¹ Sands, Philippe, Principles of International Environmental Law, 2nd edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) at 205.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

² Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, 16 September 1987, entered into force 1 January 1989, reprinted in (1987) 26 I.L.M. 154. The Montreal Protocol is to the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, 22 March 1985, entered into force 22 September 1988, reprinted in (1985) 26 I.L.M. 1529. The Vienna Convention and the Montreal Protocol website are available at <www.unep.org/ozone/>.

³ Decision II/5 of the Second Meeting of the Parties, reproduced in UNEP Ozone Secretariat, , Handbook for the International Treaties for the Protection of the Ozone Layer (6th ed., 2003), available at <www.unep.org/ozone/> at 183.+at+183.>Google Scholar

⁴ Decision IV/5 of the Fifth Meeting of the Parties, reproduced in UNEP Ozone Secretariat, supra note 3 at 184 and 295–97 [Montreal Protocol, Non-Compliance Procedure].

⁵ Decision X/1 o of the Tenth Meeting of the Parties, reproduced in UNEP Ozone Secretariat, supra note 3 at 185–86 and 295–97.

⁶ Koskenniemi, Martti, “Breach of Treaty or Non-Compliance? Reflections on the Enforcement of the Montreal Protocol” (1992) 3 Y.B. Int’l Env. L. 123 at 133.Google Scholar

⁷ Anderson, Stephen O. and Sarma, K. Madhara, Protectingthe Ozone Layer: The United Nations History (London: Earthscan Publications, 2002) at 275.Google Scholar

⁸ Ibid, at 274.

⁹ Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution Concerning the Emissions of Volatile Organic Compounds or Their Transboundary Fluxes, 18 November 1991, entered into force 29 September 1997, reprinted in (1992) 31 I.L.M. 568 [VOC Protocol]. The 1991 VOC Protocol is to the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, done 13 November 1979, entered into force 16 March 1983, reprinted in (1979) 18 I.L.M. 1442 [LRTAP Convention]. The LRTAP Convention and its protocols website is <www.unece.org/env/lrtap/>. Article 3(3) is set out in note 127 in this article.

¹⁰ Protocol to the 1979 LRTAP Convention on Further Reduction of Sulphur Emissions, i4june 1994, entered into force 5 August 1998, reprinted in (1998) 33 I.L.M. 1540 [Oslo Protocol]. Article 7 is set out in the text at note 130 in this article. The establishment of the LRTAP compliance committee has a bit of a twist. See the section entitled “LRTAP Convention” later in this article.

¹¹ Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, 7 November 1996, not yet in force, reprinted in (igg7) 36 I.L.M. 1. The 1996 protocol is to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, 29 December 1972, entered into force 30 August 1975, reprinted in 1046 U.N.T.S. 120 [London Dumping Convention]. The London Dumping Convention and its protocol website is at <http://www.londonconvention.org>. Article 11 is set out in the text at note 196 in this article.

¹² Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 11 December 1997, not yet in force, reprinted in (1998) 37 I.L.M. 22. The Kyoto Protocol is to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, done g May 1992, entered into force 24 March igg4, reprinted in (igg2) 31 I.L.M. 84g [UNFCCC]. The Kyoto Protocol and the UNFCCC website is at <www.unfccc.int/>. Article 18 reads:

¹³ Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade, 11 September 1998, entered into force 24 February 2004, reprinted in (1999) 38 I.L.M. 1 [Rotterdam Convention]. The Rotterdam Convention website is at <www.pic.int>. Article 17 is set out in the text at note 187 in this article.

¹⁴ Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation and Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, 25 June 1998, entered into force 30 October 2001, reprinted in (1999) 38 I.L.M. 517 [Aarhus Convention]. The Aarhus Convention website is at <www.unece.org/env/pp/welcome.html>.

Article 15 reads:

¹⁵ Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 29 January 2000, entered into force 11 September 2003, reprinted in (2000) 39 I.L.M. 1027 [Cartagena Protocol]. The Cartagena Protocol is to the Convention on Biological Diversity, done 5june 1992, entered into force 29 December 1993, reprinted in (1992) 31 I.L.M. 822 [CBD]. The Cartagena Protocol website is at <www.biodiv.org/biosafety/>. Article 34 is set out in the text at note 176 in this article.

¹⁶ Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, 22 May 2001, entered into force 17 May 2004, reprinted in (2001) 40 I.L.M. 532 [Stockholm Convention]. The Stockholm Convention website is at <www.pops.int>. Article 17 is set out in the text at note 191 in this article.

¹⁷ International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, 3 November 2001, entered into force 29 June 2004 [ITPGRFA]. The treaty text is available at <www.fao.org/ag/cgrfa/>. Article 21 reads:

The Governing Body shall, at its first meeting, consider and approve cooperative and effective procedures and operational mechanisms to promote compliance with the provisions of this Treaty and to address issues of non-compliance. These procedures and mechanisms shall include monitoring, and offering advice or assistance, including legal advice or legal assistance, when needed, in particular to developing countries and countries with economies in transition.

¹⁸ Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, 22 March 1989, entered into force 5 May 1992, reprinted in (1989) 28 I.L.M. 657 [Basel Convention]. The Basel Convention website is at <www.basel.int>.

¹⁹ Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, 25 February 1991, entered into force 10 September 1997, reprinted in (1991) 30 I.L.M. 802 [Espoo Convention]. The Espoo Convention website is at <www.unece.org/env/eia/welcome.html>.

²⁰ Decision III/7, “Second Amendment to the Espoo Convention,” in Report of the Third Meeting of the Conference of the Parties, Doc. ECE/MP.EIA/6, 13 September 2004, Annex VII, available at the Espoo Convention website, supra note 19. The amendment will add a new Article 14 bis to the convention, which is set out in the text at note 153 in this article and see the section entitled “Espoo Convention” later in this article.

²¹ Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 3 March 1973, entered into force 1 July 1975, reprinted in 993 U.N.T.S. 243 [CITES]. The CITES website is at <www.cites.org>.

