press, 2016) at 15Google Scholar, 32. See also BEW, John, “The Real Origins of Realpolitik” (2014) 130 The National Interest 40 at 43–4Google Scholar, 49. In the same sense, politics means: “officials are not really doing law but rather using legal argumentation as a mere mask or pretext as they pursue their political (apologist or utopian) aims” as “deformed legalism”, ROBINSON, Darryl, “Inescapable Dyads: Why the International Criminal Court Cannot Win” (2015) 28 Leiden Journal of International Law 323 at 345Google Scholar.

⁶ MéGRET, supra note 1 at 95. See also NOUWEN, Sarah and WERNER, Wouter, “Doing Justice to the Political: The International Criminal Court in Uganda and Sudan” (2010) 21(4) European Journal of International Law 941Google Scholar, 962–4.

⁷ BOSCO, David, Rough Justice: The International Criminal Court in a World of Power Politics (United States of America: Oxford University Press, 2014) at 167–72Google Scholar.

⁸ Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, SC Res. 1970 (2011), UN Doc S/RES/1970 (2011); ICCSt, supra note 2, Art. 13(b).

⁹ Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, SC Res. 1973 (2011) at 2, UN Doc S/RES/1973 (2011).

¹⁰ Michael CONTARINO, Melinda NEGRÓN-GONZALES, and Kevin MASON, “The International Criminal Court and Consolidation of the Responsibility to Protect as an International Norm” (2012) 4(3) Global Responsibility to Protect 275 at 306.

¹¹ Warrant of Arrest for Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi, (ICC-01/11-01/11-2), Pre-Trial Chamber I, 27 June 2011; Warrant of Arrest for Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, (ICC-01/11-01/11-14), Pre-Trial Chamber I, 27 June 2011; Warrant of Arrest for Abdullah Senussi, (ICC-01/11-01/11-4), Pre-Trial Chamber I, 27 June 2011.

¹² Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, SC Res. 1973 (2011) at 2, UN Doc S/RES/1973 (2011).

¹³ Mark KERSTEN, “Between Justice and Politics: The ICC's Intervention in Libya” in De Vos, Kendall and STAHN, supra note 3, at 463.

¹⁴ REIKE, Ruben, “Libya and the Prevention of Atrocity Crimes: A ‘Controversial Success’” in Serena SHARMA and Jennifer WELSH, eds, The Responsibility to Prevent: Overcoming the Challenges of Atrocity Prevention (United States of America: Oxford University Press, 2015) 324 at 340–1Google Scholar.

¹⁵ Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, SC Res. 1973 (2011) at 2, UN Doc S/RES/1973 (2011).

¹⁶ REIKE, supra note 14 at 340–1.

¹⁷ African Union, “Decision on the Peaceful Resolution of the Libyan Crisis” (Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union on the State of Peace and Security in Africa) (African Union, Addis Ababa 2011) EXT/ASSEMBLY/AU/2(01.2011).

¹⁸ KERSTEN, supra note at 13 at 445.

¹⁹ See Mark RAI and Milan BOWERY, “Libyan Peace Deal Undermined by West” Peace News (1 May 2011) online: Peace News http://peacenews.info/node/6131/libyan-peace-deal-undermined-west; “Gaddafi accepts Chavez talks offer” Al Jazeera (3 March 2011) online: Al Jazeera https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2011/3/3/gaddafi-accepts-chavez-talks-offer; “Libya: Gaddafi Government Accepts Truce Plan, Says Zuma” BBC (11 April 2011) online: BBC News http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13029165; Harriet SHERWOOD and Chris McGREAL, “Libya: Gaddafi Has Accepted Roadmap to Peace, Says Zuma” The Guardian (11 April 2011) online: The Guardian https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/10/libya-african-union-gaddafi0-rebels-peace-talks.

²⁰ “Libyan Rebels Reject African Union Peace Plan” The Independent (11 April 2011) online: The Independent http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/libyan-rebels-reject-african-union-peace-plan-2266294.html.

²¹ Mark KERSTEN, Justice in Conflict: The Effects of The International Criminal Court's Interventions on Ending Wars and Building Peace (United States of America: Oxford University Press, 2016) at 162.

²² “Libya: Zuma Says Gaddafi Will Not Quit” BBC News (31 May 2011) online: BBC News http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13597702.

²³ KERSTEN, supra note 13 at 464–5; Reike, supra note 14 at 341–2. See also David SMITH, “Where Could Colonel Muammar Gaddafi Go If He Were Exiled?” The Guardian (21 February 2011) online: The Guardian https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/21/muammar-gaddafi-exile-options; David SANGER and Eric SCHMITT, “U.S. and Allies Seek a Refuge for Qaddafi” The New York Times (16 April 2011) online: The New York Times http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/17/world/africa/17rebels.html.

