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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 27 October 2021
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2. For a popular introduction see Nicolelis, M. Beyond Boundaries: The New Neuroscience of Connecting Brains with Machines and How it Will Change Our Lives. New York: St Martin’s Press; 2011.Google Scholar
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7. A recording of that event is available here: Automation and Utopia: John Danaher in Conversation with Brian D. Earp; available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lTqo_zVMRgI&t=268s (last accessed 4 Feb 2021).
8. One worry about John’s idea of using technology to merge minds might be that it is unclear what kinds of technologies could be used to accomplish this feat. Here, however, I will mostly set technological worries aside and instead primarily focus on more conceptual and evaluative/normative issues.
9. https://philosophicaldisquisitions.blogspot.com/p/podcast.html (last accessed 4 Feb 2021).
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28. Many thanks to John Danaher and Tomi Kushner for helping me during the process of putting together my contributions to this exchange. In creating the written version of this debate, I have also been helped greatly by the discussion session that we had at the Neuroethics Network event in February 2021, which was chaired by David Lawrence. The comments made and questions asked during that session were very helpful, in particular those from Lawrence and those from Yves Agid and Philipp Kellmeyer.
