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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 January 2017
In Metal-Tech Ltd. v. Republic of Uzbekistan, an International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) panel unanimously dismissed an investment claim by an Israeli investor filed pursuant to the Israel-Uzbekistan Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) against Uzbekistan. The tribunal concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the dispute because the investment was not “implemented,” i.e., “established” in accordance with the laws and regulations of Uzbekistan as it was the result of corrupt practices by the investor. To reach this conclusion, the tribunal relied, inter alia, on the requirement of consent as set forth in Article 46 of the ICSID Convention. Ultimately, the tribunal decided that as a consequence of having no jurisdiction over the claims, it had no jurisdiction over Uzbekistan’s counterclaims.
* This text was reproduced and reformatted from the text available at the Investment Treaty Arbitration Law website (visited March 6, 2015), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw3012.pdf.
1 Metal-Tech Ltd. v. Republic of Uzbekistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/3, Award (Oct. 4, 2013), available at http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw3012. pdf.
2 Agreement between the Government of the State of Israel and the Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Isr.-Uzb., July 4, 1994, WIP Lex No. TRT/IL-UZ/001, [hereinafter BIT], available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/other_treaties/text.jsp?file_id_309386.
3 Metal-Tech, supra note 1, ¶¶ 412, 413.
4 Id. ¶¶ 412, 372.
5 Id. ¶ 243
6 Alexis Mourre, Arbitration and Criminal Law: Jurisdiction, Arbitrability and Duties of the Arbitral Tribunal, in Arbitrability: International and Comparative Perspectives 229 (Loukas, A. Mistelis & Stavros L. Brekoulakis eds., 2009); see also Paul Friedland, Fact-Finding by International Arbitrators – The Issue of Sua Sponte Calls for Evidence, at 3 (ASA Conference, Feb. 2015), available at http://www.arbitration-ch.org/dl/2f9f8cbc536af2ec4743743cc25256cf/050%20Panel%203% 20Friedland%20-%20Sua%20Sponte%20Calls%20for% 20Evidence.pdf.
7 Mourre, supra note 6; see also Gary B. Born, Rights and Duties of International Arbitrators, in International Commercial Arbitration 1998 (2d ed. 2014).
8 See, e.g., Anna Jouravleva, Sua Sponte Corruption Inquiries by Arbitral Tribunals: Causing More Harm Than Good, Global Arb. Blog (Dec. 19, 2014), http://globalanticorruptionblog.com/2014/12/19/sua-spontecorruption-inquiries-by-arbitral-tribunals-causing-moreharm-than-good/ (arguing that “the approach adopted by the tribunal in Metal-Tech might do more harm than good” and listing a number of possible “scenarios” where sua sponte considerations of corruption may “unwittingly perpetuate corruption”).
9 See, e.g., Michael Hwang S.C. & Kevin Lim, Corruption in Arbitration—Law and Reality, 8 Asian Int’l Arb. J 1, 13 (2012) (“A tribunal is not ‘solely a manifestation and instrumentalization of party autonomy’ which can ignore ‘international goals of sanctioning illegality.’ Tribunals must remain vigilant and alert to the possibility of corrupt dealings being hidden by one or both parties, otherwise they may become unwitting accessories to heinous acts ‘more odious than theft.’” (emphasis in original)).
10 See Friedland, supra note 6, at 4.
11 In particular, Metal-Tech argued that Uzbekistan breached its obligations under the BIT and Uzbekistan law by unlawfully expropriating its investment, by failing to accord it fair and equitable treatment, as well as full protection and security, and by subjecting the investment to unreasonable and discriminatory measures. See Metal-Tech, supra note 1, ¶¶ 107– 09. 188 [VOL. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 54:
12 Id. ¶ 110 (emphasis in original).
13 Id.
14 Id. (emphasis added). Uzbekistan read the word “implemented” broadly, arguing that “an investor forfits any right under the BIT in respect of investment that are ‘made, carried out, or operated in an unlawful manner.’” See id. ¶ 167. Metal-Tech, on the other hand, disputed this expansive interpretation of the temporal scope of Article 1(1) of the BIT, arguing that the provision “refers only to the establishment of an investment (not its operation) and that there is no evidence that the establishment of [the joint venture] was illegal.” See id. ¶ 176
15 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, art. 25(1), Mar. 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 (entered into force Oct. 14, 1966).