²⁴ Martin CHULOV, “Libyan Regime Makes Peace Offer that Sidelines Gaddafi” The Guardian (26 May 2011) online: The Guardian https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/may/26/libyan-ceasefire-offer-sidelines-gaddafi.

²⁵ Deborah Ruiz VERDUZCO, “The Relationship between the ICC and the United Nations Security Council” in Carsten STAHN, ed., The Law and Practice of the International Criminal Court (United States of America: Oxford University Press, 2015) at 42.

²⁶ Farouk CHOTHIA, “Gaddafi: African Asylum Seeker?” BBC News (12 September 2011) online: BBC News http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14806140; Vivienne WALT, “Death, Prison or Exile: Gaddafi Is out of Options” Time (1 June 2011) online: Time http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2074926,00.html.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ian BLACK, “Turkey Asks Libya Summit to Back Peace Negotiations” The Guardian (14 July 2011) online: The Guardian https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jul/14/libya-turkey-peace-negotiations-roadmap. These non-ICC states include Sudan, Belarus, and Zimbabwe.

²⁹ “Statement on Libya: Following the Working Lunch of NATO Ministers of Defence with non-NATO Contributors to Operation Unified Protector” NATO (4 June 2011) online: NATO https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_75177.htm.

³⁰ Max BOOT, “Qaddafi Exile Unlikely” Commentary Magazine (23 March 2011) online: Commentary Magazine https://www.commentary.org/max-boot/qaddafi-exile-unlikely/.

³¹ Doug SAUNDERS, “When Justice Stands in the Way of a Dictator’s Departure” The Globe and Mail (2 April 2011) online: The Globe and Mail https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/when-justice-stands-in-the-way-of-a-dictators-departure/article623912/.

³² Philippe SANDS, “The ICC Arrest Warrants Will Make Colonel Gaddafi Dig in His Heels” The Guardian (4 May 2011) online: The Guardian https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/may/04/icc-arrest-warrants-libya-gaddafi.

³³ KERSTEN, supra note 13 at 463–4. See also Boot, supra note 30; Saunders, supra note 31; Sands, supra note 32.

³⁴ See Priscilla HAYNER, “International Justice and the Prevention of Atrocities Case Study: Libya: The ICC Enters during War” ECFR background paper (November 2013) online: ECFR http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/IJP_Libya.pdf at 4.

³⁵ KERSTEN, supra note 21 at 151.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid., at 161.

³⁸ Ibid., at 152.

³⁹ STAHN, Carsten, “Libya, the International Criminal Court and Complementarity: A Test for ‘Shared Responsibility’” (2012) 10(2) Journal of International Criminal Justice 325 at 330–2CrossRefGoogle Scholar; BOSCO, supra note 7 at 167–8; KERSTEN, supra note 13 at 467–8; BABAIAN, Sarah, The International Criminal Court – An International Criminal World Court? Jurisdiction and Cooperation Mechanisms of the Rome Statute and its Practical Implementation (New York: Springer Cham, 2017) at 180Google Scholar.

⁴⁰ REIKE, supra note 14 at 338–9.

⁴¹ BOSCO, supra note 7 at 172.

⁴² Ben FISHMAN, “Could Libya's Decline Have Been Predicted?” (2015) 57(5) Survival 199 at 204. See SPENCER ACKERMAN, Chris STEPHEN, and Ewen MacASKILL, “US Launches Airstrikes against Isis in Libya” The Guardian (1 August 2016) online: The Guardian https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/01/us-airstrikes-against-isis-libya-pentagon; “Gaddafi wants EU Cash to Stop African Migrants” BBC News (31 August 2010) online: BBC News https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-11139345; Rana JAWAD, “How Libya Became a Dead End for Migrants” BBC News (17 June 2010) online: BBC News http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10338790.

⁴³ CRAWFORD, James, The Creation of States in International Law, 2nd ed. (United States of America: Oxford University Press, 2006) at 55–61Google Scholar.

⁴⁴ “New America, Airstrikes, Proxy Warfare, and Civilian Casualties in Libya” New America online: New America https://www.newamerica.org/international-security/reports/airstrikes-proxy-warfare-and-civilian-casualties-libya/key-findings.

