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Governing Global Capitalism: A Lawyer's Perspective
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 29 September 2023
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In April 1959, editor-in-chief of Time magazine, Henry Luce, spoke vehemently to the World Congress of the International Chamber of Commerce, encouraging business leaders “to unite [their] energies on something which is really fundamental—fundamental to civilization and economic progress. That something is the advancement of the rule of law.” Together with lawyers, business leaders had “the responsibility to see that the rule of law prevails in every corner of the business world.” Luce insisted that international trade needs “legal certainty” and business leaders would do better by focusing less on “certain rules and regulations” and more on “basic and universal rules under which all business could prosper.” One of the proposals he asked the audience to endorse was German banker and politician Hermann Abs's Magna Carta (a formative proposal to enact what is known today as investor-state dispute settlement, or ISDS).
- Type
- Roundtable on Capitalism and Global Governance
- Information
- Business History Review , Volume 97 , Issue 3: Governing Global Capitalism , Autumn 2023 , pp. 614 - 620
- Copyright
- © 2023 The President and Fellows of Harvard College
References
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