16 Metal-Tech, supra note 1, ¶ 123.
17 Id. at ¶ 128. The tribunal explicitly disagreed with the ruling in Phoenix Action Ltd. v. Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, Decision on Jurisdiction (Apr. 15, 2009), which took a broader approach and ruled that “compliance with the laws of the host State and respect of good faith are elements of the objective definition of investment under Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention.” See Metal-Tech, supra note 1, ¶ 127.
18 Id. ¶ 129.
19 See id. ¶ 149.
20 Id. ¶ 139.
21 Id. (referring to Société Générale v. Dominican Republic, UNCITRAL, Award on Preliminary Objections to Jurisdiction (Sept. 19, 2008)).
22 Id. ¶ 145.
23 Id. ¶ 147.
24 Id. ¶ 164.
25 As to the subject-matter scope of the legality argument, the tribunal stated: “In general, on the basis of existing case law, it considers that the subject-matter scope of the legality requirement covers: (i) non-trivial violations of the host State’s legal order (Tokios Tokelés, LESI, and Desert Line), (ii) violations of the host State’s foreign investment regime (Saba Fakes), and (iii) fraud – for instance, to secure the investment (Inceysa, Plama, Hamester) or to secure profits. There is no doubt that corruption falls within one or more of these categories.” Id. ¶ 165.
26 Id. ¶ 193.
27 Id. ¶ 189.
28 The tribunal noted that the total payments paid by Metal-Tech to the consultants “exceeded its initial cash contribution to the venture and amounted to nearly 20% of the entire cost of the project.” Id. ¶ 199.
29 Id. ¶ 86.
30 Id. ¶ 241.
31 See Friedland, supra note 6, at 3.
32 Metal-Tech, supra note 1, ¶ 225.
33 Id. ¶ 273.
34 Id. ¶ 372. Applying Uzbekistan’s relevant criminal provisions to the facts discovered during the proceedings, the tribunal concluded that corruption was “established to an extent sufficient to violate Uzbekistan law in connection with the establishment of the Claimant’s investment in Uzbekistan.”
35 Id. ¶¶ 372–73.
36 World Duty Free Co. Ltd. v. Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, Award (Oct. 4, 2006).
37 Id.
38 Gary Born, Bribery and an Arbitrator’s Task, Kluwer Arb. Blog (Oct. 11, 2011), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2011/10/11/bribery-and-an-arbitrator%E2%80%99s-task/.
39 Id.
40 Jason Yackee, Investment Treaties and Investor Corruption: An Emerging Defense for Host States?, Investment Treaty News (Oct. 19, 2012), https://www.iisd.org/itn/2012/10/19/investment-treaties-and-investor-corruption-anemerging-defense-for-host-states/ (referring to Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide v. Republic of Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25, Award (Aug. 16, 2007) (Cremades, dissenting) (providing an argument to balance the investor and state participation in illegal acts).
41 Id.
42 Metal-Tech, supra note 1, ¶ 329
43 Id. ¶
1 Prior to 24 July 2001, Metal-Tech Ltd. was known as MetekMetal Technology, Ltd. (RA n.1)
2 See RA n.3 (describing molybdenum as a “metallic elementused to enhance the strength, durability, and corrosionresistance of steel, cast iron, and superalloys. Molybdenumproducts have many advanced applications in the industrialtechnology sector”)