⁴⁵ “Civilian casualties report from 1 January – 31 March 2020” reliefweb (30 April 2020) online: reliefweb https://reliefweb.int/report/libya/civilian-casualties-report-1-january-31-march-2020; “United Nations Support Mission in Libya” UNSMIL (29 July 2020) online: UNSMIL https://unsmil.unmissions.org/civilian-casualties-report-1-april-30-june-2020.

⁴⁶ “Number of Deaths in Libya” Uppsala Conflict Data Program Online: UCDP https://ucdp.uu.se/country/620.

⁴⁷ KUPERMAN, Alan, “NATO’s Intervention in Libya: A Humanitarian Success?” in Aidan HEHIR and Robert MURRAY, eds., Libya: The Responsibility to Protect and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013) 191 at 2014Google Scholar.

⁴⁸ Jeune AFRIQUE, “Libya: Gaddafi regime’s last loyalists are negotiating their release from prison” The Africa Report (4 July 2022) online: The Africa Report https://www.theafricareport.com/218935/libya-gaddafi-regimes-last-loyalists-are-negotiating-their-release-from-prison/; “Libya elections: Presidential poll postponed” BBC News (24 December 2021) online: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-59755677; Anthony BELL, Spencer BUTTS and David WITTER, “The Libyan Revolution: The Tide Turns Part 4” Institute for the Study of War (ISW) (November 2011) online: Institute for the Study of War http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Libya_Part4.pdf at 25; Colin FREEMAN, “Gaddafi Loyalists Join West in Battle to Push Islamic State from Libya” The Telegraph (7 May 2016) online: The Telegraph http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/05/07/gaddafi-loyalists-join-west-in-battle-to-push-islamic-state-from/.

⁴⁹ Mathieu GALTIER, “Libya: Why the Gaddafi Loyalists Are Back” Middle East Eye (11 November 2016) online: Middle East Eye http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/libya-why-gadhafi-loyalists-are-back-2138316983.

⁵⁰ Situation in Libya, International Criminal Court, See online: ICC https://www.icc-cpi.int/libya.

⁵¹ Warrant of Arrest for Al-Tuhamy Mohamed Khaled, (ICC-01/11-01/13), Pre-Trial Chamber I, 18 April 2013; First Warrant of Arrest for Mahmoud Mustafa Busayf Al-Werfalli, (ICC-01/11-01/17-2), Pre-Trial Chamber I, 15 August 2017; Second Warrant of Arrest for Mahmoud Mustafa Busayf Al-Werfalli, (ICC-01/11-01/17-13), Pre-Trial Chamber I, 04 July 2018; Situation in Libya in the case of The Prosecutor v. Al-Tuhamy Mohamed Khaled ICC: online ICC https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/CourtRecords/CR2022_05887.PDF; Situation in Libya in the case of The Prosecutor v. Mahmoud Mustafa Busayf: online ICC https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/CourtRecords/CR2022_04813.PDF.

⁵² Michael REISMAN, “The Manley O. Hudson Lecture: Why Regime Change s (Almost Always) a Bad Idea” (2004), 98(3) American Journal of International Law, 516.

⁵³ Nesam McMILLAN and David MICKLER, “From Sudan to Syria: Locating ‘Regime Change’ in R2P and the ICC” (2013) 5(3) Global Responsibility to Protect 283 at 297.

⁵⁴ Geoff DANCY, “Searching for Deterrence at the International Criminal Court” (2017) 17 International Criminal Law Review 625 at 634.

⁵⁵ KERSTEN, supra note 21 at 163. This biased approach has a longer pedigree since the Court's establishment in Uganda's case. Despite crimes committed from both sides of the conflict, the Uganda government and the LRA, the Prosecutor only preferred to select the senior commanders of the LRA for prosecution. This created a “good” versus “evil” narrative that undeniably impacted the peace talks considerably. See also Anni PUES, Prosecutorial Discretion at the International Criminal Court (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2020) at 146.

⁵⁶ “Libya: France recognises rebels as government” BBC News (10 March 2011) online: BBC News https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12699183.

⁵⁷ AADAPO Akande, “Recognition of Libyan National Transitional Council as Government of Libya” EJIL:Talk! (23 July 2011) online: EJIL:Talk! https://www.ejiltalk.org/recognition-of-libyan-national-transitional-council-as-government-of-libya/.

⁵⁸ Ibid; Stefan TALMON, “Recognition of the Libyan National Transitional Council” Insights 15(16) (16 June 2011) online: Insights https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/15/issue/16/recognition-libyan-national-transitional-council.

⁵⁹ Carsten STAHN, “Syria and the Semantics of Intervention, Aggression, and Punishment” (2013) 11(5) Journal of International Criminal Justice 955 at 956.

