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The Myth of the Good Epistemic Bubble

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 December 2022

Meredith Sheeks Open the ORCID record for Meredith Sheeks [Opens in a new window]
Meredith Sheeks*
Affiliation:
The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, NC, USA
*
Email: msheeks@unc.edu
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Abstract

Intellectual interest in epistemic bubbles and echo chambers has grown exponentially over the past two decades. This is largely because many assume, in light of recent events, that these phenomena are morally, socially, politically, and epistemically problematic. But are we justified in simply assuming that epistemic bubbles and echo chambers are inherently epistemically problematic? Perhaps surprisingly, numerous philosophers have recently argued that epistemic bubbles and echo chambers are not intrinsically epistemically problematic. Nevertheless, I argue, this trend is mistaken. Epistemic bubbles and echo chambers are all intrinsically epistemically problematic, such that we should try to escape them, if we find ourselves in them. Crucially, there are two senses in which we might identify epistemic bubbles and echo chambers as being intrinsically epistemically problematic, as opposed to “good.” After distinguishing between these senses, I demonstrate that, even if there is a sense in which epistemic bubbles can in principle be “good,” all epistemic bubbles are epistemically problematic in the sense that is ultimately relevant to the question of whether we ought to stay in epistemic bubbles or to try to get out of them.

Keywords

Epistemic bubblesecho chambersrationalitypolitical epistemology
Type
Article
Information
Episteme , Volume 20 , Issue 3 , September 2023 , pp. 685 - 700
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press

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