3 Mem. J. ¶¶11–12; Witness Statement of Farhod Tashmetovdated 9 November 2010 (“Tashmetov WS”) ¶5.
4 Mem. J. ¶10.
5 RA ¶5.
6 Mem. J. ¶10; Mem. M. ¶22
7 Mem. J. ¶12; Mem. M. ¶¶20, 25.
8 Mem. M. ¶24.
9 Mem. J. ¶¶12–14; Mem. M. ¶¶22–28; Exh. R-19, pp. 1–2.
10 Mem. M. ¶30; Mem. J. ¶30; Exh. C-3/R-21.11 Mem. M. ¶30; RA ¶¶4 –5.
12 Mem. J. ¶17.
13 Mem. M. ¶¶48 –55.
14 Mem. M. ¶¶48 –55.
15 Exh. C-3.
16 Exh. R-22.
17 Preamble to Resolution No. 15, Exh. C-3.
18 Exh. R-22.
19 Uzmetal’s share capital was later increased to USD 5 million(Exh. R-192, pp. 6–9).
20 Article 16, Exh. R-21.
21 Exh. C-4.
22 Exh. C-5.
23 Article 4.2, Exh. C-4; see also Article 8.1, Exh. C-5.
24 Mem. J. ¶48, Mem. M. ¶37; Exh. R-29.
25 Mem. M. ¶36; Exh. R-29.
26 Exh. R-29.
27 C-Mem. M. ¶¶109–111, Exh. R-29.
28 C-Mem. M. ¶183.
29 Article III.1, Exh. R-34.
30 C-Mem. M. ¶256, Exh. R-34.
31 Expert Report by Mr. Juval Aviv dated 14 May 2012 (the”Aviv Report”) ¶8. See also Exh. R-679; Kanyazov IIAttachment 15, p. 9.
32 Exh. R-39, p. 5.
33 Exh. R-170
34 Exh. R-41.
35 Exh. R-42.
36 Exh. R-64.
37 Mem. J. ¶¶86–87; Witness Statement of Azizbek Usmanovdated 10 November 2010 (“Usmanov WS I”), ¶13; Exh.R-65.
38 Exh. C-6.
39 Mem. M. ¶9; C-Mem. M. ¶¶277–288; Exh. C-6, Exh. C-3.
40 Mem. M. ¶78.
41 Mem. M. ¶82 citing Exh. C-39.
42 Exh. C-45.
43 Exh. C-46.
44 Exh. R-295.
45 Exh. C-49.
46 Exh. C-51.
47 Exh. C-54
48 Exh. C-55.
49 C-Mem. M. ¶325 and n. 1082 (citing Exh. R-299).
50 Exh. R-300.
51 Exh. R-305; C-Mem. M. ¶321.
52 Exh. C-63.
53 Exh. C-66.
54 Exh. C-68.
55 Exh. C-71, 76.
56 Exh. C-73.
57 Exh. C-75; Exh. R-325.
58 Exh. C-80.
59 Exh. R-364.
60 C-Mem. M. ¶¶371–383, Exhs. R-350, 360, 366, 385.
61 Exh. R-385.
62 Exh. R-390.
63 Exh. R-403.
64 Exh. R-408.
65 Mem. M. ¶99. See also C-Mem. M. ¶¶388–391.
66 RA ¶36.
67 Mem. M. ¶¶106–120; Reply M. ¶¶34 –50.
68 Mem. M. ¶¶126–147.
69 Mem. M. ¶¶148–149.
70 See Mem. M. ¶¶164–179; Reply M. ¶¶152–206.
71 Mem. M. ¶171.
72 Mem. M. ¶179.
73 Mem. M. ¶¶180–185; Reply M. ¶¶207–221.
74 Mem. M. ¶¶186–196; Reply M. ¶¶222–237.
75 Mem. M. ¶¶197–199; Reply M. ¶¶238–245.
76 Mem. M. ¶280.
77 Mem. M. ¶¶200–205; Reply M. ¶¶246–252.
78 Mem. M. ¶¶170, 183–192, 202; Reply M. ¶¶76, 153, 158–163, 209–210, 240.
79 Mem. M. ¶¶282–294.
80 Mem. M. ¶¶200–208; Reply ¶¶262–265.
81 Mem. M. ¶¶209–231; Reply M. ¶¶267–291.
82 Mem. M. ¶¶248–272; Reply M. ¶¶292–322.
83 Reply M. ¶¶254–261.
84 Reply M. ¶¶323–327.
85 C-PHB 1 ¶184. At the January and May hearings, theClaimant did not appear to seek any relief other than thatmentioned in its written submissions.