²² The CITES Secretariat has been working on the Guidelines on Compliance with the Convention, which were presented for state party comment at the forty-ninth Meeting of the Standing Committee, April 2003. Guidelines on Compliance with the Convention, Doc. SC 49, Doc. 16, available at the CITES website, supra note 21. A revised version with state party comments is found in Guidelines on Compliance with the Convention, Doc. SC 50, Doc. 27, available at the CITES website, supra note 21. See generally Reeve, Rosalind, Policing International Trade in Endangered Species: The CITES Treaty and Compliance (London: Earthscan Publications, 2002).Google Scholar

²³ See Report of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for an Internationally Legally Binding Instrument for Implementing International Action on Certain Persistent Organic Pollutants on The Work of Its Seventh Session, Doc. UNEP/POPS/INC. 7/ 28, 18 July 2003, at paras. 126–31, available at the Stockholm Convention website, supra note 16. A more pointed report of the meeting is provided in “Summary of the Seventh Session of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for an Internationally Legally Binding Instrument for Implementing International Action on Certain Persistent Organic Pollutants” (21 July 2003) 15(81) Earth Negotiations Bulletin 8–9, available at <www.iisd.ca/chemical/pops7>.

²⁴ Montreal Protocol, Non-Compliance Procedure, supra note 4. For the most recent report of the Montreal Protocol Implementation Committee, see Report of the Implementation Committee under the Non-Compliance Procedure for the Montreal Protocol on the Work of Its Thirty-First Meeting, Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro/ImpCom/31/3, 13 November 2003, available on the UNEP Ozone Secretariat website, supra note 2. See also Anderson and Sarma, supra note 7 at 274–89.

²⁵ Decision 1997/2, Concerning the Implementation Committee, Its Structure and Functions and Procedures for Review of Compliance, Doc. ECE/EB.Air/53, Annex III, available on the LRTAP website, supra note 9 [LRTAP Convention, Structure and Functions of Implementation Committee]. Revisions were made in 2001, see Doc. ECE/EB.Air/75, annex v. For the most recent report of the LRTAP Implementation Committee, see The Sixth Report of the Implementation Committee, Doc. ECE/EB.Air/2003/1 and Doc. ECE/EB.Air/2003/1 /Add. 1, 2 October 2003, available on the LRTAP website, supra note 9.

²⁶ Decision II/4, “Review of Compliance,” in Report of the Second Meeting of the Conference of the Parties, Doc. ECE/MP.EIA/4, 7 August 2001, Annex IV, available on the Espoo Convention website, supra note 19. Revisions were made and a consolidation of the Structure and Functions of the Implementation Committee and Procedures for Review of Compliance, adopted in 2004. See Decision III/2, “Review of Compliance,” in Report of the Third Meeting of the Conference of the Parties, supra note 20 [Espoo Convention, Structure and Functions of the Implementation Committee]. For the most recent report of the Espoo Convention Implementation Committee, see Report of the Fifth Meeting of the Implementation Committee, Doc. MP.EIA/WG. 1 / 2004/4,8 April 2004, available on the Espoo Convention website, supra note 19.

²⁷ Decision VI/12, “Establishment of Mechanism for Promoting Implementation and Compliance,” in Report of the Sixth Conference of the Parties of the Basel Convention, Doc. UNEP/CHW.6/40, 10 February 2003 [Basel Convention, Mechanism for Promoting Implementation and Compliance], available on the Basel website, supra note 18.

²⁸ Decision BS-I/7, “Establishment of Procedures and Mechanisms on Compliance under the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety,” in “Report of the First Meeting of the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Protocol on Biosafety,” Doc. UNEP/CBD/BS/COP-MOP/1/15, 14 April 2004, available on the Cartagena Protocol website, supra note 15.

²⁹ Pursuant to Article 18 of the Kyoto Protocol, supra note 12, the Seventh Conference of the Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC in 2001 adopted Procedures and Mechanisms Relating to Compliance under the Kyoto Protocol as Decision 24/ CP. 7, reprinted in Report of the Seventh Conference of the Parties of the Climate Change Convention, Doc. FCCC/CP/2001/13 Add.3, 21 January 2002 [Kyoto Protocol, Procedures and Mechanisms Relating to Compliance]. The question remains whether the first COP serving as the Meeting of the Parties (MOP) to the Kyoto Protocol will adopt the compliance mechanism as a decision, an amendment to the protocol, or both. See note 53 later in this article. For a brief review of the Kyoto compliance procedures, see Yamin, Farhana and Depledge, Joanna, The International Climate Change Regime: A Guide to Rules, Institutions and Procedures (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, chapter 12. A draft of this book is available at <www.ids.ac.uk/ids/env/climatechange.html> and references are to this draft. Regarding compliance and the Kyoto Protocol generally, see Werksman, Jacob, “Compliance and the Kyoto Protocol: Building a Backbone into a ‘Flexible’ Regime” (1998) 9 Y.B. Int’l Env. L. 48–101.Google Scholar

³⁰ The most recent draft of a decision and annex for the establishment of a compliance committee under the Rotterdam Convention is in Report of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for the Rotterdam Convention on its Tenth Session, Doc. UNEP/FAO/PIC/INC.10/24, 21 November 2003, Annex VIII, available on the Rotterdam Convention website, supra note 13 [Rotterdam Convention, Draft Non-Compliance Procedures].

³¹ See the Stockholm Secretariat report Synthesis of Views on Non-Compliance, Doc. UNEP/POPS/INC.7/21, 20 February 2003, prepared for the seventh meeting of the Stockholm Convention intergovernmental negotiating committee, available on the Stockholm Convention website, supra note 16.

³² See Report of the Twenty-Fifth Consultative Meeting of the Parties to the London Dumping Convention, Doc. LC 25/16, 7 November 2003, paras. 4.1–4.10 available on the London Dumping Convention website, supra note 11.

³³ Decision 1/7, “Review of Compliance,” in Report of the First Meeting of the Conference of the Parties, Doc. ECE/MP.PP/2, 17 December 2002, available on the Aarhus Convention website, supra note 14 [Aarhus Convention, Structure and Functions of the Compliance Committee). For the most recent report of the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee, see Report of the Second Meeting of the Implementation Committee, Doc. MP.PP/C. 1/2003/4, 15 October 2003, available on the Aarhus Convention website, supra note 14.

³⁴ “Statement by the Delegation of the United States with Respect to the Establishment of the Compliance Mechanism,” in Report of the First Meeting of the Conference of the Parties, supra note 33, Annex, para. 5 [Statement of the United States].