⁶⁰ Iavor RANGELOV, “Justice as a Security Strategy? International Justice and the Liberal Peace in the Balkans” (2016) 21(1) Journal of Conflict and Security Law 9 at 25.

⁶¹ McMillan and Mickler, supra note 54 at 286; Kenneth RODMAN, “Justice as a Dialogue between Law and Politics Embedding the International Criminal Court within Conflict Management and Peacebuilding” (2014) 12(3) Journal of International Criminal Justice 437 at 448; PATTISON, James, Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect: Who Should Intervene? (Oxford University Press, 2010) at 272–3Google Scholar.

⁶² Mégret, supra note 1 at 95. See also Nouwen and Werner, supra note 6 at 962–4.

⁶³ Robinson, supra note 5 at 328.

⁶⁴ Luigi CORRIAS and Geoffrey GORDON, “Judging in the Name of Humanity International Criminal Tribunals and the Representation of a Global Public” (2015) 13(1) Journal of International Criminal Justice 97 at 107; Martti KOSKENNIEMI, “Between Impunity and Show Trials”, (2002) 6 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 1 at 9; Immi TALGRE, “The Sensibility and Sense of International Criminal Law” (2002) 13(3) European Journal of International Law 561 at 591–2.

⁶⁵ Luis MORENO-OCAMPO, Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, “Keynote Address Council on Foreign Relations” (4 February 2010). See also Nouwen and Werner, supra note 6 at 942; Bosco, supra note 7 at 163.

⁶⁶ BASSIOUNI, Cherif, The Legislative History of the International Criminal Court (Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 2005) at 121Google Scholar.

⁶⁷ KOSKENNIEMI, Martti, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870–1960 (Cambridge University Press, 2002) at 177Google Scholar.

⁶⁸ Robert CRYER, “International Criminal Law vs. State Sovereignty: Another Round?” (2005) 16(5) European Journal of International law 979 at 989; SCHABAS, William, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome, 2nd ed. (Oxford University Press, 2016) at 378Google Scholar; Sarah NOUWEN and Wouter WERNER, “Monopolizing Global Justice International Criminal Law as Challenge to Human Diversity” (2015) 13(1) Journal of International Criminal Justice 157 at 161–2.

⁶⁹ Frederic MéGRET, “In whose name? The ICC and the search for constituency” in De Vos, Kendall, Stahn, supra note 3 at 31–2, 35–6.

⁷⁰ Ibid., at 33.

⁷¹ Magdi ABDELHADI, “Libya conflict: Why Egypt might send troops to back Gen Haftar” BBC News (17 August 2020) online: BBC News https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-53779425; Giorgio CAFIERO and Daniel WAGNER, “How the Gulf Arab Rivalry Tore Libya Apart” The National Interest (11 December 2015) online: The National Interest http://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-the-gulf-arab-rivalry-tore-libya-apart-14580.

⁷² See “Germany, UN to host Libya conference” Al Jazeera (1 June 2021) online: Al Jazeera https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/6/1/germany-un-to-host-libya-conference; “UN envoy: Libya mercenaries a threat to entire North Africa” Al Jazeera (22 May 2021) online: Al Jazeera https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/5/22/un-envoy-failure-to-get-rid-of-libya-mercenaries-a-threat; “Tensions persist as Libya's warring sides debate road to peace” Al Jazeera (13 November 2020) online: Al Jazeera see https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/11/13/tensions-persist-as-libyas-rival-side-debate-road-to-peace; “Libya summit: Participants agree to respect arms embargo” Al Jazeera (19 January 2020) online: Al Jazeera https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/01/world-powers-meet-berlin-discuss-libya-crisis-200119023145417.html; “Libya's warring sides pull out of Geneva peace talks” Al Jazeera (25 February 2020) online: Al Jazeera https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/02/eastern-libya-legislators-pull-geneva-peace-talks-200224160824800.html.

⁷³ See “Why is Libya so lawless?” BBC News (23 January 2020) online: BBC News https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-24472322; Garikai CHENGU, “Libya: From Africa's Richest State Under Gaddafi to Failed State After NATO Intervention” Global Research (14 September 2016) online: Global Research http://www.globalresearch.ca/libya-from-africas-richest-state-under-gaddafi-to-failed-state-after-nato-intervention/5408740; Richard LARDNER, “The Top American General in Africa Says Libya is a Failed State” US News (8 March 2016) online: US News https://www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2016-03-08/us-commander-in-africa-says-libya-is-a-failed-state; Cafiero and Wagner, supra note 72.