86 C-Mem. M. ¶392.
87 C-Mem. M. ¶¶393–407.
88 C-Mem. M. ¶¶408–429.
89 C-Mem. M. ¶560.
90 C-Mem. M. ¶¶471–472
91 C-Mem. M. ¶¶516–520.
92 C-Mem. M. ¶¶521–525.
93 C-Mem. M. ¶¶526–530
94 C-Mem. M. ¶¶501–507, 531–544.
95 C-Mem. M. ¶¶545–549.
96 C-Mem. M. ¶¶473–487.
97 C-Mem. M. ¶490; Rej. M. ¶220–234.
98 C-Mem. M. ¶¶488–496.
99 C-Mem. M. ¶¶508–509.
100 C-Mem. M. ¶¶510–514.
101 C-Mem. M. ¶¶550–556.
102 C-Mem. M. ¶¶561–565. 103 C-PHB 1 ¶448.
104 R-PHB 1 ¶612. At the January and May hearings, theRespondent did not appear to seek any relief other than thatmentioned in its written submissions.
105 See e.g., Saipem S.p.A. v. the People’s Republic ofBangladesh, Decision on Jurisdiction and Recommendationon Provisional Measures, 21 March 2007, ¶67; AESCorporation v. the Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.ARB/02/17, Decision on Jurisdiction, 13 July 2005,¶¶30 –33; Saba Fakes v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No.ARB/07/20, Award, 14 July 2010 (hereafter “Saba Fakes”),¶96.
106 While Israel is not a party to the VCLT, it has not beencontested that the rules on interpretation that it containsreflect customary international law.
107 The Preamble of the Constitution reads as follows: “The peopleof Uzbekistan, solemnly declaring their adherence to humanrights and principles of state sovereignty, aware of theirultimate responsibility to the present and the future generations,relying on historical experience in the development of Uzbekstatehood, affirming their commitment to the ideals ofdemocracy and social justice, recognizing priority of thegenerally accepted norms of the international law, aspiring to aworthy life for the citizens of the Republic, setting forth the taskof creating a humane and democratic rule of law, aiming toensure civil peace and national accord [. . .]” (emphasis added).
108 Article 2 of the Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan No. 609-I”On Foreign Investments” of 30 April 1998 reads as follows:”If an international agreement concluded by the Republic ofUzbekistan established other rules than those provided by thelegislation on foreign investments, then the rules ofinternational agreement are applied” (Exh. R-14).
109 Article 2 of the Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan No. 611-I”On Guarantees and Measures of Protection of ForeignInvestors’ Rights” of 30 April 1998 reads as follows: “If aninternational agreement concluded by the Republic ofUzbekistan established other rules than those provided by thelegislation on guarantees and measures of protection offoreign investors’ rights then rules of internationalagreement are applied” (Exh. R-15).
110 Phoenix Action Ltd. v. Czech Republic (hereafter”Phoenix”), Decision on Jurisdiction, 15 April 2009, ¶54.
111 Reply M. ¶288.
112 See e.g., Phoenix ¶¶101, 114.
113 Mem. J. ¶200.
114 The Treaty entered into force on 19 February 1997.
115 RA ¶35.
116 Mem. M. ¶229.
117 Article 1(1) of the Greece-Uzbekistan BIT provides: “1. Theterm “investment” means every kind of asset and inparticular, though not exclusively, includes: a) movable andimmovable property and any rights in rem, such asservitudes, ususfructus [sic], mortgages, liens or pledges; b)shares in and stock and debentures of a company and anyother form of participation in a company; c) claims to moneyor to any performance under contract having an economicvalue, as well as loans connected to an investment; d)intellectual and industrial property rights, patents, trademarks, technical processes, know-how, goodwill and anyother similar rights; e) any right conferred by law or contractor by virtue of any licences and permits granted pursuant tolaw to undertake an economic activity. A possible change inthe form in which the investments have been made does notaffect their character as investments” (Exh. CL-1).
