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Democratic Equality and Relating as Equals

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Richard J. Arneson
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Extract

Imagine a democratic society in which all members are full citizens and citizens relate to each other as equals. Social arrangements bring it about, to the maximum possible extent, that all adults are full functioning members of society. The society is not marred by caste hierarchies, invidious status distinctions, or unequal power relations. No one is able to dominate others. Moreover, the urge to dominate over others does not loom large in social life. Each person's relations with others manifest the belief, shared by all, that each person is fundamentally the equal of all others and that this equality calls for treating others with civility and mutual respect and forbearance. Each is viewed as having the right to live as she chooses, within broad constraints of morality. This individual entitlement to freedom establishes a strong presumption against paternalism, restricting a person's liberty against her will for her own good. Regarding distributive justice, the norm is that each should be enabled to have enough by way of resources and opportunities to sustain herself as a full functioning member of democratic society.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume , Volume 36: Justice and Equality , 2010 , pp. 25 - 52
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2010

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