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Changing Patterns of Violence and Justice In Fourteenth- and Fifteenth-Century Florence

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 June 2009

Marvin B. Becker
Affiliation:
The University of Michigan

Extract

The Otto di Guardia was a powerful magistracy established in the late fourteenth century just after Florence's experiment with democratized government (1378). The new regime was much perturbed by fear of revolution and replication of the terrible events of the Ciompi uprising. Intelligent commentators such as Francesco Guicciardini were to argue a century and a half later that formation of the Otto had saved the Repub- lic from anarchy. Without the fear of this dread tribunal, seditious and factious Florentines would certainly have toppled the regime. Many modern interpreters of these events follow this grand generalization, but few have bothered to study the day-to-day activities of this court or in fact of any of its adjuncts.

Type
Domestic Violence
Copyright
Copyright © Society for the Comparative Study of Society and History 1976

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References

This paper was presented at the annual meeting of the American Historical Association at San Francisco in December of 1974. Subsequently, it was delivered at the University of Pennsylvania, the University of Toledo, and Brown University. A fuller version of this article will appear in my third volume of Florence in Transition. All documents cited in this article are to be found in the Archivio di Stato in Florence.

1 On the politics of this period, see Rodolico, N., La democrazia fiorentina nel suo tramonto (1378–1382) (Bologna, 1905), pp. 224–54Google Scholar; Brucker, G., Florentine Politics and Society 1343–1378 (Princeton, 1962).CrossRefGoogle Scholar The Otto was established on 2 September 1378 shortly after the Ciompi revolutionaries were displaced. Cf. also Consulte e Pratiche, vol. 16, cc. 16v–17r (2 Sept. 1378) for a discussion of the role of this magistracy.

2 The views of Francesco Guicciardini as expressed in his Storie fiorentine dal 1378 al 1409 (Bari, 1931), p. 41Google Scholar have proven too convincing; his taste for aphorisms is much in evidence here as elsewhere: “For, as any one expert in the affairs of this country knows, nobody could live in Florence if evil minds were not restrained through fear of the Eight—a fear born of their promptness in finding out and punishing crimes.”

3 For background on this magistracy, see Antonelli, G., “Gli Otto di Guardia a Firenze,” Archivio Storico Italiano, CXII (1954), 339.Google Scholar

4 Otto di Guardia (Epoca repubblicana), vol. 17,Google Scholar cc. 21r, 25v, 26r, 26v, 45r. One of the important features of the Florentine judicial system was the sentencing of criminals to incarceration. The Stinche (the communal prison) was one of the first prisons in Europe whose surviving records disclose that criminals were sentenced to variable periods of detention depending upon the nature of the offense. Documents from the Soprastanti alle Stinche will be analyzed in my forthcoming volume. For further information on this valuable source, see Wolfgang, M., “A Florentine Prison: Le Carceri delle Stinche,” Studies in the Renaissan VII (1960), 148–66;CrossRefGoogle ScholarPolitical Crimes and Punishments in Renaissance Florence,” Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science, XLIV (1954), 555–81.Google Scholar

5 Otto di Guardia, vol. 12, cc. llr–29r (1460). Those not permitted to post bond were said to have “brought shame to the city of Florence,” and it was maintained that evidence had been presented to the Otto “de mala vita et moribus” of the accused or convicted.Google Scholar

6 Ibid., vol. 17, cc. 50r ff. (1466).

7 Statuti del Podesta del 1325, ed. Caggese, R. (Florence, 1921), pp. 152–5.Google Scholar For instances of reconciliation between magnate families, see Provvisioni, vol. 13, f. 128v (1307); ibid., 14, f. 174v (1316); ibid., 15, ff. 20r–24r (1317).

8 The quotation is from Dante. Cf. Becker, M., Florence in Transition (Baltimore, 1967), vol. I, pp. 22–3.Google Scholar For the use of communal art to promote “concord between the orders,” see Wieruszowski, H., “Art and the Commune in the Time of Dante”, Speculum, XIX (1944), 1433;CrossRefGoogle ScholarRubinstein, N., “Political Ideas in Sienese Art,” Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes, XXI (1958), 179207;CrossRefGoogle ScholarBrandi, C., “Chiarimenti sul Buon Governo di Ambrogio Lorenzetti,” Bulletino d'Arte, XL (1955), 119–23.Google Scholar On legislation restricting the vendetta, see Enriques, A., “Lavendetta nella vita nella legislazione fiorentina,” Archivio Storico Italiano, XCI (1933), 85142;Google ScholarSantini, P., “Societa delle torri in Firenze,” Archivio Starico Italiano, XX (1887), 2558, 178204.Google Scholar

