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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2020
Plato represents Socrates as believing in the unity of the virtues, quarreling with those who, like Protagoras or Meno, wish to treat the virtues as distinct objects of inquiry (Protagoras 329c2ff., Meno 71e1ff.). On the other hand, there is good reason to deny that Plato's Socrates believed in the numerical identity of the virtues (cf. Meno 79a3-5). What Socrates did believe, I shall argue, is that the various virtues are one in essence. I shall show what this means and how it clears up prima facie inconsistencies among Plato's early dialogues.
If I am right, Socrates’ theory has startling consequences. Since essence is exactly what Socrates wants a definition to state, it follows that all virtues will have one and the same definition. And if this is so, no wonder the quest for separate definitions of virtues fails in every case! For example in the Laches the generals are baffled by Courage because Courage has no private essence and cannot be marked off from the other virtues by stating its essence. Its essence is Virtue entire. That is a radical view, but there are good reasons for attributing it to Socrates.
For the problem I address in this essay I am indebted to VlastosGregory’ article, “Socrates on the Parts of Virtue,” Review of Metaphysics25(1972) pp. 415-458. References are to the corrected version in his Platonic Studies, Princeton, 1973, pp. 221-269. For a different point of view, see PennerTerry, “Socrates on the Parts of Virtue,” Philosophical Review82(1973) pp. 35-68. I am grateful for useful comments to Michael Gagarin, David Furley, Jeffry Pelletier, A.P.D. Mourelatos, Leslie Martinich, and the editors of the Canadian Journal of Philosophy.
2 Vlastos’ translation, op. cit., p. 224. Except where noted, translations are mine.
3 Vlastos, op. cit., p. 230.
4 Ibid., p. 252, and passim.
5 Terry Penner, op. cit. Penner's thesis is that “when Socrates said ‘Virtue is one,' he meant it quite literally!” (p. 35) For a brief history of the opposing views, see Penner's note 3, p. 37.
6 This is controversial. See below, p. 111, ff., and note 14. To the Laches we can add the evidence of Aristotle, who holds the biconditionality thesis but finds Socrates’ unity of the virtues thesis too strong. It follows that Aristotle understood Socrates to be committed to something stronger than the biconditionality thesis. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VI, 1144b18, ff.)
7 I offer an explanation for Socrates’ holding this part of the doctrine in my “The Socratic Approach to Semantic Incompleteness,” forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
8 In the Euthyphro Socrates apparently insists that Piety be defined through its genus (Justice) and its differentia (not discovered). He does this, I think, so he may exhaust the possibilities for relevant differentiae. The final aporia suggests that the genus-differentia strategy is hopeless. What is different about Piety is that it has to do with the gods; but nothing to do with the gods makes any difference to the question of how Euthyphro should treat his father. It is a question of justice, and it is Justice that Euthyphro should try to understand. In the context of Socrates’ question about Piety, its differentia is not important. and so (on my interpretation) not part of the essence of Piety.
9 In my unpublished dissertation, “Two Studies in Socratic Dialectic: The Euthyphro and the Hippias Major,” Princeton, 1973. The sort of study I have in mind was carried out for the Euthyphro by Allen, R. E. in his Plato's Euthyphro and the Earlier Theory of Forms, London, 1970Google Scholar. Although I applaud R. E. Allen's approach, and agree with him on many points, on the crucial issue I come to a different conclusion. Allen argues that the Euthyphro envisages, and the other early dialogues permit, definition of the virtues per genus et differentiam. I find the evidence of the Euthyphro inconclusive on this point, but that it points in another direction. (See above, note 8.) Allen's reading of the other dialogues depends on his interpretation of the doctrine of the unity of the virtues, for which see his pp. 93-100.
10 At Euthyphro 11ab, where he finds that an answer identifying an accident (pathos) of what is to be defined does not state its essence (ousia). The passage is difficult and its interpretation controversial. On my view, when Socrates denies that Euthyphro has defined Piety he does not mean to deny that Piety (and only Piety) is loved by all the gods, but only that being loved by all the gods defines (states the essence of) Piety. My interpretation is close to Cohen's, S. Marc, in his “Socrates on the Definition of Piety: Euthyphro 10A-11B,” Journal of the History of Philosophy, IX (1971) pp. 1-13.Google Scholar
11 The refusal is documented and explained in my “The Socratic Approach to Semantic Incompleteness.“
12 That is the consequence Vlastos fears, op. cit., p. 230.
13 Two passages from other dialogues support my reading of the gold analogy. At Meno 72a8-b6 Socrates compares the various virtues to bees, which all have the same essence while differing in beauty, size, etc. In the Timaeus, at 50a5,ff., Plato makes a similar point specifically about gold, to illustrate the role of the receptacle. If a variety of shapes is produced from gold, what each of them really is is gold. So the answer to one of Socrates’ essence-seeking questions about a golden triangle would be not “golden triangle” but “gold.“
14 For a history of the problem see Meister, R., “Thema und Ergebnis des platonischen Laches,” Wiener Studien XLII (1921) p. 9Google Scholar and p. 103. Recent works in English are Santas, G., “Socrates at Work on Virtue and Knowledge in Plato's Laches,” Review of Metaphysics 22 (1969) p. 433Google Scholar; Vlastos’ appendix to the work cited, p. 266; and Penner's discussion, op. cit., p. 60, ff. I am largely in agreement with Penner. For Vlastos’ view see below, note 16. Santas blames Socrates for poor analysis of the concept Courage; but of course analysis may not be Socrates’ object.
15 For this much of my interpretation I am much indebted to Penner, op. cit., pp. 60-62.
16 Vlastos sees a fallacy in the inference from (5) and (6) to, “Courage is the knowledge of all goods and evils.” (Op. cit., pp. 267-8) From these premises, he argues, all that follows is that Courage requires the knowledge of all goods and evils. He seems to understand (6) as,
6a. The knowledge of future x'es requires the knowledge of all x'es.
But the natural reading is,
6b. The knowledge of future x'es is the same thing as the knowledge of all x'es.
With (6b) as a premise the argument is valid, so we should take (6) that way unless there is a good reason not to. Vlastos eschews (6b) because it would be false if knowledge were no more than a disposition to behave. Then types of knowledge would be divided not by subject matter but by behavior patterns. But there is no reason to believe Socrates thought that way about knowledge.
17 By itself this line (199e9) admits the translation, “But what was just now said turns out to be false,” τὸ λεγόμευου being ambiguous between “what was said” (i.e., the sentence) and “what was mentioned” (in this case, Virtue). The context establishes at 199e3-4 that τὸ λεγόμευου is what Nicias' formula is a formula of. So I have supplied “Courage” at 199e9 to make that clear.
18 Cf. Euthyphro 11e4, ff., and Protagoras 322b5.
19 Vlastos uses this passage as the only direct evidence that Socrates was committed to considering the various virtues as parts of Virtue. (Op. cit., p. 225 in note 8, and p. 267.)
20 It is an open question how much otherness there is between Justice and the other virtues; so Socrates’ point here does not imply that the virtues have distinct essences. What Socrates means to do is to warn Meno against evading definition by giving answers that (on Meno's own view) are parts of a list.