118 Mem. M. ¶231.
119 Reply M. ¶283.
120 Reply M. ¶284.
121 Reply M. ¶285.
122 Reply M. ¶287.
123 Reply M. ¶290.
124 C-Mem. M. ¶409.
125 C-Mem. M. ¶410.126 C-Mem. M. ¶410 citing Société Générale v. DominicanRepublic, UNCITRAL, Award on Preliminary Objections toJurisdiction, 19 September 2008 (hereafter “Société Générale”),¶41.
127 C-Mem. M. ¶410 citing Yaung Chi Oo Trading PTE Ltd. v.Gov’t of the Union of Myanmar, ASEAN ICSID Case No.ARB/01/1, Award, 31 March 2003, ¶¶53–63, 83.
128 C-Mem. M. ¶411 citing Técnicas Medioambientales TecmedS.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2,Award,29 May 2003, ¶69.
129 C-Mem. M. ¶412.
130 C-Mem. M. ¶412.
131 C-Mem. M. ¶413 citing Plama Consortium Ltd. v. Republicof Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Decision onJurisdiction, 8 February 2005, ¶204; Telenor MobileCommunications v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No.ARB/04/15, Award, 13 September 2006, ¶91 and otherauthorities.
132 C-Mem. M. ¶417.
133 C-Mem. M. ¶422 citing Efraim Chalamish, An Oasis in theDesert: The Emergence of Israeli Investment Treaties in theGlobal Economy, 32 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 123,157 (2010).
134 C-Mem. M. ¶427.
135 C-Mem. M. ¶428 citing Phoenix ¶101.
136 C-Mem. M. ¶428 citing Gustav Hamester F W HamesterGmbH & Co KG v. Republic of Ghana, ICSID Case No.ARB/07/24, Award, 18 June 2010 (hereafter “Hamester”),¶¶123–24 and Plama Consortium Limited v. Bulgaria,ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Award, 27 August 2008(hereafter “Plama”), ¶¶138–139.
137 Société Générale ¶41.
138 Mem. M. ¶228 (“normally one might not consider thedefinition of ‘investment’ as ‘treatment’ under an MFNprovision”).
139 Berschader v. The Russian Federation, SCC Case No.080/2004, Award, 21 April 2006, ¶188.
140 This is confirmed by scholars, e.g. A. Aust, Modern TreatyLaw and Practice (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2nd Ed., 2007),p.248, and cases, e.g. Asian Agricultural Products Ltd v.Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB 87/3, FinalAward, 27 June 1990, ¶40.
141 Annex, Exh. RL-109, p.11 (emphasis added). See also 1998Israel-Croatia BIT, Protocol, Exh. RL-104, p. 7.
142 “The provisions of this Agreement relating to the grant oftreatment not less favorable than that accorded to theinvestors of either Contracting Party or of any third Stateshall not be construed so as to oblige one Contracting Partyto extend to the investors of the other Contracting Party thebenefit of any treatment, preference or privilege by virtue of264 MATERIALS 54:d) the definition of “investment” (Article 1, paragraph 1)and the reference to “reinvestment” (Article 1, paragraph2) and the provisions of Article 6 contained in agreementsentered into by the State of Israel prior to January 1, 1992with Poland, Romania and Hungary” (Article 7(d), Exh.CL-62, p. 6).
143 Annex, Exh. CL-62, p.12.
144 At the January Hearing, the Claimant observed: “if there wasproof of corruption here, if there was specific and credibleevidence before this Tribunal, that would be relevant to thequestion of jurisdiction in this case” (Tr. 27:1-3).
145 Tokios Tokele˙s v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18,Decision on Jurisdiction, 29 April 2004 (hereafter “TokiosTokele˙s Jurisdiction”), ¶86.
146 LESI Spa et Astaldi S.p.A. v. People’s Democratic Republicof Algeria, Decision on Jurisdiction, 12 July 2006, ¶83(iii).
