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Further Notes on Feminist Ethics and Pluralism: A Reply to Lindgren

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 March 2020

Margaret Urban Walker
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Abstract

In a comment on my paper, “Moral Understandings: Alternative Epistemology for a Feminist Ethics” (1989) Ralph Lindgren questions the wisdom of confronta' tional rhetoric in my paper and much feminist moral philosophy, and the consistency of this stance with pluralism about ethics. I defend both the rebellious rhetoric and the inclusivity of my own approach, but suggest that pluralism in moral philosophy is harder to define than Lindgren's comments suggest.

Type
Comment/Reply
Information
Hypatia , Volume 5 , Issue 1 , Spring 1990 , pp. 151 - 155
Copyright
Copyright © 1990 by Hypatia, Inc.

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References

Cavell, Stanley. 1979. TJie claim of reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Lindgren, J. Ralph. 1990. Beyond revolt: A horizon for feminist ethics. Hypatia 5 (1): 145–150.10.1111/j.1527-2001.1990.tb00400.xCrossRefGoogle Scholar