1. Translation adapted from “Bonn's Song Plugging Fails to Win Germans to Idea of New Anthem,” New York Times, 29 December 1951 and “‘Germany above all’ is national hymn again,” Daily Herald (London), 6 May 1952.Google Scholar

2. See Klemperer, Victor, The Language of the Third Reich: LTI—Lingua Tertii Imperii, trans. Brady, Martin (London, 2000)Google Scholar. On Günther Grass and “damaged language,” see Hartman, Geoffrey H., The Longest Shadow: In the Aftermath of the Holocaust (Bloomington, 1996), 53.Google Scholar

3. McClelland, Charles E. and Scher, Steven P., eds., Postwar German Culture: An Anthology (New York, 1974), 154–55.Google Scholar

4. Wintzen, René, “Post-war German Literature,” in Germany: Cultural Developments since 1945, ed. Paul, Schallück (Munich, 1971), 203Google Scholar. According to Turner, Henry A., young postwar writers pursued “freeing the German language from what they saw as the corrupting influences of the past,” The Two Germanics since 1945 (New Haven, 1987), 64.Google Scholar

5. Hattenhauer, Hans, Deutsche Nationalsymbole: Zeichen und Bedeutung (Munich, 1984), 64Google Scholar; Knopp, Guido and Kuhn, Ekkehard, Das Lied der Deutschen (Berlin, 1988), 92.Google Scholar

6. Haydn's melody with various textual variations served as the Austrian royal song until 1918. With new lyrics it served as the anthem for the first Austrian republic from 13 December 1929 until the end of World War II. Acknowledging that the reintroduction of the Haydn melody would be viewed by foreigners as a provocation, the second Austrian republic held a contest to solicit proposals for a new anthem. On 22 October 1946 the Council of Ministers selected a composition attributed to Mozart as the music for the new “Federal song.” Later, the government chose the lyrics submitted by poet and novelist Paula von Preradovic. See, Diem, Peter, Die Symbole Österreichs (Vienna, 1995), 148.Google Scholar

7. Weissmann, Karlheinz, Die Zeichen des Reiches (Asendorf, 1989), 72.Google Scholar

8. Knopp, and Kuhn, , Lied der Deutschen, 60Google Scholar. On occasion Wacht am Rhein was also used as a signal song.

9. Ulrich, Allwardt, Einigkeit und Recht und Freiheit: Nationale Symbole und nationale Identität (Bonn, 1985), 26Google Scholar; Theodor, Heuss, “Politische Stilbildung,” in Die grossen Reden: Der Staatsmann (Tübingen, 1965), 213Google Scholar. The regimental histories suggest that while the romanticized event reported in the war bulletin probably did not happen, the Deutschlandlied had, in fact, been sung on many occasions during the battle, often in failed attempts to divert friendly fire. See, Karl, Unruh, Langemarck: Legende und Wirklichkeit (Koblenz, 1986), 151–64Google Scholar; and Reinhard, Dithmar, ed., Der Langemarck-Mythos in Dichtung und Unterricht (Berlin, 1992).Google Scholar

10. A Weimar postage stamp commemorating the song bore the text “Einigkeit und Recht und Freiheit” from the third verse and suggested the political values for which the government stood.

11. Hattenhauer, , Deutsche Nationalsymbole, 62.Google Scholar

12. Dithmar, , Langemarck-Mythos, XXXV.Google Scholar

13. Ibid., xxxii–xxxiii; Adolf, Hitler, Mein Kampf, trans. Ralph, Manheim (Boston, 1971), 164–65.Google Scholar

14. In modern society, “public communication … is organized and structured by the media according to professional criteria and norms. Public opinion thus becomes visible through the contributions of various actors who advance their views on certain issues in print and electronic media.” Christiane Eilders, “The Impact of Editorial Content on the Political Agenda in Germany: Theoretical Assumptions and Open Questions Regarding a Neglected Subject in Mass Communication Research” (Discussion Paper FS III 97–102 presented at Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, December 1997), 1.