³⁵ Kyoto Protocol, Procedures and Mechanisms Relating to Compliance, supra note 29, paras IV and V; and see Yamin and Depledge, supra note 29 at 12–13 to 19.

³⁶ Yamin and Depledge, supra note 29 at 12–10.

³⁷ To be discussed in the next section of this article, entitled “Overview of Compliance Committee Structure Issues.”

³⁸ Excluded from detailed discussion are the compliance procedures under CITES, supra note 22, the Aarhus Convention, supra note 33, and the Kyoto Protocol, supra note 29.

³⁹ While Conference of the Parties (COP) will be used throughout this contribution, as evidenced in note 40, for some MEAs the plenary organ is referred to as the Meeting of the Parties (MOP), the Executive Body, or the Governing Body.

⁴⁰ For an excellent review of COPs under MEAs, see Churchill, Robin R. and Ulfstein, Geir, “Autonomous Institutional Arrangements in Multilateral Environmental Agreements: A Little-Noticed Phenomenon in International Law” (2000) 94 Am. J. Int’l L. 623-59CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also the listing in Sands, supra note 1 at 109–11. Regarding the conventions and protocols discussed in this contribution, see Montreal Protocol, supra note 2, Article 11, which establishes the MOP; Basel Convention, supranote 18, Article 15, which establishes the COP; LRTAP Con-vention, supra note g, Article 10, which establishes the Executive Body; Protocol to the London Dumping Convention, supra note 11, Article 18, which, when the protocol enters into force, will establish the Meeting of the Contracting Parties that will take over from the consultative meetings of the contracting parties established under the London Dumping Convention, supra note 11, Article XIV(4); Espoo Convention, supra note ig, Article 11, which establishes the MOP; Rotterdam Convention, supra note 13, Article 18, which establishes the COP; Cartagena Protocol, supra note 15, Article 29, which allows for the COP established by Article 23 of the CBD, supra note 15, to serve as the MOP for the Cartagena Protocol; Stockholm Convention, supra note 16, Article 19, which establishes the COP; Kyoto Protocol, supra note 12, Article 13, which allows for the COP established by Article 7 of the UNFCCC, supra note 12, to serve as the MOP for the Kyoto Protocol; and the ITPGRFA, supra note 17, Article 19, which establishes the Governing Body.

⁴¹ Montreal Protocol, supra note 2, Article 8; VOC Protocol, supra note 9, Article 3(3); Oslo Protocol, supra note 10, Article 7; Protocol to the London Dumping Convention, supra note 11, Article 11; Rotterdam Convention, supra note 13, Article 17; Cartagena Protocol, supra note 15, Article 34; Stockholm Convention, supra note 16, Article 16; Kyoto Protocol, supra note 12, Article 18; and the ITPGRFA, supra note 17, Article 21.

⁴² Rotterdam Convention, supra note 13, Article 18(5). Similar language is located in: Montreal Protocol, supra note 2, Article 11 (4)(a); Basel Convention, supra note 18, Article 15(5); LRTAP Convention, supranote 9, Article 10(2); Protocol to the London Dumping Convention, supra note 11, Article 18 (1); Espoo Convention, supra note 19, Article 11(2); Cartagena Protocol, supra note 15, Article 29(4); Stockholm Convention, supra note 16, Article 19(5); Kyoto Protocol, supra note 12, Article 13(j); and the ITPGRFA, supra note 17, Article 19.3.

⁴³ See Oslo Protocol, supra note 10, Article 7(2); Protocol to the London Dumping Convention, supra note 11, Article 11(2); Cartagena Protocol, supra note 15, Article 34; ITPGRFA, supra note 17, Article 21; Basel Convention, Mechanism for Promoting Implementation and Compliance, supra note 27, paras. 1 and 2; and Espoo Convention, Structure and Functions of the Implementation Committee, supra note 26, para. 12. The Kyoto Protocol, Procedures and Mechanisms Relating to Compliance, supra note 29, para. I, is a bit different: “The objective of these procedures and mechanisms is to facilitate, promote and enforce compliance with the commitments under the Protocol.”

⁴⁴ See Cartagena Protocol, supra note 15, Article 34; Montreal Protocol, Non-Compliance Procedure, supra note 4, preamble; LRTAP Convention, Structure and Functions of Implementation Committee, supranote 25,para. 12;Rotterdam Convention, Draft Non-Compliance Procedures, supra note 30, para. 27; Basel Convention, Mechanism for Promoting Implementation and Compliance, supra note 27, para. 27; Kyoto Protocol, Procedures and Mechanisms Relating to Compliance, supra note 29, para. XVI; and Espoo Convention, Structure and Functions of the Implementation Committee, supra note 26, para 12.

For a detailed analysis of the legal relationship between the Montreal non-compliance procedures and formal dispute settlement, see Koskenniemi, supra note 6 at 155–61. More generally on the relationship between international dispute setüement and MEA compliance mechanisms, see Fitzmaurice, M. A. and Redgwell, C., “Environmental Non-Compliance Procedures and International Law” (2000) 31 Netherlands Y.B. Int’l L. 35 at 43–52 Google Scholar. These authors wryly note that the without prejudice wording “scarcely penetrates the surface” of the relationship (at 51).

⁴⁵ Protocol to the London Dumping Convention, supra note 11, Article 16.

⁴⁶ See Vienna Convention on Protection of the Ozone Layer, supra note 2, Article 11, which applies to the Montreal Protocol pursuant to Article 14 of the protocol, supra note 2; Rotterdam Convention, supra note 13, Article 20; Basel Convention, supra note 18, Article 20; CBD, supra note 15, Article 27, which applies to the Cartagena Protocol pursuant to Article 32 of the protocol, supra note 15; Stockholm Convention, supra note 16, Article 18; and Espoo Convention, supra note 19, Article 15. See also UNFCCC, supra note 12, Article 14, which applies to the Kyoto Protocol pursuant to Article 19 of the protocol, supra note 12.

⁴⁷ Fitzmaurice and Redgwell, supra note 44 at 64.

⁴⁸ Shibata, Akiho, “The Basel Compliance Mechanism” (2003) 12 Rev. Eur. Comm. Int’l Env. L. 183 at 196.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ Koskenniemi, supra note 6 at 144 [footnote deleted] and see also 145.

