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China Eyes the Japanese Military: China's Threat Perception of Japan since the 1980s*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 September 2010

Tomonori Sasaki
Tomonori Sasaki
Affiliation:
Ministry of Defence of Japan. Email: tomonorisasaki94@gmail.com
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Abstract

This article represents the first attempt to examine the Chinese elite's threat perception of Japan using statistics to analyse what, if any, differences exist among the People's Liberation Army, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Chinese economic institutes. It seeks to answer two questions that have not previously been addressed in the literature. First, has there been a change in perception of the Japanese threat in these three sectors over time? And if so, what can we deduce about the causes of this change? This study finds that there have indeed been two major shifts in China's threat perception of Japan since the 1980s, one in the late 1980s and the other in the mid-1990s. It also finds that there were no differences between sectors as to the direction and timing of these shifts. It suggests that Japan's military build-up in the late 1980s and the strengthening of the US–Japan alliance from 1996 onwards are what prompted these shifts in China's threat perception.

Type
Articles
Information
The China Quarterly , Volume 203 , September 2010 , pp. 560 - 580
Copyright
Copyright © The China Quarterly 2010

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