15. Research has demonstrated that editorials and the media directly and indirectly influence individuals in their decision-making process. Elihu, Katz and Lazarsfeld, P., Personal Influence (Glencoe, Illinois, 1955), 32Google Scholar, quoted in Grossberg, Lawrence, Wartella, Ellen, and Whitney, D. Charles, Media Making: Mass Media in a Popular Culture (Thousand Oaks, California, 1998), 340.Google Scholar

16. Noelle-Neumann, Elisabeth, “The Theory of Public Opinion: The Concept of the Spiral of Silence,” in Communications Yearbook 14, ed. Anderson, James A. (Newbury Park, 1991), 270.Google Scholar

17. Ibid., 259.

18. President Heuss complained that although Severing and other leaders of the SPD had approached him early on to oppose the reintroduction of the Deutschlandlied, Schumacher had been less than supportive of the idealist position. Heuss accused the SPD and Schumacher of leaving him holding the bag. Minutes of meeting between Heuss and Adenauer, 21 August 1951, in Unter vier Augen: Gespräche aus den Gränderjahren, 1949–1959, ed. Hans-Peter, Mensing (Berlin, 1997), 65.Google Scholar

19. Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages, 1. Wahlperiode, Drucksachen, vol. 1 (1949), Doc. 67.

20. In the Bundestag, Ott aligned himself initially with the Bloc of Expellees and Disenfranchised (BHE) and in 1952 with the German Party (DP). Richard, Stöss, ed., Parteien-Handbuch (Opladen, 1984), 2:1428–29.Google Scholar

21. “‘Einigkeit und Recht und Freiheit,’” Kieler Nachrichten, 6 March 1952.Google Scholar

22. “Vom Flaggenstreit zum Hymnenstreit,” Die Tat (Zurich), 11 November 1951.Google Scholar

23. On 2 October 1949, Dorls cofounded and became chairman of the Sozialistische Reichspartei (SRP: Socialist Party of the Reich). Most members of the SRP were former Nazi activists and SS-men. After numerous conflicts between the SRP and the Federal government, the SRP was declared subversive by the Constitutional Court and outlawed on 23 October 1952. To avoid prosecution, Dorls fled the country. He returned in 1955, was arrested and subsequently convicted of having led an anticonstitutional organization and sentenced to fourteen months in prison. See, Stöss, , Parteien-Handbuch, 2:2275.Google Scholar

24. Kurt, Seeger, Letter to the Editor, “Der Leser hat das Wort: Noch einmal das Deutschlandlied,” Das Parlament, 2 02 1955.Google Scholar

25. Paul, Sethe, “Das Lied der Deutschen,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 10 05 1952.Google Scholar

26. Erich Stückrath, “Es gibt einen Weg,” ibid., 14 September 1951.

27. Heuss and Adenauer discussed the decision by the Board of the Federation of Trade Unions to oppose the Deutschlandlied as national anthem. Heuss persuaded Adenauer to omit the planned performance of Haydn's Kaiserquartett from the official program for the upcoming national holiday. Minutes of meeting on 24 August 1951, in Mensing, , ed., Unter vier Augen, 66–67.Google Scholar

28. An expert opinion from the Federal Ministry of the Interior confirmed the Adenauer government's support for this position. See, Bundesregierung, , “35. Kabinettssitzung am 13. Januar 1950,” in Die Kabinettsprotokolle der Bundesregierung, ed. Ulrich, Enders and Konrad, Reiser (Boppard am Rhein, 1984), 2:126.Google Scholar

29. Heuss to Adenauer, 24 January 1952, in Unserem Vaterlande zugute: Der Briefwechsel, 1948–1963, ed. Mensing, Hans Peter (Berlin, 1989), 100.Google Scholar

30. Heuss had been assistant professor in Berlin from 1920 to 1933 and became professor of political science and modern history at the Institute of Technology in Stuttgart in 1948.

31. The CDU had proposed a flag containing the Andreas Cross as an alternative to the tricolor. One of the conspirators of the 20 July 1944 plot against Hitler had created the design. The CDU intended for the flag to indicate the German Christian tradition and to recall the conservative resistance to Hitler.