9 The chronicler Giovanni Villani gives the figure 20,000 florins as an average for the years 1336–8, adding, however, that it was particularly low at that time. My calculations indicate that the high point in money fines was achieved in the 1340s when the government implemented the principle of collective liability on magnate clans with great vigor. Cf. Becker, M., “Florentine Popular Government (1343–48),” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, CVI (1962), 360–82.Google Scholar On the reliability of Villani's statistics, see Sapori, A., “L'attenibilita di alcune testimonianze cronistiche dell'economia medievale,' Archivio Storico Italiano, LXXXVI (1929), 1930.Google ScholarCf. Villani, G., Cronica, Dragomanni, F., ed. (Florence,18441845), XI, 92. Figures for the later period (1380s and '90s) are taken from the Camera del Comune, Provveditori, entrata e uscita, vols. 3, 4, 7, 8, and 10.Google Scholar

10 Becker, M., “A Study in Political Failure: The Florentine Magnates (1280–1343),” Mediaeval Studies, XXVII (1965), 272 ff.Google Scholar For the origins of these procedures, see Fasoli, G., “Ricerche sulla legislazione anti-magnatizia nei comuni dell'alta e media Italia,” Rivista di Storia del Diritto Italiano, XII (1939, 240 ff.).Google Scholar On consorterie, see Niccolai, F., “I consorzi nobiliari ed il comune nell'alta e media Italia,” Rivista di Storia del Diritto Italiano, XIII (1940), 318 ff.Google Scholar For early Florentine developments, see Rubinstein, N., “La prima legge sul'sodamento' a Firenze,” Archivio Storico Italiano, XCIII (1935), 161–72.Google Scholar On the number of magnate crimes committed during the decade of the 1330s, see Giudice degli Appelli, vols. 121–5. Approximately one-half (46) of the Florentine magnate clans committed 146 serious crimes during this decade. The chronicler Giovanni Villani (XI, 94) tells us that there were 1,500 magnates in the city at this time; therefore, a tenth of their number were convicted for grave offenses. In the next decade the Florentine treasury records disclose the very substantial condemnations exacted from kinsmen of magnate culprits held jointly liable for breaches of the law. This decade marks the crest for implementation of the principle of collective responsibility for criminous behavior. Cf. Becker, M., Florence in Transition, vol. I, pp. 209–13Google Scholar.

11 Figures for the two triennia (1352–5 and 1380–3) were published by Dorini, U., II diritto penale e la delinquenza in Firenze nel secolo XIV (Lucca, 1916), p. 38.Google Scholar For population statistics covering the second half of the fourteenth century, see Fiumi, E., “Fioritura e decadenza dell'economia fiorentina,” Archivio Storico Italiano, CXVI (1958), 468–70;Google Scholar

12 Dorini, U., op. cit., p. 64.Google Scholar

13 The ardent wish of many a citizen was to dissociate himself from ongoing feuds. This fact helps to explain the widespread citizen support for restricting the vendetta. See Becker, M., Florence in Transition, vol. I, pp. 224–6Google Scholar for a discussion of the role of the novi cives in sponsoring legislation against over-mighty magnates who pursued feuds with a vengeance. Cf. also Velluti, D., Cronaca domestica, ed. Lungo, I. del and Volpi, C. (Florence, 1914), pp. 6670 for expressions of satisfaction at having settled a feud with a rival house. Velluti tells us that he feared being implicated, although he was not a principal to the quarrel; one of his forebears, murdered in the early fourteenth century, had left a legacy of 500 florins to anyone avenging his death.Google Scholar

14 Dorini, U., op. cit., p. 142.Google Scholar For the growth of state power, see Becker, M., “The Republican City State in Florence: An Inquiry into Its Origins and Survival (1280–1434),” Speculum, XXV (1960), 3950.CrossRefGoogle Scholar During the ninety years between the promulgation of the Statuto del Podesta and the Statuti of 1415, the authority of communal magistrates was extended to include most serious crimes—even to some committed by Florentine subjects outside territories of the Republic.

15 Dorini, U., op. cit., p. 72.Google Scholar Communal legislation against such crimes as sodomy came to be increasingly harsh. For example, see Provvisioni, vol. 52, fol. 128r (2 04 1365):Google Scholar only one witness was required instead of two, as had earlier been the case, for conviction. The use of torture was permitted. Cf. also Provvisioni, vol. 92, fol. 9r (20 04 1403) for the election of a special “official foreigner” authorized to prosecute sodomites.Google Scholar

16 For modern statistics disclosing sizable increases in offenses against property, see Modona, G., “Carcere e societÀ civile,” Storia d'ltalia (Turin, 1967), vol. 5, part 2, 1906–80;Google ScholarSommario di statistiche storiche italiane (1861–1955) (Rome, 1958);Google ScholarFarnetti, P., Sistema politico e societd civile (Turin, 1971).Google Scholar Worth noting is the fact that only 3½ percent of those convicted for theft during the two triennia under consideration in this article were magnates, and only 8 percent can be judged affluent burghers. Even this statistic may be a bit exceptional, since during the 1352–5 interval there were some unusual magnate crimes. Cf. Villani, M., Cronica, Dragomanni, F., ed. (Florence, 18441845).Google Scholar

