L'une des fonctions des institutions publiques des démocraties libérales est de formuler des recommandations à l'attention des décideurs. Or, les institutions publiques savent que leurs recommandations seront souvent ignorées en partie par le décideur. Cette situation de « conformité partielle » aux recommandations soulève plusieurs problèmes de nature philosophique pour les institutions. En nous appuyant sur une analyse de 570 recommandations tirées de 40 documents et rapports du secteur public québécois, nous identifions deux enjeux entourant la structure des recommandations issues du secteur public.

In this introduction, I offer a broad overview of Asha Bhandary's Freedom to Care: Liberalism, Dependency Care, and Culture so that readers can better situate the suggestions of this symposium's contributors: Clark Wolf, Elizabeth Edenberg, and Helga Varden. Bhandary develops and defends the theory of liberal dependency care in response to the failure of past liberal theorizing to appreciate that dependency care — which is essential to our survival — is a matter of justice. By concluding with a Hamptonian framing, I hope to further generate discussion of this novel work that broadens the influence of contemporary feminist liberal theorizing.

This article argues that blacks should reject integration on self-protective and solidarity grounds. It distinguishes two aspects of black devaluation: a ‘stigmatization’ aspect that has to do with the fact that blacks are subject to various forms of discrimination, and an aesthetic aspect (‘phenotypic devaluation’) that concerns the aesthetic devaluation of characteristically black phenotypic traits. It identifies four self-worth harms that integration may inflict, and suggests that these may outweigh the benefits of integration. Further, it argues that, while the integrating process may reduce stigmatization, there is less reason to think that it can do the same for phenotypic devaluation.

John Rawls and Asha Bhandary use David Hume's conditions of justice to frame the original position choice from which principles of justice are selected. To use Hume's conditions in this way excludes from representation those who are not full cooperators, including people who need lifelong dependency care. This implies that their claim to dependent care is not a fundamental claim of justice, but must have significantly lower priority. This article argues that an appropriate theory of liberal dependency care will abandon this Humean framing assumption, and will treat the claim to dependency care as a fundamental requirement of justice.

One of the key responsibilities of public institutions in liberal democracies is to formulate recommendations for decision makers. However, public institutions realize that decision makers will often partly ignore their recommendations. This situation of “partial compliance” with recommendations raises a number of philosophical issues for institutions. Based on an analysis of 570 recommendations drawn from 40 Quebec public-sector documents and reports, we identify two issues surrounding the structure of public-policy recommendations.

D. C. Matthew offers an original and important critique of racial integration. His claim that integration will aggravate phenotypic devaluation of blackness, threatening black self-worth, is persuasive. However, his stronger normative argument that blacks should reject integration as a consequence because the potential harms to black self-worth outweigh its purported benefits is less convincing, as it rests on a dubious cost-benefit analysis. Ultimately, I argue that we should resist the impulse to offer a definitive cost-benefit analysis of racial integration in any case, given the uncertainty of such a complex process unfolding in a speculative future.

Caregiving is crucial for any society; however, it often goes unnoticed and unanalyzed within theories of justice. Asha Bhandary's theory of liberal dependency care seeks to both rectify the invisibility of care and defend principles of justice for caregiving arrangements by arguing for several important modifications to John Rawls's theory of justice. In this article, I analyze Bhandary's modifications to Rawls's theory to consider how well liberal dependency care fits into a broader political liberal framework, while still securing protection against oppression. I also evaluate the permissibility and limits of teaching children autonomy and caregiving skills in a politically liberal society.

This review locates Asha Bhandary's Freedom to Care in the history of philosophy, notes some of the theory's distinctive features that clearly advance the care theory tradition, and raises some puzzles and questions regarding specific elements of the theory. My remarks focus mostly on Part I of the book and on the following four topics: (1) Bhandary's Rawlsian roots, (2) Bhandary's engagement with Eva Feder Kittay, (3) Bhandary's choice of J. S. Mill and John Rawls as her main historical interlocutors, and finally, (4) Bhandary's methodological choice of ‘men/fathers,’ ‘women/mothers,’ and ‘children/girls/boys’ as the main focus of much of her analysis.

