Freedom of Speech in Early Stuart England, David Colclough, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 314.

The rhetorical lynchpin of this fascinating book's central argument is the concept of parrhesia, which is a Greek term that began life as a catch-all expression for the quality of speech belonging to citizens of the polis (6). Colclough implies that the tradition of parrhesia took a circular route via the freedom of expression inherent in the group rights of Greek citizens to the need for frank expression of unpleasant truths by courtiers to their rulers. This transition required that “frankness” be elevated to the status of a virtue once it became apparent that rulers did not always make decisions in the best interest of the state. After the Reformation in northern Europe this virtue evolved into a religious imperative in the face of sectarian persecution and in England, especially, this imperative naturally extended itself to the admonition of monarchs who encroached on their citizens' religious freedoms. Religious conflict led to war, war required economic investment and soon the religious imperative to oppose the wrong-headed heretic blended with a protestant parliament's right to admonish the monarch on purely secular matters. Thus, under the Stuarts, parrhesia eventually came to resume its original sense as the right and duty of a free subject to speak out in public without fear that his desire to preserve the common good would be prosecuted under laws aimed at the seditious and libelous. It is but a rising sense of the secular that enables us to recognize the change in values that led an onerous religious duty to become the unimpeachable liberal right we so casually assert today.