Online ordering is currently unavailable due to technical issues. We apologise for any delays responding to customers while we resolve this. For further updates please visit our website: https://www.cambridge.org/news-and-insights/technical-incident
We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 08 May 2018
The freedom of the individual can easily come into conflict with his or her obligation to integrate in society. The case of Belcacemi and Oussar v Belgium provides a good example. It is evident that some restrictions of citizens’ freedoms must be accepted for a state to function and, more basically, persist; as a consequence, it is acceptable that certain demands, incorporated in criminal law, are made of citizens. The issue of the extent to which such restrictions are justified has increasingly become a topic of discussion. The present case raises a number of important questions with respect to the right to wear a full-face veil in public if the societal norm is that the face should be visible, the most salient of which are whether women should be ‘protected’ from unequal treatment against their will and to what extent society may impose values on the individual. I will argue that Belgian law places unwarranted restrictions on citizens and that the values behind it testify to an outlook that is difficult to reconcile with the freedom of conscience and religion.
1 App No 37798/13 (ECtHR, 11 July 2017).
2 App No 4619/12 (ECtHR, 11 July 2017).
3 Article 563bis of the Belgian Penal Code.
4 Belcacemi and Oussar at para 18. The original text of the ruling is only available in French and reads ‘entendaient souscrire à un modèle de société faisant prévaloir l'individu sur ses attaches culturelles, philosophiques ou religieuses’.
5 Belcacemi and Oussar at para 6; Dakir at para 7.
6 Belcacemi and Oussar at para 6; Dakir at para 7.
7 Belcacemi and Oussar at para 27 (B 17).
8 Ibid at para 18.
9 See also Joppke, C, ‘Islam and the legal enforcement of morality’ (2014) 43:6 Theory and Society 589–615CrossRefGoogle Scholar at 607; Joppke, C, The Secular State under Siege (Cambridge, 2015), p 176Google Scholar.
10 SAS v France, App No 43835/11 (ECtHR, 1 July 2014), para 87.
11 Ibid, joint partly dissenting opinion of Judges Nussberger and Jäderblom, para 8.
12 Belcacemi and Oussar at para 41. The original text reads, ‘Le Gouvernement souligne qu'il n'appartient pas aux individus de s'arroger, à la faveur de leurs libertés individuelle ou religieuse, le pouvoir de décider quand ils accepteraient de se découvrir dans l'espace public.’
13 The Court has also considered the employer's wish to ‘project a certain corporate image’ to be a relevant factor (Eweida and Others v the United Kingdom, App Nos 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 and 36516/10 (ECtHR, 15 January 2013), para 94), but takes a nuanced stance here, taking into consideration how conspicuous the symbol in question is (in this case, a cross necklace). In a Belgian case before the European Court of Justice (ECJ) (on the basis of a request for a preliminary ruling), involving an employee who had been dismissed, having refused to work without wearing a headscarf, the ECJ ruled: ‘An employer's wish to project an image of neutrality towards customers relates to the freedom to conduct a business that is recognised in Article 16 of the Charter and is, in principle, legitimate, notably where the employer involves in its pursuit of that aim only those workers who are required to come into contact with the employer's customers’ (Samira Achbita and Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor racismebestrijding v G4S Secure Solutions NV (ECJ, 14 March 2017) (C-157/15), para 38). This does not derogate from the employer's duty to investigate the possibility of offering an employee who wants to wear a headscarf a position where she would not have any visual contact with customers (para 43).
14 Belcacemi and Oussar at para 27 (B 21). The original text reads ‘L'individualité de tout sujet de droit d'une société démocratique ne peut se concevoir sans que l'on puisse percevoir son visage, qui en constitue un élément fondamental.’
15 Ibid at para 27 (B 17). The original text reads ‘un modèle de société qui fait prévaloir l'individu sur ses attaches philosophiques, culturelles et religieuses en vue de favoriser l'intégration de tous et faire en sorte que les citoyens partagent un patrimoine commun de valeurs fondamentales que sont le droit à la vie, le droit à la liberté de conscience, la démocratie, l’égalité de l'homme et de la femme ou encore la séparation de l’Église et de l’État’.
16 SAS v France at para 122.
17 Ibid at para 128. See also, eg, Refah Partisi and Others v Turkey, App Nos 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98 and 41344/98 (ECtHR, 13 February 2003), paras 25, 82, 99.
18 The status of ‘dignity’, by contrast, is problematic, as its presence forces those who defend it to take an ethical and even metaphysical perspective, which usually engenders more problems than it solves. A discussion of this issue would stray too far from the topic at hand; I refer to my treatment of it elsewhere (Doomen, J, ‘Beyond dignity’ (2016) 57 Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte 57–72Google Scholar).
19 Belcacemi and Oussar at para 27 (B 23). The original text reads ‘Même lorsque le port du voile intégral résulte d'un choix délibéré dans le chef de la femme, l’égalité des sexes, que le législateur considère à juste titre comme une valeur fondamentale de la société démocratique, justifie que l’État puisse s'opposer, dans la sphère publique, à la manifestation d'une conviction religieuse par un comportement non conciliable avec ce principe d’égalité entre l'homme et la femme.’
20 See ibid at para 36 and also Dakir v Belgium at para 34.
21 Belcacemi and Oussar at para 18.
22 Ibid, concurring opinion of Judge Spano, paras 5–7.
23 SAS v France at para 141.
24 Ibid at para 153. The Court used the phrase ‘un choix de société’ in Belcacemi and Oussar (at para 53), without in that place explicitly referring to ‘living together’.
25 The original text reads ‘La France n'est jamais autant elle-même, fidèle à son histoire, à sa destinée, à son image, que lorsqu'elle est unie autour des valeurs de la République: la liberté, l’égalité, la fraternité. Ces valeurs sont le socle de notre pacte social; elles garantissent la cohésion de la Nation; elles fondent le respect de la dignité des personnes et de l’égalité entre les hommes et les femmes.’
26 Dakir v Belgium at paras 11 and 32.
27 Ibid at para 36.
28 Belcacemi and Oussar at paras 9–10.