⁷⁴ Kuperman, supra note 48 at 198–202. See also Tony KARON, “U.N. Intervention Vote Saves Libya’s Revolution from Defeat” Time (17 March 2011) online: Time http://world.time.com/2011/03/17/u-n-intervention-vote-saves-libyas-revolution-from-defeat/; John BURNS, “NATO Begins Helicopter Attacks in Hopes of Ending the Stalemate With Qaddafi” The New York Times (4 June 2011) online: The New York Times http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/05/world/africa/05libya.html?ref=africa; “Evolution of the Frontlines in Libya- March to September 2011” NATO online: NATO https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_09/20110922_110922-libya-frontlines.pdf; WILLIAMS, Paul and POPKEN, Colleen, “Security Council Resolution 1973 on Libya: A Moment of Legal and Moral Clarity” (2011) 44(1) Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 225Google Scholar at 245–8.

⁷⁵ Kuperman, supra note 48 at 197.

⁷⁶ Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, SC Res. 1973 (2011) at 2, UN Doc S/RES/1973 (2011).

⁷⁷ Overview of Security Council 6498th Meeting S/PV.6498 5–6, 8, 10 (2011).

⁷⁸ ICCSt, supra note 2, Preamble.

⁷⁹ Schabas, supra note 69 at 377–8. See also Jeremy BOWEN, “Libya conflict: Russia and Turkey risk Syria repeat” BBC News (31 May 2020) online: BBC News https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-52846879.

⁸⁰ Kersten, supra note 21 at 154; Courtney HILLEBRECHT, “Trying the Perpetrators and Fueling the War: The (Perverse) Effects of the International Criminal Court?” (2011) APSA Annual Meeting 1 at 22.

⁸¹ Hisham MATAR, “The Killing of Abdelsalam al-Mismari, and the Triumph of Fear in Libya” The Guardian (30 July 2013) online: The Guardian http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jul/30/killing-mismari-triumph-fear-libya; “Things Fall Apart” The Economist (18 May 2014) online: The Economist http://www.economist.com/blogs/pomegranate/2014/05/libya-0.

⁸² See Section I(C).

⁸³ Chiara GIORGETT, “Why Should International Law Be Concerned About State Failure?” (2010) 16(2) ILSA Journal of International and Comparative Law at 469–87; Kenneth CHAN, “State Failure and the Changing Face of the Jus ad Bellum” (2013) 18(3) Journal of Conflict and Security Law at 395–426; Armin VON BOGDANDY et al., “State-Building, Nation-Building, and Constitutional Politics in Post-Conflict Situations: Conceptual Clarifications and an Appraisal of Different Approaches” (2005) 9 Max Planck YearBook of United Nations Law at 579–613.

⁸⁴ Cryer, supra note 69 at 1000.

⁸⁵ ICCSt, supra note 2, Art. 17.

⁸⁶ Michael REISMAN, “Stopping Wars and Making Peace: Reflections on the Ideology and Practice of Conflict Termination in Contemporary World Politics” (1998) 6(1) Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law 5 at 46 (emphasis in original).

⁸⁷ KOSKENNIEMI, Martti, The Politics of International Law (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2011) at 281Google Scholar.

⁸⁸ ICCSt, supra note 2, Preamble.

⁸⁹ SC Res. 1973 (2011) at 4, UN Doc S/RES/1973 (2011).

⁹⁰ Cryer, supra note 69 at 985.

⁹¹ Ibid., at 1,000. See also Carsten STAHN and Larissa VAN DEN HERIK, “Fragmentation, Diversification and ‘3D’ Legal Pluralism: International Criminal Law as the Jack-in-the-Box?” in Carsten STAHN, and Larissa VAN DEN HERIK, eds., The Diversification and Fragmentation of International Criminal Law (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012) 21 at 23–4; Robinson, supra note 5 at 331–2.

⁹² Martti KOSKENNIEM, “Miserable Comforters: International Relations as New Natural Law” (2009) 15(3) European Journal of International Relations 395 at 403.

⁹³ Theodor MERON, “Judicial Independence and Impartiality in International Criminal Tribunals” (2005) 99(2) American Journal International Law 359 at 360; United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Res 70/118 (2015) at 1–2.

⁹⁴ ICCSt, supra note 2, Preamble.

⁹⁵ Catherine GEGOUT, “The International Criminal Court: Limits, Potential and Conditions for the Promotion of Justice and Peace” (2013) 34(5) Third World Quarterly 804–5.

⁹⁶ Meron, supra note 94 at 1–2.

⁹⁷ Allen S. WEINER, “Prudent Politics: The International Criminal Court, International Relations, and Prosecutorial Independence” (2013) 12(3) Washington University Global Studies Law Review 545 at 549.