⁵⁰ See notes 75–76 in this article. Note that Yamin and Depledge, supra note 29 at 1210, refer to aspects of the Kyoto Protocol compliance regime as “quasi-judicial.”

⁵¹ Respecting COPs and the interpretation of the underlying convention or protocol, see Churchill and Ulfstein, supra note 40 at 641–42.

⁵² See Brunnée, Jutta, “COPing with Consent: Law-Making under Multilateral Environmental Agreements” (2002) 15 Leiden J. Int’l L. 1 at 32 Google Scholar, where it is con-cluded that COP decisions “do not appear to be binding in a formal sense.” She goes on to note that the “distinction between COP decisions that are, techni-cally speaking, legally binding and those that are not may well be more apparent than real” (at 33). Generally, this article provides a sophisticated view of the working of COPs. Koskenniemi, supra note 6 at 146 and 152, notes that under the Montreal Protocol “the Meeting of the Parties cannot make binding decisions.” See also Yoshida, O., “Soft Enforcement of Treaties: The Montreal Protocol’s Noncompliance Procedure and the Functions of Internal International Institutions” (1999) 10 Colorado J. Int’l Env’l L. & Pol. 95 at 118–20.Google Scholar A different perspective, although not necessarily a different result, is provided by Churchill and Ulfstein, supra note 40 at 639–42.

⁵³ Regarding Kyoto Protocol, supranote 12, Article 18, see Brunnée, supra note 52 at 23–29; and Yamin and Depledge, supra note 29 at 12–10 to 19.

⁵⁴ For a discussion of counter-measures in state responsibility in the context of MEA compliance, see Koskenniemi, supra note 6 at 141–57; and Fitzmaurice and Redgwell, supra note 44 at 52–59.

⁵⁵ For a discussion of treaty law remedies in the context of MEA compliance, see Koskenniemi, supra note 6 at 137–41; and Fitzmaurice and Redgwell, supra note 44 at 59–62.

⁵⁶ This is not to say that the mere presence of a process for formal dispute settlement necessarily excludes the possibility of a compliance process utilizing coun-termeasures. See Koskenniemi, supra note 6 at 156. Rather, the position is that state parties have not yielded to (consented to) compliance mechanisms as the necessary authority.

⁵⁷ Fitzmaurice and Redgwell, supra note 44 at 37 and, more generally on the reasons for the establishment of compliance procedures, at 39–43. See also Churchill and Ulfstein, supra note 40 at 644–46.

⁵⁸ Excluded from detailed discussion are the compliance procedures under CITES, supra note 22, the Aarhus Convention, supra note 33, and the Kyoto Protocol, supra note 29.

⁵⁹ See Montreal Protocol, Non-Compliance Procedure, supra note 4, para. 5; LRTAP Convention, Structure and Functions of Implementation Committee, supranote 25, para. 1; and Espoo Convention, Structure and Functions of the Implementation Committee, supra note 26, para. 1(a).

⁶⁰ Basel Convention, Mechanism for Promoting Implementation and Compliance, supra note 27, para. 3; Cartagena Protocol, Procedures and Mechanisms on Compliance, supra note 28, para. 11(2); and Rotterdam Convention, Draft Non-Compliance Procedures, supra note 30, para. 2.

⁶¹ Basel Convention, Mechanism for Promoting Implementation and Compliance, supra note 27, para. 5; and Rotterdam Convention, Draft Non-Compliance Procedures, supra note 30, para. 3. The wording under the Cartagena Protocol is “serve objectively and in a personal capacity.” Cartagena Protocol, Procedures and Mechanisms on Compliance, supranote 28, para. II(3). This is further noted in notes 178–79 in this article. Members of the Kyoto Protocol compliance committee will “serve in their individual capacities.” Kyoto Protocol, Procedures and Mechanisms Relating to Compliance, supra note 29, para. II(6).

⁶² Neither the Montreal Protocol, Non-Compliance Procedure, supra note 4, para. 5, nor the LRTAP Convention, Structure and Functions of Implementation Committee, supra note 25, para. 1, make reference to the committee meetings being open and, therefore, are closed pursuant to the operating rules of procedure.

⁶³ See Basel Convention, Mechanism for Promoting Implementation and Compliance, supra note 27, para. 16.

⁶⁴ Shibata, supra note 48 at 189, noted that in the Basel Convention compliance negotiations “for the majority of parties, the issue of’non-compliance’ or ‘com-pliance difficulties’ … [was] … politically sensitive, resulting in countries being very cautious about discussing their own compliance issues in an international forum.”

⁶⁵ See Montreal Protocol, Non-Compliance Procedure, supra note 4, para. 4; LRTAP Convention, Structure and Functions of Implementation Committee, supra note 25, para. 4(b); Espoo Convention, Structure and Functions of the Implementation Committee, supra note 26, para. 4(b); Basel Convention, Mechanism for Promoting Implementation and Compliance, supra note 27, para. 9(a); Cartagena Protocol, Procedures and Mechanisms on Compliance, supra note 28, para. IV(1)(a); Kyoto Protocol, Procedures and Mechanisms Relating to Compliance, supra note 29, para. VI( 1 ) (a); and Rotterdam Conven-tion, Draft Non-Compliance Procedures, supra note 30, para. 11 (a).

⁶⁶ All of the MEAs noted herein either create their own secretariats or make use of existing secretariats. See Montreal Protocol, supra note 2, Articles 1 (3) and 12, which uses the Secretariat established by the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, supranote 2, Article 7; Basel Convention, supranote 18, Article 16; LRTAP Convention, supra note 9, Article 11, which uses the Secretariat of the Economic Commission of Europe; Protocol to the London Dump-ing Convention, supra note 11, Article ig, which, when the protocol enters into force, will make the International Maritime Organization the Secretariat; Espoo Convention, supra note 19, Article 13, which uses the Secretariat of the Economic Commission of Europe; Rotterdam Convention, supra note 13, Article 19; Cartagena Protocol, supra note 15, Article 31, which uses the Secretariat established by the CBD, supra note 15, Article 24; Stockholm Convention, supra note 16, Article 20; and the ITPGRFA, supra note 17, Article 20.