D. C. Matthew makes an important contribution to the ongoing debate between integrationists and their critics. While Matthew's conclusion that blacks have a duty not to integrate is too strong, his account provides additional reasons why they may not want to integrate. Further reasons to resist integration may be provided by considering the contexts of integration, particularly with respect to the degree of coerciveness that they involve. I argue that resistance to integration should take the form of not only refusing to participate in it but also of engaging in collective political action in the pursuit of racial justice.

There are strong moral reasons to acknowledge that third parties can have the standing to forgive. Third-party refusals to forgive can reinforce the moral agency and value of women and disrupt the gendering of forgiveness. Third-party forgiveness can also be crucial for restorative justice aims, like recognizing the value of wrongdoers. Lastly, many victim-only accounts of forgiveness are problematic and utilize an individualistic conception of the self that reinforces the logic of misogyny. Victim-only accounts of forgiveness can also restrict focus to the victim's suffering, thereby neglecting the importance of healing and the relevance of third-party forgiveness for facilitating healing.

In this article, I respond to symposium articles by Clark Wolf, Elizabeth Edenberg, and Helga Varden. With shared sympathies for anti-oppression liberalism and social contract theory, they urge me to develop the theory of liberal dependency care (LDC) in new directions — respectively, as a form of subject-centered justice, with a political liberal justification, and with a Kantian foundation for ‘private right.’ I respond by explicating the inclusivity that is built into the arrow of care map and the variety of contract theory I advance. Furthermore, I insist that anti-oppression liberalism need not formulate its claims in political liberal terms.

In response to the claim that democracies are inherently short-termist, this article argues for a new way to understand them as being committed to future generations. If taking turns among rulers and ruled is a normative idea inherent to the concept of democracy, then such turn-taking commits democrats to a fair turn with future generations.

In response to D. C. Matthew's article “Racial Integration and the Problem of Relational Devaluation,” I assess the politics of physical beauty in the intersection between the categories of race and gender. I scrutinize Matthew's contention that being perceived to be physically attractive reliably results in either good treatment or high self-esteem. I argue that, on the contrary, gender can function as a means of social control, in which the appraisal of women's bodies yields neither good treatment nor improves their self-esteem. This problem can persist among self-segregated intra-group racial communities.

In the Summa Theologiae, Thomas Aquinas states that the “aspect of pastness” involved in memory is a certain kind of cognitive object — i.e., an intention — apprehended by the “estimative power.” All told, however, Aquinas mentions this idea precisely once. In this article, I construct an account of the idea that pastness is an estimative intention by drawing upon texts in which I argue that Aquinas develops this idea, albeit without invoking the terminology of the estimative intention. I conclude that, by identifying the aspect of pastness as an estimative intention, Aquinas neatly synthesizes the Aristotelian and Arabic traditions on memory.

Le concept de race a oscillé dès l'origine entre la sphère politico-sociale et la biologie. Si les perspectives sociales ont été dominantes dans la seconde moitié du XXe siècle, une nouvelle forme de naturalisation semble émerger à l’ère de l’épigénétique. Dans cet article, je montre que la conception épigénétique de la race rappelle d'anciennes perspectives externalistes et engage à articuler naturalisme, environnementalisme et constructivisme biosocial. Je souligne qu'elle fait apparaître la race comme une propriété relationnelle, plastique et accidentelle, et les groupes raciaux comme des constructions bio-sociales historiquement contingentes.

I am broadly sympathetic to D. C. Matthew's analysis. However, in what follows, I restrict my remarks to a few areas where I think he either lacks empirical precision, or overstates his case.

We demonstrate that many philosophers accept the following claim: When an aesthetic object is apprehended correctly, taking pleasure in said object is a reliable sign that the object is aesthetically successful. We undermine this position by showing that what grounds our pleasurable experience is opaque: In many cases, the experienced pleasure is attributable to factors that have little to do with the aesthetic object. The evidence appealed to is a form of Higher-Order Evidence (HOE) and we consider attempts to overcome said evidence. We argue they are unsuccessful. We conclude by considering what this means for our practice of making aesthetic judgements.

In this article, I argue that some irremediably depressed patients have the decision-making capacity to consent to medical treatment even when they want to die. These patients are said to have deficits in appreciative capacity because they lack insight into their condition. I argue that some patients have insight if they can cognize and articulate a range of future possibilities regarding their health. The argument requires a phenomenological lens. Phenomenology captures something fundamental about depression, such as temporal experience, which is needed for a more thorough assessment of capacity for medical assistance in dying (MAiD).