⁹⁸ Luis MORENO-OCAMPO, “Ceremony for the solemn undertaking of the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court” (16 June 2003) online: ICC https://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/d7572226-264a-4b6b-85e3-2673648b4896/143585/030616_moreno_ocampo_english.pdf.

⁹⁹ Rita MUTYABA, “An Analysis of the Cooperation Regime of the International Criminal Court and Its Effectiveness in the Court's Objective in Securing Suspects in Its Ongoing Investigations and Prosecutions” (2012) 12(5) International Criminal Law Review 937 at 944.

¹⁰⁰ Antonio CASSESE, “The Statute of the International Criminal Court: Some Preliminary Reflections” (1999) 10(1) European Journal of International Law 144 at 165.

¹⁰¹ Robinson, supra note 5 at 338.

¹⁰² BA, Oumar, States of Justice: The Politics of The International Criminal Court (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2020) at 92–3Google Scholar.

¹⁰³ Ibid., at 110–11.

¹⁰⁴ Pues, supra note 56 at 3.

¹⁰⁵ Margaret deGUZMAN, “Choosing to Prosecute: Expressive Selection at the International Criminal Court” (2012) 33(2) Michigan Journal of International Law 265 at 312–3. See also FULLER, Lon, The Morality of Law, Rev. Ed. (Yale University Press, 1969)Google Scholar.

¹⁰⁶ STAHN and van den HERIK, supra note 92 at 29–30.

¹⁰⁷ Deguzman, supra note 107 at 276.

¹⁰⁸ Line ENGBO GISSEL, “Legitimising the Juba Peace Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation: The International Criminal Court as a Third-Party Actor?” (2017) 11(2) Journal of Eastern African Studies at 369; MéGRET, supra note 70 at 45.

¹⁰⁹ BA, supra note 103 at 111.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., at 112.

¹¹¹ Matthew BRUBACHER, “Prosecutorial Discretion within the International Criminal Court” (2004) 2(1) Journal of International Criminal Justice 71 at 74.

¹¹² Ibid., at 94.

¹¹³ UNGA Res A/59/565, para. 90.

¹¹⁴ MéGRET, supra note 70 at 43–4.

¹¹⁵ KOSKENNIMI, supra note 65 at 32–3; Tom BUITELAAR, “The ICC and the Prevention of Atrocities: Criminological Perspectives” (2016) 17 Hum Rights Review 285 at 294–5.

¹¹⁶ deGUZMAN, supra note 107 at 313.

¹¹⁷ See Sections II and III(C).

¹¹⁸ Silvia BORELLI and Simon OLLESON, “Obligations Relating to Human Rights and Humanitarian Law” 1177 at 1184, and Charles LEBEN, “Obligations Relating to the Use of Force and Arising from Peremptory Norms of International Law” in James CRAWFORD, Alain PELLET and Simon OLLESON, eds, The Law of International Responsibility (Oxford University Press, 2010) 1198 at 1198; Case of Lašva Valley (The Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al.), Judgment, [1995] ICTY-95-16-T, Trial Chamber, 14 January 2000, §§ 201–4; Case of Lašva Valley (The Prosecutor v. Anto Furundžija), Judgment, [1995] ICTY-95-17/1, Trial Chamber, 10 December 1998, §§ 142, 145–6; Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, with Commentaries, International Law Commission (UN Doc. A/66/10, 2011) Art. 58; Report of the International Law on the Work of Its Forty-Eighth Session, 6 May – 26 July 1996, International Law Commission (UN Doc. A/51/10, 1996) 23.

¹¹⁹ NOUWEN and WERNER, supra note 69 at 169. See also Reike, supra note 14 at 25–6, 28.

¹²⁰ Frederic MÉGRET, “ICC, R2P, and the International Community's Evolving Interventionist Toolkit” (2010) 21 Finish Yearbook of International Law at 27–8; RANGELOV, supra note 61 at 24–5; Schabas, supra note 69 at 839.

¹²¹ MERON, supra note 94 at 359.

¹²² DANCY, supra note 55 at 628.

¹²³ Ibid., at 629–30.

¹²⁴ Ibid., at 630.

¹²⁵ BUITELAAR, supra note 118 at 294.

¹²⁶ Hector OLáSOLO, “The Role of the International Criminal Court in Preventing Atrocity Crimes Through Timely Intervention: From the Humanitarian Intervention Doctrine and Ex Post Facto Judicial Institutions to the Notion of Responsibility to Protect and the Preventative Role of the International Criminal Court”, Inaugural Lecture as Chair in International Criminal Law and International Criminal Procedure, Utrecht University, delivered on 18 October 2010 at 25.

