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Lobbying and Information in Politics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 January 2017

John M. de Figueiredo*
Affiliation:
Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Extract

The vast majority of papers written about interest groups' political influence focuses on the role of money in politics. Business and interest groups' participation in campaign finance, in the form of hard and soft money, has been the subject of hundreds of theoretical and empirical studies. Moreover, with the recent congressional moves to reform campaign finance laws, campaign finance studies have received a prominent position in public discourse.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © V.K. Aggarwal 2002 and published under exclusive license to Cambridge University Press 

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References

Ansolabehere, Steven, de Figueiredo, John M. and Snyder, James M. (2003) “Why is there so little money in US politics?”. Journal of Economic Perspectives, forthcoming.Google Scholar
de Figueiredo, John M. and Silverman, Brian S. 2002. “Academic Earmarks and the Returns to Lobbying,” Working Paper #9064. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.Google Scholar
Milyo, Jeffrey, Primo, David and Groseclsoe, Timothy. 2000. “Corporate PAC Campaign Contributions in Perspective.” Business and Politics 2 (1): 7588.Google Scholar
Johnston, Jason Scott. 2002. “A Game Theoretic Analysis of Alternative Institutions for Regulatory Cost-Benefit Analysis.” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 150: 13431428.Google Scholar