17 For a list of those executed in the Quattrocento, see I ‘Giustiziati’a Firenze,” Archivio Storico Italiano, XXVII (1901), 209–50.Google Scholar Among their number were slaves, Turks, a heretic, counterfeiters, servants who poisoned masters, robbers, embezzlers, vagabond criminals—but principally those convicted of crimes against the state. Significant changes were likewise in evidence in Florentine architecture where the shift was from the palace as a fortified center owned jointly by great clans and manned for purposes of private warfare and self-defense to the Renaissance palazzo as the ornate dwelling of a single family. Greater confidence was of course expressed in the ability of magistrates to maintain public order and of the citizens to observe communal norms. The force of law could therefore be directed against elements in the population who covertly or overtly threatened community and political consensus. Cf. Goldthwaite, R., “The Florentine Palace as Domestic Architecture,” American Historical Review, LXXVII (1972), 977–81.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

18 A strong impulse in Florentine life was evidenced in the numerous petitions presented by consorts of criminous citizens beseeching the government to free them from legal liability. During the second part of the fourteenth century these requests were numerous, suggesting that the idea of limited liability was becoming increasingly onerous. Routinely, petitioners stated they were “homines pacifici et quieti,” and they desired to live “peacefully, fraternally and amicably.” They requested therefore a legal separation from those relatives whose actions were “scandalousand contentious.” Cf. Provvisioni, vol. 72, fol. 208r (3 03. 1384);Google Scholaribid., vol. 95, ff. 117r-118r; Libri Fabarum, 48, ff. 130r. From the 1340s on, large numbers of magnates separated themselves from their consorterie and took commoner status. Upon being made popolani (commoners) they took different names, renounced their coat of arms, and even moved into another quarter of the city. Villani, G., Cronica, XII, 22Google Scholar tells us that approximately one-third of the urban magnates were separated from their kinsmen in 1343. Cf. also Balie, vol.4Google Scholar for the activities of an extraordinary commission established in the summer of 1349 to confer popolani status on numerous magnates who were law-abiding citizens.

19 Jones, P. J., “Dall'impero militare all'impero economico,” Storia d'ltalia (Turin, 1974), vol. 2, part 2, 1807–9;Google ScholarBrucker, G., Florentine Politics and Society, 1343–1378 (Princeton, 1962), pp. 38–9;CrossRefGoogle Scholarde Roover, R., “The Story of the Alberti Company of Florence, 1302–1348,Google Scholar As Revealed in its Account Books,” The Business History Review, XXXII (1958), 1459;Google ScholarCorti, G., “Consigli sulla mercatura d'un anonimo trecentista,” Archivio Storico Italiano, CX (1952), 114–19.Google Scholar

20 Brucker, G., The Society of Renaissance Florence (New York, 1971), p. 190.Google Scholar In Lucca privileges were conceded to prostitutes because the signory feared extension of the heinous sin of sodomy. Cf. Cognasso, F., L'ltalia nel Rinascimento (Turin, 1965), vol. 2, p. 634.Google Scholar In the late Trecento many of the prostitutes were from outside the city and subject to close supervision by public officials. Cf. Camera del Commie, Provveditori, entrata e uscita, vol. 4, ff. 308v-309r;Google Scholaribid., vol. 5, ff. 292v-294r.

21 Becker, M., “Nota dei processi riguardanti prestatori di denaro del 1343 al 1379,” Archivio Storico Italiano, CXIV (1956), 93104.Google Scholar Cf. also Provvisioni, vol.111, fol. 48v and Libri Fabarum, vol. 52, fol. 96v in 6:315which the law of 1420 that had done great damage to paupers was repealed (June, 1421).

22 Enforcement was directed against individuals, with women (and occasionally men) continuing to be fined for violations. Infrequently producers of certain luxury items were fined, but this was because they were disobeying communal ordinances fixing the price of goods and services. Decline of enforcement of anti-monopoly legislation against corporate groups, such as the guilds, was also evident after the mid-Trecento. Becker, M., “La esecuzione della legislazione contro le pratiche monopolistiche delle arti fiorentine alia metà del secolo quattordicesimo,” Archivio Storico Italiano, CXVII (1959), 828.Google Scholar Receipts of fines collected for violations of sumptuary laws were recorded in the communal treasury under “Entrate del Chamarlinghi della Grascie.rdquo; Cf. Camera del Comune, Provveditori, entrata e uscita, vol. 4, ff. 308v-309r (1387).Google Scholar