¹²⁷ Laurel FLETCHER, “Refracted Justice: The Imagined Victim and the International Criminal Court” in DE VOS, KENDALL and STAHN, supra note 3 at 305–6.

¹²⁸ Ibid., at 321–2.

¹²⁹ KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 65 at 2–3, 7–9.

¹³⁰ Stuart FORD, “Can the International Criminal Court Succeed? An Analysis of the Empirical Evidence of Violence Prevention” (2020) 43 Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review at 106–8. See also Stuart FORD, “A Hierarchy of the Goals of International Criminal Courts” (2018) 27 Minnesota Journal of International Law 179 at 182.

¹³¹ Justice William BRENNAN, “Remarks: What's Ahead for the New Lawyer?” (1986) 47 University of Pittsburgh Law Review 705 at 708.

¹³² BUITELAAR, supra note 118 at 285.

¹³³ “Office of the Prosecutor, Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice”, Policy Paper, 1 September 2007 at 4; “Office of the Prosecutor, Policy Paper on case selection and prioritisation”, Policy Paper, 15 September 2016 at 12.

¹³⁴ RODMAN, supra note 62 at 439; Mégret, supra note 123 at 16; Daphna SHRAGA, “Politics and Justice: The Role of the Security Council”, in Antonio CASSESE, ed., The Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice (Oxford University Press, 2009) 168 at 174; SHKLAR, Judith, Legalism: Law, Morals and Political Trials (Harvard University Press, 1986) at 122–3Google Scholar. See also KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 88 at 110–1.

¹³⁵ STAHN, supra note 60 at 967.

¹³⁶ Darryl ROBINSON, “Serving the Interests of Justice: Amnesties, Truth Commissions and the International Criminal Court” (2003) 14(3) European Journal of International Law 481 at 484; Lutz OETTE, “Peace and Justice, or Neither? The Repercussions of the al-Bashir Case for International Criminal Justice in Africa and Beyond” (2010) 8(2) Journal of International Criminal Justice 345 at 350; MéGRET, supra note 118 at 9–10; CONTARINO, NEGRóN-GONZALES and MASON, supra note 10 at 307; Stahn, supra note 3 at 51–2. To trigger Article 16, the Security Council must take the initiative otherwise this legal possibility remains deactivated. Since this research is focused on the independent practice of the ICC to further ICJ principles, Article 16 remains out of this research's scope.

¹³⁷ LAUTERPACHT, Hersch, The Function of Law in the International Community, Rev. Ed. (United States of America:Oxford University Press, 2011) at 446Google Scholar.

¹³⁸ ICCSt, supra note 2, Preamble.

¹³⁹ Report of the International Criminal Court, UNGA A/Res 61/15, UN Doc A/RES/61/15 (20 November 2006) at 2.

¹⁴⁰ ICCSt, supra note 2 at Art. 21(1)(b).

¹⁴¹ Luigi CONDORELLI and Santiago VILLALPANDO, “Referral and Deferral by the Security Council”, in Antonio CASSESE, Paolo GAETA, and John JONES, eds., The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Oxford University Press, 2002) 627 at 647.

¹⁴² ICCSt, supra note 2, Preamble. Additionally, the Relationship Agreement between the ICC and the UN under Article 2 of Principles certainly binds the Court to act in conformity with the purposes and the principles of the UN Charter as reaffirmed in the preamble of the Statute too. See Negotiated Relationship Agreement between the International Criminal Court and the United Nations under Article 2.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ CONDORELLI and VILLALPANDO, supra note 139 at 578. See also Vera GOWLLAND-DEBBAS, “The Relationship between the Security Council and the Projected International Criminal Court” (1998) 3(1) Journal of Armed Conflict 97 at 112.

¹⁴⁵ ICCSt, supra note 2 at Art. 53(1).

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., at Art. 53(1)(c)

¹⁴⁷ Hitomi TAKEMURA, “Prosecutorial Discretion in International Criminal Justice: Between Fragmentation and Unification”, in STAHN, van den HERIK, supra note 92 at 635.

¹⁴⁸ DAVIS, Kenneth, Discretionary Justice, A Preliminary Inquiry (Louisiana State University Press, 1969) at 163Google Scholar. See also Pues, supra note 56 at 9.

¹⁴⁹ The Oxford Companion to Law, quoted in TAKEMURA, supra note 150 at 635.

¹⁵⁰ PUES, supra note 56 at 16, 145.

