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FREEDOM UNDER AN INDIFFERENT DICTATOR: INTENTIONALITY AND RESPONSIBILITY

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 April 2016

Frank Hindriks
Frank Hindriks*
Affiliation:
University of Groningen, Faculty of Philosophy, Oude Boteringestraat 52, 9712GL Groningen, the Netherlands. E-mail: f.a.hindriks@rug.nl. URL: http://www.rug.nl/staff/f.a.hindriks/.
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Abstract:

Freedom is often analysed in terms of the absence of intentionally imposed constraints. I defend the alternative view on which the relevant constraints are those for which some agent can be held morally responsible. I argue that this best captures the relation between freedom and respect. Berlin (1969) correctly points out that intentional restrictions exhibit ill will and hence are disrespectful. However, the same holds, I argue, for restrictions that are due to indifference. Berlin also observed that it would be counterintuitive if an agent could increase her freedom by changing her preferences. I criticize the argument that Dowding and Van Hees (2007, 2008) present according to which this observation counts in favour of explicating freedom in terms of intentionality.

Keywords

freedomindifferenceintentional actionmoral responsibility
Type
Articles
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 33 , Issue 1 , March 2017 , pp. 25 - 41
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016 

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