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MEASURING A NEGLECTED TYPE OF LOTTERY UNFAIRNESS

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 November 2017

Gerard Vong
Gerard Vong*
Affiliation:
Emory University, Center for Ethics, 1531 Dickey Drive, Atlanta, GA, 30322, USA. Email: gerard.vong@emory.edu. URL: http://ethics.emory.edu/people/Faculty/Gerard_Vong.html
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Abstract:

When it is most fair for a claimant to receive a particular chance of benefiting (e.g. 50%) but they instead receive a different chance of benefiting (e.g. 40%), this lower chance is not ideally fair. I specify the often-overlooked type of individual unfairness evident in differences of this kind and argue for four intuitively supported criteria that a measure of this unfairness must meet. I defend the Asymmetrical Proportional View, which meets these criteria and is a measure of how individually unfair any particular difference of this kind is. Finally I conclude with the View's implications for theories of distributive fairness.

Keywords

FairnessUnfairnessLotteriesDistributive Ethics
Type
Articles
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 34 , Issue 1 , March 2018 , pp. 67 - 86
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2017 

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