⁶⁷ Montreal Protocol, Non-Compliance Procedure, supra note 4, para. 1; LRTAP Convention, Structure and Functions of Implementation Committee, supranote 25, para. 4(a); Espoo Convention, Structure and Functions of the Implementation Committee, supra note 26, para. 4(a); Basel Convention, Mechanism for Promoting Implementation and Compliance, supra note 27, para. 9(b); Kyoto Protocol, Procedures and Mechanisms Relating to Compliance, supra note 29, para. VI(1) (b); and Cartagena Protocol, Procedures and Mechanisms on Compliance, supranote 28, para. IV(1)(b).

⁶⁸ For example, the party-to-party trigger is bracketed in the Rotterdam Convention, Draft Non-Compliance Procedures, supra note 30, para. 11 (b).

⁶⁹ See Montreal Protocol, Non-Compliance Procedure, supranote 4, para. 3; LRTAP Convention, Structure and Functions of Implementation Committee, supra note 25, para. 5; and Basel Convention, Mechanism for Promoting Implementation and Compliance, supra note 27, para. 9(c).

The Espoo Convention compliance mechanism does not contain an explicit secretariat trigger, however, the secretariat can put information regarding com-pliance before the committee. Espoo Convention, Structure and Functions of the Implementation Committee, supra note 26, para. 6(c). This is discussed in the section entitled “Espoo Convention” later in this article.

⁷⁰ Espoo Convention, Structure and Functions of the Implementation Committee, supranote 26, para. 5.

⁷¹ See Basel Convention, Mechanism for Promoting Implementation and Compliance, supra note 27, para. 21; Cartagena Protocol, Procedures and Mechanisms on Compliance, supra note 28, para. 111( 1 ) (d); LRTAP Convention, Structure and Functions of Implementation Committee, supra note 25, para. 3(d); and Montreal Protocol, Non-Compliance Procedure, supra note 4, para. 14.

⁷² Aarhus Convention, Structure and Functions of the Compliance Committee, supra note 33.

⁷³ See Aarhus Convention, Structure and Functions of the Compliance Committee, supra note 33, paras. 17–23. There are a number of safeguards of the “public trigger” including that state parties can, for a period of years, limit application of the trigger to them. More generally on public participation and international environmental treaties, see Ebbesson, Jonas, “The Notion of Public Participation in International Environmental Law” (1997) 8 Y.B. Int’l Envt’l L. 51–97.Google Scholar

⁷⁴ See Statement by the United States, supra note 34, paras. 7–8.

⁷⁵ Basel Convention, Mechanism for Promoting Implementation and Compliance, supra note 27, para. 19; and Cartagena Protocol, Procedures and Mechanisms on Compliance, supra note 28, para. VI(1).

⁷⁶ Montreal Protocol, Non-Compliance Procedure, supra note 4, para. 9; LRTAP Convention, Structure and Functions of Implementation Committee, supranote 25, para. 9; Espoo Convention, Structure and Functions of the Implementation Committee, supra note 26, para. 9; Basel Convention, Mechanism for Promoting Implementation and Compliance, supra note 27, para. 20; and Cartagena Protocol, Procedures and Mechanisms on Compliance, supra note 28, para. VI(1)(d) and (2).

⁷⁷ See Basel Convention, Mechanism for Promoting Implementation and Compliance, supra note 27, paras, 19 and 20; and Cartagena Protocol, Procedures and Mechanisms on Compliance, supra note 28, para. VI. This is the pattern being employed in the Rotterdam Convention, Draft Non-Compliance Procedures, supra note 30, paras. 17 and 18; and expected under the Protocol to the London Dumping Convention and the Stockholm Convention. In this regard, the Kyoto Protocol compliance mechanism is significantly different than the mechanisms under the other MEAs since the two branches of the committee clearly have the authority to take direct measures respecting a non-compliant party. See Kyoto Protocol, Procedures and Mechanisms Relating to Compliance, supra note 29, paras. XIV and XV.

⁷⁸ Basel Convention, Mechanism for Promoting Implementation and Compliance, supra note 27, para. 19(a) and (c); and Cartagena Protocol, Procedures and Mechanisms on Compliance, supranote 28, para. VI(1)(a) and (c).

⁷⁹ Basel Convention, Mechanism for Promoting Implementation and Compliance, supra note 27, para, 19 (b); and Cartagena Protocol, Procedures and Mechanisms on Compliance, supra 28, para. VI(1)(b).

⁸⁰ Indicative List of Measures That Might Be Taken by a Meeting of the Parties in Respect of Non-Compliance with the Protocol, at para. A, adopted at the Fourth Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol, reproduced in UNEP Ozone Secretariat, supra note 3 at 297 [Montreal Protocol, Indicative List of Measures].

⁸¹ Montreal Protocol, Indicative List of Measures, supra note 80, paras. B and C.

⁸² The language in the Basel Convention, Mechanism for Promoting Implementation and Compliance, supranote 27, para. 20 (b).

⁸³ Koskenniemi, supra note 6 at 145.

⁸⁴ It is worth noting that Birnie, Patricia and Boyle, Alan, International Law and the Environment, 2nd edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) at 208 Google Scholar, state, without elaboration, that the outcome of a compliance procedure can include ”suspension of treaty rights and privileges” pending attainment of full compliance by a state. Note also Churchill and Ulfstein, supra note 40 at 646–47, who make a similar statement, although in a different context.

⁸⁵ This wording is also found in the Aarhus Convention, Structure and Functions of the Compliance Committee, supranote 33, para. 35(g), and was on the table during the Basel Convention compliance negotiations, see Shibata, supra note 48 at 185.

⁸⁶ Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 May 1980, reprinted in 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.

⁸⁷ Ibid, at Article 60(3).

⁸⁸ Koskenniemi, supra note 6 at 140. See also Fitzmaurice and Redgwell, supra note 44 at 60.

⁸⁹ Klabbers, Jan, “The Substance of Form: The Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, Environmental Law, and the Law of Treaties” (1997) 8 Y.B. Int’l Envt’l L. 32 at 37Google Scholar, colourfully asserted that “Article 60 simply does not work. It does not mean what it says, and does not say what it means.”

⁹⁰ See Fitzmaurice and Redgwell, supra note 44 at 59; and Aust, Anthony, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) at 236–39.Google Scholar

⁹¹ Regarding the usefulness of Article 60 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and MEAs, see Birnie and Boyle, supra note 84 at 194–95.