32. Heuss, , letter to Carl Orff, 27 September 1950Google Scholar, quoted in Knopp, and Kuhn, , Lied der Deutschen, 105.Google Scholar

33. Heuss to Orff, quoted in ibid., 105.

34. See, letter to the editor by Drvon Poll, (Koblenz), “Die Nationalhymne,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 28 08 1951Google Scholar; swimming champion Herbert Klein's comments in “Kopfzer-brechen über die Nationalhymne,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, 29 September 1951.

35. “Für den Sport entschieden,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 6 September 1951Google Scholar; letter by Poll, , “Die Nationalhymne,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 28 08 1951.Google Scholar

36. “Das umstrittene Deutschlandlied,” Frankfurter Neue Presse, 23 October 1951.Google Scholar

37. The Minister for All-German Affairs suggested the pragmatic solution of the third verse at the 35th Cabinet Meeting on 13 January 1950. Bundesregierung, , Kabinettsprotokolle, vol. 2, 129.Google Scholar

38. “Für eine deutsche Nationalhymne,” Die Zeit, 23 August 1951.Google Scholar

39. Quoted in “Für und wider das Deutschlandlied,” Westdeutsches Tageblatt, 5 January 1952.Google Scholar

40. Furtwängler, quoted in Ibid.

41. Alois, Friedel, Deutsche Staatssymbole (Frankfurt am Main, 1968), 49Google Scholar. Apparently, President Heuss had caught wind of the chancellor's plan and had attempted to persuade him not to sing the third verse since such an event would politicize the anthem question. See Under-Secretary of State Manfred Klaiber to Vice Chancellor Franz Blücher, 25 April 1950, quoted in Mensing, , ed., Unter vier Augen, 341Google Scholar, n. 5.

42. On 28 April 1950 Adenauer received a memorandum from the Allied High Commission reminding him of the unfortunate reputation of the Deutschlandlied abroad.

43. “Neue Nationalhymne oder altes Deutschlandlied?” Freie Demokratische Korrespondenz, 1 November 1950.Google Scholar

44. Knopp, and Kuhn, , Lied der Deutschen, 102Google Scholar; Allwardt, , Einigkeit, 29.Google Scholar

45. Minutes of meeting between Adenauer and Heuss, 8 May 1950, in Mensing, , ed., Unter vier Augen, 41.Google Scholar

46. Knopp, and Kuhn, , Lied der Deutschen, 103.Google Scholar

47. In their meeting of 8 May 1950, Heuss informed Adenauer that he had commissioned a poet to write the lyrics for a new anthem. Mensing, , ed., Unter vier Augen, 41.Google Scholar

48. For an example of this, see Erich, Stückrath, “Es gibt einen Weg,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 10 09 1951.Google Scholar

49. To indicate that Germany was preferred over, or was superior to, other nations, the phrase would use the words “Deutschland [liebe ich] vor allem.”

50. The first line of the Horst-Wessel-Lied is: “Raise the flag, tightly close the ranks!” See, “Wer kennt das Deutschlandlied?” Deutsche Nationalzeitung, 10 July 1954.Google Scholar

51. “Für eine deutsche Nationalhymne,” Die Zeit, 23 August 1951.Google Scholar

52. “Die Nationalhymne,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 25 August 1951Google Scholar. Such reports furthered public misperception that Schumacher personally opposed the Deutschlandlied.

53. “Verhängnisvolle Geschehnisse belasten ein Lied,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, 12 November 1949Google Scholar; “Deutschland über alles?” Deutsche Zeitung und Wirtschafts-Zeitung, 1 September 1951.Google Scholar

54. Harold, James, A German Identity (London, 1989), 183.Google Scholar

55. Letter to the editors by , A.W., “Unsere Leser zur Frage der Nationalhymne,” Deutsche Tagespost, 11 January 1951.Google Scholar

56. See “Die Nationalhymne,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 25 August 1951Google Scholar; “Die Kriegsgesänge der anderen,” Hamburger Abendblatt, 29 March 1952.Google Scholar

57. Letter by Poll, , “Die Nationalhymne,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 28 08 1951.Google Scholar

58. Quoted in “‘Hymne an Deutschland’ diskutiert: Pressekommentare und Stimmen aus dem Publikum,” Die Neue Zeitung, 9 January 1951.Google Scholar

59. Letter to the editors by , W.R., “Unsere Leser zur Frage der Nationalhymne,” Deutsche Tagespost, 11 January 1951.Google Scholar

60. Letter to the editors by , E.M., “Unsere Leser zur Frage der Nationalhymne,” Deutsche Tagespost, 11 January 1951Google Scholar. See also, “Kein Streitobjekt,” Kieler Nachrichten, 6 March 1952.Google Scholar

61. This concern that the Federal Republic's symbols speak to Germans in Soviet POW camps or in the GDR played a role in the adoption of the republican colors of black-red-gold and in the 1950s debate over the wearing of World War II military medals.