¹⁵¹ TAKEMURA, supra note 150 at 636; Brubacher, supra note 116 at 71–2.

¹⁵² SCHABAS, supra note 69 at 835–6.

¹⁵³ BRUBACHER, supra note 114 at 81.

¹⁵⁴ STIGEN, Jo, The Relationship between the International Criminal Court and National Jurisdictions: The Principle of Complementarity (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2008) at 484Google Scholar.

¹⁵⁵ PUES, supra note 56 at 136.

¹⁵⁶ SCHABAS, supra note 69 at 836–7.

¹⁵⁷ William SCHABAS, “Prosecutorial Discretion v. Judicial Activism at the International Criminal Court” (2008) 6(4) Journal of International Criminal Justice 761 at 748; Pues, supra note 56 at 136.

¹⁵⁸ Luc CÔTÉ, “Reflections on the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion in International Criminal Law” (2005) 3(1) Journal of International Criminal Justice 162 at 163.

¹⁵⁹ Pues, supra 56 note 31 at 12. See also DWORKIN, Ronald, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press, 1977) at 31Google Scholar.

¹⁶⁰ Pues, supra note 56 at 14–5. These objects are relevant to the analysis here, enumerated in the Rome Statute Preamble: Peace and security of mankind, prevention of crimes, independence of the Court and, impliedly, the principle of sovereignty and peace.

¹⁶¹ Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice, supra note 136 at 5, 2–9.

¹⁶² Pues, supra note 56 at 132–3; Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice, supra note 136 at 1, 5. For the first time in the history of the ICC jurisprudence, the PTC II referred in its Afghanistan decision to the concept of interests of justice, although beyond Article 53 domain. Interestingly, in this sole case, the PTC II took the initiative and the Prosecutor herself did not make any submission on having recourse to the interests of justice. See Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Decision under Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Pre-Trial Chamber II, ICC-02/17-33, 12 April 2019, para. 53.

¹⁶³ PUES, supra note 56 at 134.

¹⁶⁴ SCHABAS, supra note 69 at 833; Pues, supra note 56 at 140–1, 144.

¹⁶⁵ ROBINSON, supra note 139 at 488.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., at 495–6, 487–8. See also Pues, supra note 56 at 146; Schabas, supra note 64 at 835; Carlos NINO, “The Duty to Punish Past Abuses of Human Rights Put into Context: The Case of Argentina” (1991) 100(8) Yale Law Journal 2619 at 2620; ZALAQUETT, Jose, “Balancing Ethical Imperatives and Political Constraints: The Dilemma of New Democracies Confronting Past Human Rights Violations” (1992) 43(6) Hastings Law Journal at 1425–38Google Scholar; AKHAYAN, Payam, “Are International Criminal Tribunals a Disincentive to Peace? Reconciling Judicial Romanticism with Political Realism” (2009) 31(3) Human Rights Quarterly 624 at 633Google Scholar.

¹⁶⁷ ICCSt, supra note 2 at Art. 53(3)(a)-(b).

¹⁶⁸ Frank MEYER, “Complementing Complementarity” (2006) 6(4) International Criminal Law Review 549 at 579–80.

¹⁶⁹ SCHABAS, supra note 69 at 830.

¹⁷⁰ RODMAN, supra note 62 at 439.

¹⁷¹ KOSKENNIEMI, Martti, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument (Cambridge University Press, 2005) at 16Google Scholar.

¹⁷² ROBINSON, supra note 5 at 325–6.

¹⁷³ Ibid., at 344; KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 175 at 18.

¹⁷⁴ KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 93 at 413.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., at 414.

¹⁷⁶ ROBINSON, supra note 5 at 344.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid., at 346–7.

¹⁷⁸ MÉGRET, supra note 70 at 45.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid., at 43.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid., at 34–6.

¹⁸¹ “Khalifa Haftar: The Libyan general with big ambitions” BBC News (8 April 2019) online: BBC News https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-27492354; “Libya: Lawyers to press ICC to probe Khalifa Haftar” Al Jazeera (14 November 2017) online: Al Jazeera https://www.aljazeera.com/videos/2017/11/14/libya-lawyers-to-press-icc-to-probe-khalifa-haftar/?gb=true; BOWEN, supra note 80; ABDELHADI, supra note 72.

¹⁸² “Libya elections: Presidential poll postponed” BBC News (24 December 2021) online: BBC News https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-59755677.

¹⁸³ “Libya talks in Geneva end without breakthrough” Reuters (30 June 2022) online: Reuters https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/libya-talks-geneva-end-without-breakthrough-2022-06-30/.