⁹² See Churchill and Ulfstein, supra note 40 at 646–47; and Brunnée, supra note 52 at 16.

⁹³ See Yoshida, supra note 52 at 119.

⁹⁴ Koskenniemi, supra note 6 at 145.

⁹⁵ Such a trade embargo, having no foundation in international law, as for example a counter-measure, would also appear to be a breach of obligations existing on member states arising from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 1994 (GATT 1994), which was administered by the World Trade Organization (WTO). Pursuant to Article 11(4) of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 15 April 1994, entered into force 1 January 1995, GATT 1994 is a renaming of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 1947, as amended. Both the GATT 1947, as amended (GATT 1994) and the Agreement Establishing the WTO are reprinted in GATT Secretariat, The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations: The legal Texts (Geneva, 1994) at 485 and 6. See also the WTO website at <www.wto.org>.

⁹⁶ Decision IV/5 of the Fifth Meeting of the Parties, supra note 4.

⁹⁷ See Koskenniemi, supra note 6 at 129–34; andYoshida, supranote 52 at 101–4.

⁹⁸ See Anderson and Sarma, supra note 7 at 274–89; and Yoshida, supra note 52 at 109–21 and 127–39.

⁹⁹ See Decision II/5 of the Second Meeting of the Parties, supra note 3.

¹⁰⁰ Submission of the Soviet Union to the Third Meeting Ad Hoc Working Group of Legal Experts on Non-compliance with the Montreal Protocol, Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro/WG. 3/ CRP. 1, 6 November 1991, available on the UNEP Ozone Secretariat website, supra note 3.

¹⁰¹ Report of the Third Meeting of the ad hoc Working Group of Legal Experts on Non-Compliance with the Montreal Protocol, Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro/WG.3/3/3, 9 November 1991, para. 25, available on the UNEP Ozone Secretariat website, supra note 3, notes:

¹⁰² Decision IX/35 of the Ninth Meeting of the Parties, reproduced in the UNEP Ozone Secretariat, supra note 3 at 184–85.

¹⁰³ Decision X/10 of the Tenth Meeting of the Parties, supra note 5.

¹⁰⁴ See Report of the Implementation Committee under the Non-Compliance Procedure for the Montreal Protocol on the work of its Twentieth Meeting, Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro/ImpCom/20/4, 9 July 1998, paras. 31–33, available on the UNEP Ozone Secretariat website, supra note 3, and set out in condensed form in Anderson and Sarma, supra note 7 at 284.

¹⁰⁵ See Decision XV/14, “Data and Information provided by the Parties in Accordance with Article 7 of the Montreal Protocol,” para. 2, in Report of the Fifteenth Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer [Report of the Fifteenth Meeting], Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro. 15/9, 11 November 2003, available on the UNEP Ozone Secretariat website, supra note 3.

¹⁰⁶ See Decision XV/16, “Non-Compliance with Data Reporting Requirements under Article 7,” and Decision XV/18, “Non-Compliance with Data Reporting Requirements for the Purpose of Establishing Baselines,” in Report of theFifteenth Meeting, supra note 105.

¹⁰⁷ Report of the Fifteenth Meeting, supra note 105, paras. 132–33. For more on compliance with the reporting obligations in the Montreal Protocol, see Anderson and Sarma, supra note 7 at 275–78; and Yoshida, supra note 52 at 127– 30.

¹⁰⁸ See Yoshida, supra note 52 at 130–33; and Anderson and Sarma, supra note 7 at 278–80. There have been a number of amendments adding substances to the Montreal Protocol: the London Amendments, 29June 1990, entered into force 10 August 1992; the Copenhagen Amendment, 25 November 1992, entered into force 14june 1994; the Montreal Amendment, 17 September 1997, entered into force 19 November 1999; and the Beijing Amendment, 3 December 1999, entered into force 25 February 2002. All are reprinted in UNEP Ozone Secretariat, supra note 3 at 358–82 and are available on the UNEP Ozone Secretariat website, supra note 3.

¹⁰⁹ See Report of the Fifteenth Meeting, supra note 105, para. 135 and relevant decisions.

¹¹⁰ Report of the Fifteenth Meeting, supra note 105, para. 139; and Decision XV/42, “Non-Compliance with the Montreal Protocol by Saint Vincent and the Grenadines,” in Report of the Fifteenth Meeting, supra note 105.

¹¹¹ See, for example, Yoshida, supra note 52 at 135–39; Brack, Duncan, International Trade and the Montreal Protocol (London: Earthscan Publications, 1996) at 103–5Google Scholar; Anderson and Sarma, supra note 7 at 282–84; and Werksman, supra note 29 at 71–73.

¹¹² Decision VII/18 of the Seventh Meeting of the Parties, reproduced in UNEP Ozone Secretariat, supra note 3 at 214–15.

¹¹³ Decision VII/18, supra note 112, at para. 8, does not explicitly indicate that exports to other state parties were prohibited. Note Brack, supra note 111 at 104.

¹¹⁴ This is well described by Werksman, supra note 29 at 73.

¹¹⁵ Montreal Protocol, supra note 2, Articles 10 and 11 (4) (e). For the most recent report of the Multilateral Fund, see Report of the Executive Committee [of the Multilateral Fund] to the Fifteenth Meeting of the Parties, Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro. 15/ 8, 29 September 2003, available on the UNEP Ozone Secretariat website, supra note 3. For some general comments on the Multilateral Fund, see Sands, supra note 1 at 355–56 and 1031–32.

¹¹⁶ Montreal Protocol, supranote 2, Article 4.

¹¹⁷ Werksman, supra note 29 at 72.

¹¹⁸ See Decision XV/42, supra note 110, at para. 5.

¹¹⁹ Montreal Protocol, supra note 2, Article 4(9) reads:

For the purposes of this Ardele, the term “State not Party to this Protocol” shall include, with respect to a particular controlled substance, a State … that has not agreed to be bound by the control measures in effect for that substance.

¹²⁰ See Report of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Legal and Technical Experts, Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro/WG.4/1/3, 18 November 1998, at paras. 41–42, available on the UNEP Ozone Secretariat website, supra note 3.

