At the turn of the twentieth century, American and Chinese millers were locked in a fiercely contested battle for control of China’s flour market. Imported American flour had dominated Chinese urban markets since the early 1880s, but the founding of a modern native milling industry in 1900 had initiated a commercial war that pitted the great flour corporations of the Pacific Coast against the independent mill owners near Shanghai. Although the anti-American boycott of 1905 had boosted sales for Chinese mills and sparked growth in the native industry, the period between 1905 and 1909 severely tested the ability of the young industry to survive foreign competition. A high silver/gold rate, low transpacific shipping rates, and bumper wheat harvests in the Pacific Northwest lowered the relative cost and enhanced the market appeal of American flour to Chinese brokers. Conversely, severe flooding in China’s wheat-producing regions forced curtailment or even cessation of production for some native mills. Facing catastrophic reductions in their wheat supplies and markets saturated with American flour, Chinese millers devised alternative business strategies and implemented collaborative measures to ensure the solvency of their mills.

As China underwent industrialization during the Republican period, how did companies deal with the problems of expansion, competition, and relationship with the state? Using the concept of network capitalism, this article demythologizes the “enigma” of Chinese network by analyzing the experience of the Jiuda Salt Industries, Ltd. Fan Xudong, the company’s founder, deftly managed his network portfolio for information and other resources. Kith and kin as shareholders, interlocking directorates, and cross-shareholding, as well as hierarchical management and cartels, were utilized to raise capital and manage local markets. Market, hierarchy, and network thus constitute three complementary organization principles in explaining Jiuda’s success.

This article is a case study of a Chinese indigenous firm in the refrigerated egg-packing industry during the interwar period. I argue that the China Egg Produce Company (CEPC) was quick to grasp Western management in terms of vertical integration and business diversification. In addition, this firm took advantage of embedded social relations and social networks to construct a strong “internal architecture.” As a result, CEPC not only rivaled some six to eight British and American enterprises, but also took the lead in persuading them to form an international cartel during the 1930s. The data presented in this case study shows the surprising vitality and adaptability of Chinese businesses and suggests that China was in the process of developing a modern business system prior to the chaotic events of the late 1940s.

Much of current scholarly work argues that China and Chinese communities are distinguished by a culturally specific and unique pattern of networking based on personal relations (guanxi), but there is little agreement about whether such personal relations produce discrete factions or more disbursed, weblike connections. The literature on banking networks is similarly unclear, and most discussion has focused on regional groups, such as a clique made up of natives from Zhejiang and Jiangsu provinces, or shared professional values among bankers. None of these approaches adequately describes actual connections, and this case study provides a new and empirically broad approach that applies tools of network analysis to interlocking bank directorships in 1936. This analysis shows the existence of twenty-four isolated banks; three very small, discrete, and regionally based groups; and one huge, diffuse, and weblike bank network that included virtually all Chinese bank assets and extended to most of China’s economically developed regions.