62. Heuss to Adenauer, 19 June 1951, in Mensing, , ed., Unserem Vaterlande, 73–74.Google Scholar

63. Adenauer to Heuss, 26 June 1951, in ibid., 74.

64. “Erstmals wieder Deutschlandlied,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 12 July 1951Google Scholar; “Keine Zustimmung Adenauers,” ibid., 13 July 1951.

65. Reported in DrFranz, Lorenz, “Die ‘Hymne an Deutschland’ in der Volksmeinung,” Westdeutsche Rundschau, 3 03 1951.Google Scholar

66. Ibid.

67. “Wir wollen unser Deutschland-Lied!” Flensburger Tageblatt, 3 March 1951.Google Scholar

68. “Versuch einer Nationalhymne,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 5 January 1951Google Scholar. See also “‘Hymne an Deutschland’ diskutiert: Pressekommentare und Stimmen aus dem Publikum,” Die Neue Zeitung, 9 January 1951.Google Scholar

69. In a 1975 study using Ralph Dahrendorf's model of social stratification, 85 percent of German journalists were determined to be from the service class and from the old middle class. “The service class is a participant in power and therefore interested in preserving the status quo.” Müller-Sorge, Maria M., Journalismus-Offenheit und Konformität: Die politische Tagespresse in der Bundesrepublik (Frankfurt am Main., 1975), 176–77Google Scholar. For Dahrendorf's discussion of the service class and the old middle class, see Ralph, Dahrendorf, Society and Democracy in Germany (New York, 1967), 89–92.Google Scholar

70. “Bonn's Song Plugging Fails to Win Germans to Idea of New Anthem,” New York Times, 28 December 1951.Google Scholar

71. For more on the influence of editorial policy on public opinion, see Shanto, Iyengar and Kinder, Donald R., News that Matters: Television and American Public Opinion (Chicago, 1987)Google Scholar; Rogers, Everett M. and Dearing, James W., “Agenda-Setting Research: Where has it Been, Where is it Going?” in Communication Yearbook 11, ed. Anderson, James A. (Newbury Park, 1988): 555–94Google Scholar; Eilders, , “Impact of Editorial Content.”Google Scholar

72. “Zunehmende Spannung um Nationalhymne,” Allgemeine Zeitung (Mainz), 15 September 1951.Google Scholar

73. The first Adenauer government formed in 1949 was a coalition of the CDU-CSU, the FDP, and the DP. In 1953 the second Adenauer government included the previous coalition partners and the BHE.

74. Hans-Joachim von Merkatz, a member of the DP delegation to the Bundestag and observer to the Permanent Secretary in the Federal Ministry for the Affairs of the Bundesrat, informed the cabinet on 21 August 1951 of the DP's continuing support for the Deutschlandlied in its entirety. Adenauer instructed him that the first two verses of the anthem “are not well-suited to the present day; therefore, the German Party should reconsider the matter.” Bundesregierung, , “167. Kabinettssitzung am 21. August 1951,” Kabinettsprotokolle, 4:603.Google Scholar

75. “Blücher stumm beim Deutschlandlied,” Abendpost [West Berlin?], 22 September 1951.Google Scholar

76. “Diskussion um das Deutschlandlied geht weiter,” Münchner Merkur, 27 October 1951.Google Scholar

77. “Bemerkungen,” Kasseler Post, 27 October 1951.Google Scholar

78. “Die Kata=Strophe,” Neuer Vorwärts, 2 November 1951.Google Scholar

79. Richard, Schweitzer, “Erne Lanze für das Deutschlandlied,” Westdeutsches Tageblatt, 26 03 1952.Google Scholar

80. “Die Mehrheit wünscht das Deutschlandlied,” Die Welt, 7 November 1951Google Scholar; “‘Bevölkerung will Deutschlandlied’,” Frankfurter Neue Presse, 7 November 1951.Google Scholar

81. Efforts to create a German-German team failed. The International Olympic Committee then recognized the West German National Olympic Committee for Germany as the provisional German Olympic Committee. Only West German athletes participated in the 1952 Olympic Games.