¹²¹ See Montreal Protocol, supra note 2, Articles 2 and 3 and the amendments thereto in the London Amendment, the Copenhagen Amendment, the Montreal Amendment, and the Beijing Amendment, supra note 108.

¹²² The reporting obligadon is in Montreal Protocol, supra note 2, Article 7.

¹²³ Submission by Australia to the Ad Hoc Working Group of Legal and Technical Experts, Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro/WG.4/1/1/Add.2, 18 May 1998, paragraph 8, available on the UNEP Ozone Secretariat website, supra note 3.

¹²⁴ Methyl bromide was the subject of an Extraordinary Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol in March 2004. See Report of the First Extraordinary Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol, Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro.ExMP/1/3, 27 March 2004, available on the UNEP Ozone Depletion website, supra note 3, and a succinct overview in “Summary of the Extraordinary Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol” (29 March 2004) 19(34) Earth Negotiations Bulletin 7–8, available at <www.iisd.ca/ozone/exmp/>.

¹²⁵ LRTAP Convention, Structure and Functions of the Implementation Committee, supra note 25.

¹²⁶ Regarding the authority of the Executive Body under the LRTAP Convention, see LRTAP Convention, supra note 9, Article 10.

¹²⁷ VOC Protocol, supra note 9, Article 3(3) states:

The Parties shall establish a mechanism for monitoring compliance with the Present Protocol. As a first step based on information provided pursuant to Article 8 or other information, any Party which has reason to believe that another Party is acting in a manner inconsistent with its obligations under this Protocol may inform the Executive Body to that effect and, simultaneously, the Parties concerned. At the request of any Party, the matter may be taken up at the next meeting of the Executive Body.

¹²⁸ Oslo Protocol, supra note 10, Article 7(1).

¹²⁹ Report of theFifteenth Session of the Executive Body, Doc. ECE/EB.AIR/53, 7 January 1998, at para. 47, available on the LRTAP Convention website, supra note 9.

¹³⁰ Oslo Protocol, supra note 10, Article 7.

¹³¹ Decision 1997/2, Concerning the Implementation Committee, Its Structure and Functions and Procedures for Review of Compliance, supra note 25, at para. 4.

¹³² Decision 1997/3, Compliance Monitoringfor the VOC Protocol, Doc. ECE/EB.AIR/ 53, Annex IV, available on the LRTAP Convention website, supranote 9.

¹³³ Decision 1998/6, The Review Foreseen Under Article 8 of the 1994 Oslo Convention, Doc. ECE/EB.AIR/59, Annex I, available on the LRTAP Convention website, supra note 9.

¹³⁴ See the 1998 Protocol on Heavy Metals, 24 June 1998, entered into force 29 December 2003, Article 9; the 1998 Protocol on Persistent Organic Pollutants, 24 June 1998, entered into force 23 October 2003, Article 11; and the 1999 Protocol to Abate Acidification, Eutrophication and Ground-Level Ozone, 30 November 1999, not yet in force, Article 9. These protocols are available on the LRTAP Convention website, supra note 9.

¹³⁵ For a good overview of the workings of the LRTAP Convention and its various protocols, see Sands, supra note 1 at 324–36.

¹³⁶ See the Third Report of the Implementation Committee, Doc. ECE/EB.AIR/ 2002/2, 29 September 2000, at para. 31, available on the LRTAP Convention website, supra note 9. The authority for this is the LRTAP Convention, Structure and Functions of the Implementation Committee, supra note 25, para. 3(d).

¹³⁷ LRTAP, Structure and Functions of the Implementation Committee, supra note 25, para. 3(a).

¹³⁸ See the Fourth Report of the Implementation Committee, Doc. ECE/EB.AIR/2001/ 3, 3 October 2001, at para. 45(i), available on the LRTAP Convention website, supra note 9.

¹³⁹ See the Fifth Report of the Implementation Committee, Doc. EB.AIR/2002/2, 30 September 2002, at para. 30, available on the LRTAP Convention website, supra note 9.

¹⁴⁰ Sixth Report of the Implementation Committee,” supra note 25, at para. 17.

¹⁴¹ LRTAP, “Structure and Functions of the Implementation Committee,” supra note 25, para. 3(d).

¹⁴² Ibid. at paras. 5 and 3(b).

¹⁴³ Ibid. at paras. 3(b) and 4(b).

¹⁴⁴ Fourth Report of the Implementation Committee, supra note 138, at paras. 3–10.

¹⁴⁵ Third Report of the Implementation Committee, supra note 136, at paras. 3–13.

¹⁴⁶ Protocol to the LRTAP Convention Concerning the Control of Nitrogen Oxides, 31 October 1988, entered into force 14 February 1991, reprinted in (1988) 28 I.L.M. 214, and available on the LRTAP Convention website, supra note 9.

¹⁴⁷ Fifth Report of the Implementation Committee, supra note 139, at paras. 22–50.

¹⁴⁸ See the Sixth Report of the Implementation Committee, supra note 25, at paras 29–62.

¹⁴⁹ Report of the Twenty-First Session of the Executive Body, Doc. ECE/EB.AIR/79, 21 January 2004, at para. 21, available on the LRTAP Convention website, supra note 9.

¹⁵⁰ Report of the Twenty-First Session of the Executive Body, supra note 149 at para. 24.

¹⁵¹ Report of the Fifteenth Session of the Executive Committee, supra note 129 at para. 48.

¹⁵² Espoo Convention, Structure and Functions of the Implementation Committee, supranote 26.

¹⁵³ Decision III/7, supranote 20, at para. 3(f).

¹⁵⁴ The decision also confirms that parties shall continue to be eligible to participate in the convention’s compliance activities, regardless of whether the second amendment has entered into force for that party or not. See Decision III/7, supra note 20, paras. 1 and 2.

¹⁵⁵ Decision II/4, supra note 26, para. 4 states:

Decides to review the structure and functions of the [Implementation] Committee at the third meeting of the Parties, bearing in mind the possible involvement of the public and requests in this context the Implementation Committee to prepare the necessary proposals for the third meeting of the Parties.

¹⁵⁶ Decision III/2, supra note 26.

¹⁵⁷ Report of the Third Meeting of the Implementation Committee, Doc. MP.EIA/WG. 1 / 2003/8, 10July 2003, paras. 13–15, available on the Espoo Convention website, supra note 19.

