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A Trade Strategy for the United States1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 September 2012

Stephen D. Krasner
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Abstract

Krasner considers the decline of the global economic power the United States enjoyed from the 1940s through the 1960s and prescribes a policy of specific repricocity that aims not at restoring the country's postwar position but at allowing it to compete effectively in an emerging and changing economic climate. Specific repricocity focuses on short term pay-offs, outcomes, and differences in the domestic institutional arrangements of major economic partners. It aims at maintaining global stability while supporting the national best interest.

Type
Articles
Information
Ethics & International Affairs , Volume 2 , March 1988 , pp. 17 - 35
Copyright
Copyright © Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs 1988

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Footnotes

1

Completion of this paper was facilitated by grant BNS–8700864 from the National Science Foundation to the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, California.

References

2 See Lumsdaine, David O., “Ideals and Interests: The Foreign Aid Regime, 1948–1986” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation) Stanford University, 1987Google Scholar.

3 See Russett, Bruce, “The Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony; Or, Is Mark Twain Really Dead?” International Organization 39:2 (Spring 1985)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. As I will argue below I do not find Russett's analysis convincing because it understates the importance of dramatic declines in capability in many specific sectors, although it does point to the importance of not thinking America has suddenly become a second-rate power.

4 World Bank, World Development Report (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986) Table 2.6Google ScholarPubMed.

5 Ibid., Figure 2.2Google Scholar.

6 See Organski, A.F.K. and Kugler, Jacek, The War Ledger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980)Google Scholar.

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10 World Bank, op.cit., Table 5Google Scholar.

11 See Gilpin, Robert, The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987) p. 346CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

12 The distinction between diffuse and specific reciprocity is developed in Keohane, Robert O., “Reciprocity in International Relations,” International Organization 40:1 (Winter 1986) pp. 1–27CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

13 See Axelrod, Robert, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984)Google ScholarPubMed; and Oye, Kenneth, ed., Cooperation Under Anarchy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986)Google Scholar.

14 George, A. Akerlof, “The Market for ‘Lemons,’” Quarterly Journal of Economics 84 (August 1970)Google Scholar.

15 Michael Aho, C. and Aronson, Jonathan David, Trade Talks: America Better Listen! (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1985) p. 126Google Scholar.

16 For an explanation of developments in the textile sector see Aggarwal, Vinod, Liberal Protectionism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985)Google Scholar.

17 A listing of the issues dealt with in the MOSS negotiations can be found in the Japan Economic Institute, JEI Report No. 2B (January 17, 1986) pp. 3–6Google Scholar.

18 The New York Times, August 1, 1986, pp. 1:5Google Scholar, and March 28, 1987, pp. 1:3. While the symbolic importance of American action does need to be highlighted, it must be recognized that the duties affected less than one percent of Japanese products entering the United States.

19 Kilborn, Peter T., “Curb Asked on Foreign Takeovers,” The New York Times, March 18, 1987, pp. Dl:5Google Scholar.

20 United States Federal Communications Commission, Notice of Inquiry and Proposed Rulemaking, “Regulatory Policies and International Telecommunications,” FCC 86–563 (Washington, DC: January 30, 1987)Google Scholar.

21 See Keohane, Robert O., After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984)Google Scholar.

22 This argument is developed in Joesph M. Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of Neoliberal Institutionalism,”International Organization (forthcoming)Google Scholar.

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24 See Okimoto, Daniel I., Between MITI and the Market (Stanford: Stanford University Press, forthcoming)Google Scholar.

25 Asymmetries in Japanese-American Trade: The Case for Specific Reciprocity (Berkeley: Institute for International Studies, 1987)Google Scholar.

26 Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985)Google Scholar.