82. A draft treaty for the European Defense Community was initialed by the intended participants in Bonn on 23 May 1952, and a related treaty ending the Federal Republic's occupied status was drafted. The French parliament rejected the proposed EDC in 1954, endangering the plans to grant sovereignty to the Federal Republic. In the fall of 1954 new agreements were reached in the Paris Treaties which allowed for the entry of the Federal Republic into NATO as an autonomous state. On 5 May 1955 the Occupation Statute lapsed, and the Federal Republic became sovereign.

83. Heuss, , memorandum concerning the national anthem, 3 April 1952Google Scholar, in Mensing, , ed., Unserem Vaterlande, 110.Google Scholar

84. Adenauer to Heuss, 29 April 1952; Heuss to Adenauer, 2 May 1952, in ibid., 111–14.

85. See “Unser deutsches Lied,” Christ und Welt (Stuttgart), 8 May 1952Google Scholar; “Die Koalition begrüsst die Hymne,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 6 May 1952.Google Scholar

86. “Symbole sind stark,” Ibid.

87. “Deutschlandlied von Heuss als Nationalhymne anerkannt,” Die Neue Zeitung, 6 May 1952.Google Scholar

88. Quoted in “Germany Keeps an Old Symbol,” New York Herald Tribune, 10 May 1952.Google Scholar

89. “Das Deutschland-Lied,” Allgemeine Wochenzeitung der Juden (Düsseldorf), 9 May 1952.Google Scholar

90. “Wenn der Bundespräsident resigniert …,” National-Zeitung (Basel), 7 May 1952.Google Scholar

91. See “Germany Keeps an Old Symbol,” New York Herald Tribune, 10 May 1952Google Scholar; “Ausland kritisiert das Deutschlandlied,” Westdeutsche Neue Presse, 9 May 1952Google Scholar; Paul, Sethe, “Das Lied der Deutschen,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 10 05 1952.Google Scholar

92. “Wenn der Bundespräsident resigniert …,” National-Zeitung (Basel), 7 May 1952.Google Scholar

93. “Die Hymne des Todes,” Tägliche Rundschau (East Berlin), 7 May 1952.Google Scholar

94. “Chauvinistisches Kriegsgegröhl aus Bonn,” Neues Deutschtand (East Berlin), 12 May 1952.Google Scholar

95. The cool reaction of the Adenauer government to the March 1952 Stalin note, proposing a reunified, neutral Germany, probably encouraged the SED-leadership to view the adoption of the Deutschlandlied as a hostile act.

96. “SPD: Taktlosigkeit der Regierung,” Frankfurter Rundschau, 6 May 1952.Google Scholar

97. Heuss to Adenauer, 2 May 1952, in Mensing, , ed., Unserem Vaterlande, 113.Google Scholar

98. See Heuss to Adenauer, 6 December 1959, in idem, , Unserem Vaterlande, 292–94.Google Scholar

99. The editor had published a satirical text, Deutschlandlied '86, that was critical of contemporary German society.

100. This decision rejected the Federal Minister of Justice's contention that all three verses of the song constituted the national anthem. The court accepted the petitioner's argument that his right to artistic freedom had been violated by the lower courts' decisions. The petitioner had also argued that the law for the protection of state symbols was too vague, but the Court accepted this only insofar as it pertained to the first two verses of the Deutschlandlied. The Court found that the law clearly applied to the third verse. Bundesverfassungsgericht, , “Beschluß des Ersten Senats vom 7. März 1990,” Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts (Tübingen, 1990), 81:298–309.Google Scholar

101. Letter to the editors by Kurt, Rothfuss, “Der Leser hat das Wort: Das Deutschlandlied und seine erste Strophe,” Das Parlament, 26 January 1955.Google Scholar