¹⁵⁸ Espoo Convention, Structure and Functions of the Implementation Committee, supra note 26, para 5. For obvious reasons, the scope of the self- and party-to-party triggers are not relevant to the issue of “unsolicited” information.

¹⁵⁹ These lacunae should be addressed when the second amendment enters into force, as a new provision in the convention will allow the MOP to establish reporting requirements. See Decision III/7, supra note 20.

¹⁶⁰ As part of its review of public involvement with the Implementation Committee, the committee reported that:

If the Committee received unsolicited information, it might review the need for a procedure for processing such information. The Committee would then report back to the Parties at their fourth meeting on how the Committee might deal with unsolicited information.

Report of the Third Meeting of the Implementation Committee, supra note 157, para. 10.

¹⁶¹ Report of the Fourth Meeting of the Implementation Committee, Doc. MP.EIA/WG.1/ 2003/3,17 December 2003, para. 4, available on the Espoo Convention website, supra note 19.

¹⁶² See Report of the Fourth Meeting of the Implementation Committee, supra note 161, paras. 8–10.

¹⁶³ Report of the Fifth Meeting of the Implementation Committee, supra note 26, para. 7 and see more generally paras. 5–8.

¹⁶⁴ Report of the Fifth Meeting of the Implementation Committee, supranote 26, para. 7.

¹⁶⁵ Decision III/2, supra note 26, at para. 7.

¹⁶⁶ For a detailed review of the negotiations leading to the completion of the Basel Convention compliance mechanism, see Shibata, supra note 48.

¹⁶⁷ Basel Convention, Mechanism for Promoting Implementation and Compliance, supra note 27.

¹⁶⁸ Basel Convention, supra note 18, Article 15(5)(c) and (e).

¹⁶⁹ Basel Convention, supra note 18, Article 19 reads:

Any Party which has reason to believe that another Party is acting or has acted in breach of its obligations under this Convention may inform the Secretariat thereof, and in such an event, shall simultaneously and immediately inform, directly or through the Secretariat, the Party against whom allegations are made. All relevant information should be submitted by the Secretariat to the Parties.

¹⁷⁰ Basel Convention, Mechanism for Promoting Implementation and Compliance, supra note 27, paras. 3 and 5.

¹⁷¹ Ibid, at para. 9.

¹⁷² Ibid, at para. 9(b).

¹⁷³ Ibid at para. 9(c).

¹⁷⁴ Ibid at para. 20(b).

¹⁷⁵ See “Statement by the Chair of the Committee,” in Report of the Second Session of the Open-ended Working Group, Doc. UNEP/CHW/OEWG/2/12, 16 December 2003, Annex V, available on the Basel Convention website, supra note 18.

¹⁷⁶ Cartagena Protocol, supra note 15, Article 34. The convention referred to in Article 34 is the CBD, supra note 15.

¹⁷⁷ Cartagena Protocol, Procedures and Mechanisms on Compliance, supranote 28.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid. at para. 11(3) [emphasis added].

¹⁷⁹ See “Summary of the First Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety” (1 March 2004) 9(289) Earth Negotiations Bulletin at 8, available at <www.iisd.ca/biodiv/bs-copmopi/>.

¹⁸⁰ Cartagena Protocol, Procedures and Mechanisms on Compliance, supra note 28, para. VI(1).

¹⁸¹ Ibid, at para. VI(1). The Basel provision is Basel Convention, Mechanism for Promoting Implementation and Compliance, supra note 27, para. 18.

¹⁸² Cartagena Protocol, Procedures and Mechanisms on Compliance, supra note 28, para. VI(2) (a),(b) and (c).

¹⁸³ Ibid. at para. VI(2)(d).

¹⁸⁴ For a recent overview of the Rotterdam Convention, see McDorman, T. L., “The Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesdcides in International Trade: Some Legal Notes” (2004) 13 Rev. Eur. Comm. & Int’l Env’l L. 187–200.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁸⁵ Rotterdam Convention, Draft Non-Compliance Procedures, supra note 30.

¹⁸⁶ See ibid, at paras. 11 and 18.

¹⁸⁷ Rotterdam Convention, supranote 13, Article 17.

¹⁸⁸ Rotterdam Convention, Draft Non-Compliance Procedures, supra note 30, para. 17.

¹⁸⁹ See text accompanying note 43 in this article.

¹⁹⁰ Regarding the Stockholm Convention, see Downie, David and Fenge, Terry, eds. Northern Lights against POPs: Combatting Toxic Threats in the Arctic (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2003).Google Scholar

¹⁹¹ Stockholm Convention, supranote 16, Article 17.

¹⁹² See text accompanying notes 187–89 in this article.

¹⁹³ Compilation of Views on Non-Compliance, Doc. UNEP/POPS/INC.7/INF/8, 25 February 2003 and Synthesis of Views on Non-Compliance, supra note 31, available on the Stockholm Convention website, supra note 16.

¹⁹⁴ “Summary of the Seventh Session,” supra note 23 at 8; and see Report of the Seventh Session of the Stockholm Convention, supra note 23 at para. 128.

¹⁹⁵ “Summary of the Seventh Session,” supra note 23 at 8; and Report of the Seventh Session of the Stockholm Convention, supra note 23 at paras. 127 and 130.

¹⁹⁶ Protocol to the London Dumping Convention, supra note 11, Article 11.

¹⁹⁷ Development of Compliance Arrangements: Compliance under the London Convention 1972 and the 1996 Protocol, Submitted by Canada, Doc. LC 20/4, 24 September 1998.

¹⁹⁸ Report of the Twenty-Fifth Consultative Meeting of Parties, supra note 32 at paras. 3.3 et seq. and Annex 2.

¹⁹⁹ For the most recent report of the Scientific Group on Dumping, see Report of the Twenty-Fifth Consultative Meeting of Parties, supranote 32 at paras. 5.1–5.27.

²⁰⁰ Protocol to the London Dumping Convention, supra note 11, Article 9(5).

²⁰¹ Ibid. at Article 26.

²⁰² See text accompanying note 22 in this article.

²⁰³ See text accompanying notes 84–95 in this article.

²⁰⁴ See notes 146–48 in this article.

²⁰⁵ Kyoto Protocol, supra note 12, Article 11.

²⁰⁶ See note 144 in this article.