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Politics Matter: The 1997 Derailment of Fast-Track Trade Authority

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 January 2017

Karen E. Schnietz  and
Timothy Nieman
Karen E. Schnietz*
Affiliation:
Rice University
Timothy Nieman
Affiliation:
Lumina Decision Systems
*
Jones Graduate School of Management, MS 531, Rice University, 6100 South Main Street, Houston, TX 77005–1892, USA. Tel: (713) 285–5388; Fax: (713) 285–5251; E-mail: schnietz@rice.edu
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Abstract

In 1997, President Clinton became the first President not awarded fast-track trade negotiating authority since this congressional delegation of trade policymaking authority first began in 1934. Fast-track's failure also represents a case of an unsuccessful business political strategy since business supporters of the measure were easily defeated by labor and environmental opponents, despite the many political ‘privileges’ that business possessed. This case study describes why fast-track is important to the future of US and global trade policy and examines the main reasons for its failure. In doing so, it illustrates theories of pivotal politics, the median voter, collective action, issue framing, international trade's welfare costs and benefits, and international relations that often arise in research and courses on the non-market environment of business, international trade, and international political economy.

Type
Research Article
Information
Business and Politics , Volume 1 , Issue 2 , August 1999 , pp. 233 - 251
Copyright
Copyright © V.K. Aggarwal 1999 and published under exclusive license to Cambridge University Press 

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