23 The inventory of “forbidden items”: drawn up in 1343 survives in the Archivio di Stato. Cf. Inquisizione, vol. 1932;Google ScholarD'Ancona, Paolo, Le vesti delle donne fiorentine nel secolo XIV (Perugia, 1906).Google Scholar On the subject of Jews in Florence, see Molho, A., “Note on Jewish Moneylenders in Tuscany in the Late Trecento and Early Quattrocento,” in Renaissance Studies in Honor of Hans Baron (Dekalb, 111., 1971), 101–40);Google ScholarCassuto, U., Gli ebrei a Firenze nell'etd del Rinascimento (Florence, 1918).Google Scholar

24 Substantial numbers of communal councilors could be counted upon to vote against any measures pertaining to Jewish pawnbrokers. Libri Fabarum, vol. 47, ff. 92r-93v;Google Scholaribid., vol. 48, ff. 116r-119r; Provvisioni, vol. 94, ff. 232v-233r.Google Scholar Public brothels were established and sizable fines levied on public prostitutes “who go through Florence without bells and gloves.” Camera del Comttne, Provveditori, entrata e uscita, vol. 5, ff. 292r-294r.Google Scholar Jewish moneylenders were of course required to wear badges. Cf. Cassuto, U., op. cit., pp. 371 ff.Google Scholar On bastardy, see Besta, E., La famiglia nella storia del diritto italiano (Padua, 1933)Google Scholar and his Le succession! nella storia del diritto italiano (Milan, 1935).Google Scholar On the topic of slavery, see Origo, I., “The Domestic Enemy: the Eastern Slaves in Tuscany in the 14th and 15th centuries,” Speculum, XXX (1955), 329 ff.;Google ScholarZanelli, A., Le echiave orientali a Firenze nei secoli XIV e XV (Florence, 1885).Google Scholar

25 Becker, M., “Florentine Politics and the Diffusion of Heresy in the Trecento,” Speculum, XXXIV (1959), 6075.CrossRefGoogle Scholar For examples of legislation directed against the spiritually overzealous during the 1380s and '90s, see Provvisioni, vol. 77, fol. 215r;Google Scholaribid., vol. 80, ff. 69r-70v; ibid., vol. 82, fol. 21lr; Libri Fabarum, vol. 43, fol. 212r;Google Scholaribid., vol. 44, fol. 88r.

26 Brucker, G., “Sorcery in Renaissance Florence,” Studies in the Renaissance, X (1963), 724.CrossRefGoogle Scholar This sorceress was sentenced in absentia by the executor of the Ordinances of Justice to be burned at the stake in November of 1375. Three years later, during the regime of the Ciompi, the sentence was canceled. Only one case in either of the triennia under discussion involved charges of witchcraft, magic, sorcery, and infanticide to boot. In this single case these accusations were made in tandem, but we cannot know how seriously the court took the allegations when sentencing the accused to decapitation for homicide by poisoning. Cf. Dorini, U., op. cit., p. 134.Google Scholar Those eager to find demographic and socioeconomic causes for witchcraft denunciations might discover that Florence had many of those characteristics considered quintessential for an upsurge in witchcraft prosecutions: a large population of older women and economic strains between mutuality and neighborliness on the one hand, and competition and entrepreneurship on the other. Yet no rash of denunciations occurred. For a cautionary note on this complex topic, see Cohn's, NormanEurope's Inner Demons (New York, 1975), pp. 162–3.Google Scholar

27 Becker, M., “Aspects of Lay Piety in Early Renaissance Florence,” in The Pursuit of Holiness in Late Medieval and Renaissance Religion, Trinkaus, C. and Oberman, H., eds. (Leiden, 1974), 190–9.Google Scholar

28 Scaramella, G., Firenze allo scoppio del tumulto dei Ciompi (Pisa, 1914);Google ScholarBecker, M., “An Essay on the ‘Novi Cives’ and Florentine Politics, 1343–1382,” Mediaeval Studies, XXIV (1962), 3582.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

29 This justly famous quotation appears in numerous general histories, but see in particular the observations of Jones, P. J. in “Communes and Despots: The City State in Late Medieval Italy,” Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, XV (1965), 76–8,Google Scholar in which he describes the importance of a large neutral bloc—homines communes—for enforcement of public law against the lawless and overmighty. Cf. Mundy, J., Europe in the High Middle Ages (New York, 1973), p. 455 for quotation.Google Scholar

30 Morelli, Giovanni di Pagolo, Ricordi, Branca, V., ed. (Florence, 1956), p. 131.Google Scholar Looking back from the vantage point of the late Trecento to the feuds of Dante's time, Morelli says, “E s'usava alora di nimicarsi peù colla spada in mano che colle fave, come si fa al d'oggi.”s