¹ Craig Scott, Iraq and the Serious Consequences of Word Games: Language, Violence and Responsibility in the Security Council, 3, German Law Journal No. 10 (2002), available at http://www.germanlawjournal.com/index.php?pageID=11&artID=209. All citations are to the paragraph numbering in the online version. “Iraq and the Serious Consequences of Word Games” is reproduced, with two corrections, in Comparative Law as Transnational Law (Russell Miller & Peer Zumbansen eds., forthcoming 2011). As noted in the opening footnote to the Miller and Zumbansen version: “References in the original article to the Operation Desert Fox bombings in November 1998 by the US, the UK and France were erroneous in two respects. First, the month was December (not November) 2008. Second, while France was involved with the US and the UK in the 1993 bombings discussed in the article, it was not involved in 1998 in Operation Desert Fox. The text has been modified to correct these two errors.”Google Scholar

² Draft of a U.S.-British Resolution on Iraq and Inspectors, NY Times, Oct. 23, 2002, at A23 (as cited in footnote 1 of the article); partially reproduced in Chart 1 below.Google Scholar

³ UN Doc. S/RES/1441 (8 November 2002); partially reproduced in Chart 1 below.Google Scholar

⁴ UN Doc. S/2002/1198 (7 November 2002) entitled “United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America: draft resolution.”Google Scholar

⁵ See Scott, supra note 1 (this movement to end of the document – viewed by some to strengthen the importance of the “serious consequences” clause – was suggested by France). See infra note 20.Google Scholar

⁶ Such that “will be reported to the Council for assessment in accordance with paragraphs 11 or 12 below” [emphasis added], which the UK and US had inserted into one of their drafts following their 21 October draft, became “will be reported to the Council for assessment in accordance with paragraphs 11 and 12 below” [emphasis added]. See Ewan MacAskill, Two Words Make All the Difference: UN Resolution Wrangles Were Over Trigger for Attack, The Guardian Online, 9 November 2002, at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/nov/09/iraq.unitednations (last accessed May 9, 2010).Google Scholar

⁷ Id. Google Scholar

⁸ Id. Google Scholar

⁹ Patrick E. Tyler, Security Council Votes, 15-0, for Tough Iraq Resolution; Bush Calls it a ‘Final Test'; Clock Ticks for Hussein; With Deadlines Set, Only Weeks Remain for Iraqi Disarmament by Peaceful Means, NY Times, 9 Nov. 2002, at A1(N); A1(L).Google Scholar

¹⁰ Verbatim Report of 4644^th Meeting of the Security Council, 10 am, 8 November 2002, UN Doc. S/PV.4644 (8 November 2002); available in HTML at http://www.undemocracy.com/securitycouncil/meeting_4644 (last accessed May 8, 2010); partially reproduced in Chart 2 below.Google Scholar

¹¹ Joint declaration by France, Russia, and China on resolution 1441, New York, November 8, 2002, at http://www.iraqwatch.org/government/France/MFA/france-mfa-jointdecl-110802.htm (Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control) (last accessed May 8, 2010); reproduced in Chart 2 below.Google Scholar

¹² Joint Declaration by Russia, Germany and France on Iraq, Paris, February 10, 2003, at https://pastel.diplomatie.gouv.fr/editorial/actual/ael2/bulletin.gb.asp?liste=20030211.gb.html (Government of France) (last accessed on May 8, 2010); partially reproduced in Chart 2 below.Google Scholar

¹³ See e.g., the following passages in Scott, supra note 1, at para. 6 (“After showing what the serious consequences of ‘serious consequences’ could be, I end by arguing that, since Council texts are not all-governing but instead are located in a web of associated interpretive signals, it is crucial for key states to delegitimize U.S. claims to UN endorsement of its war agenda by going on record with their interpretations of what the resolution does not permit.”); id. at para. 32 (“[T]he goal of this article is to contribute to transparency before the final Iraq-resolution text is settled upon—or in the immediate aftermath of a vote when interpretive explanations can still play a role in structuring the meaning that can be plausibly attributed to the text. By shining a spotlight on the serious consequences of ‘serious consequences,’ the hope is that key states will be pushed into a mode of public justification that will lead to U.S. and U.K. interpretive unilateralism being interpretively outflanked.”); id. at para. 34 (“Were both France and Russia to say that ‘serious consequences’ does refer to military force but is not a coded authorization for unilaterally determined exercise of such force, any interpretive unilateralism on the part of the U.S. or U.K. would more clearly stand to be condemned as the aggression it would be. Despite the likelihood of a Chinese abstention, it may be that China will join France and Russia in such an interpretive statement.”); id. at para. 36 (“Finally, there are states that are not members of the Council—states such as Canada—whose views also matter. If they are truly concerned, they have the means to interpretively surround the Security Council text by providing their own view of the contents and limits of the text. The authoritative interpretive (including interpretive evolution) of the UN Charter—including those legal acts authorized by the Charter—is ultimately in the hands of all member states of the UN and not simply a fluctuating group of fifteen states with the P-5 at its controlling core.”).Google Scholar

¹⁴ See Scott, supra note 1, at paras. 15 and 24, notes 17 and 21 (discussing these two notions); id. at paras. 1, 4, 15, 34 and 35, note 3 (in relation to automaticity in relation to stages).Google Scholar

¹⁵ The eventual release of the UK Iraq Inquiry's report may well provide the occasion for a retrospective look at the interaction of the normative politics of word games and legal analysis of the (un)lawfulness of the 2003 Iraq invasion. See http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/about.aspx. The Iraq Inquiry was officially launched on July 30, 2009, and continues to hold hearings at the time of the writing of this article.Google Scholar

¹⁶ See Scott, supra note 1, at paras. 6, 14, 20, 21 and 26 (discussing the ambiguity as to whether alerting Iraq to “serious consequences” was intended to be understood as a threat or a warning or both).Google Scholar

¹⁷ In a post-vote explanation of its vote Singapore incorporated, by reference, “positions we have espoused in the Security Council” in past debates.Google Scholar