147 Desert Line Projects LLC v. Republic of Yemen, Award, 6February 2008, ¶104.
148 Saba Fakes ¶119.
149 Inceysa Vallisoletana v. Republic of El Salvador, Award, 2August 2006, ¶¶236–238.
150 Plama ¶¶133–135.
151 Hamester ¶¶129, 135.
152 The Tribunal finds further support of these views inQuiborax S.A., Non-Metallic Minerals S.A. v. PlurinationalState of Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/2, Decision onJurisdiction, 27 September 2012, ¶140, which was issuedafter the submission of the post hearing briefs and is thusmentioned as mere confirmation of the views alreadyreached.
153 R-PHB 1 ¶360.
154 C-Mem. M. ¶398 citing WTO Panel Report, United States –Laws, Regulations and Methodology for CalculatingDumping Margins, WT/DS294/R, 31 October 2005, ¶7.169.
155 C-Mem. M. n. 1285 citing Article 11, Law of the Republicof Uzbekistan No. 609-I “On Foreign Investments” dated 30April 1998 (Exh. R-14).
156 C-Mem. M. ¶395.
157 C-Mem. M. ¶406, citing Tokios Tokele˙s Jurisdiction ¶86.
158 R-PHB 1 ¶367.
159 Mem. M. ¶216.
160 Reply M. ¶268.
161 Reply M. ¶272.
162 Reply M. ¶271.
163 Reply M. ¶270 (referring to the WTO Panel Report, UnitedStates – Laws, Regulations and Methodology for CalculatingDumping Margins, WT/DS294/R, 31 October 2005).
164 Reply M. ¶267.
165 R-PHB 1 ¶40.
166 Exh. R-101.
167 Tr. 353:15-18.
168 Tr. 478:5-9.
169 In fact, the Claimant’s counsel himself admitted that whilenot “suspiciously high”, “a lot of money” was indeed paid byMetal-Tech to the Consultants (Tr. 1299:14-18).
170 The Tribunal notes that while the Claimant’s paymentschedule indicates only payments totalling USD3,532,689.40 to the Consultants, Mr. Rosenberg lateradmitted that an additional payment of USD 30,000 had beenmade to MPC Tashkent (Tr. 1583:1-15). Thus, the totalpayments made to the Consultants would be USD3,562,689.40. Further, an additional payment of USD240,803.97 to Lacey International has been contestedbetween the Parties, but is not relevant for the presentpurposes. Indeed, whether or not these additional paymentswere made does nothing to alter the Tribunal’s findings inrespect of the payments of USD 3,562,689.40 which areadmitted.
171 Article 2 and Appendix No. 2 Exh. R-21.
172 Reply M. n. 313.
173 Exh. R-22.
174 Rej. M. ¶237; see C-Mem. M. ¶¶59 –74, 169–232, 307–22.
175 Rosenberg WS III ¶3.
176 Tr. 476:12-15.
177 Art. 4.1.3, Kanyazov WS II Attachment 13, p. 25.
178 Art. 3.2, Exh. C–224, p. 1; Tr. 1751:11-13.
179 Art. 3.2, Exh. C–223, p. 1; Art. 3.2, Exh. C–225, p. 1; Tr.1751:14-17.
180 Rosenberg WS III ¶18.
181 Most of the consulting contracts prohibited disclosure oftheir contents. See for e.g., the contract dated 15 December2000 (Exh. C-221) which provided that MPC was to “treatany information related to this agreement but also to furthercontracts which may result, as fully secret and confidential.”
182 Rosenberg WS III ¶12.
183 Exh. C-228.
184 Tr. 1645:12-14.
185 Exh. C-228.
186 Tr. 1631:18 –22
187 Tr. 1632:4 –5.
188 Exh. C-228.189 Rosenberg WS III ¶10.
190 Exh. C-236-238.
191 Exh. C-243.
192 Exh. C-230.
193 Rosenberg WS III ¶10(f) referring to Exh. C-230-231;233-237, 242.
194 Exh. C-241-248.
195 Exh. C-230-240.
196 Exh. C-229.
197 Tr. 1583:16-1584:6.
198 Rosenberg WS III ¶2.
199 Tr. 1300:9-11.
200 Tr. 447:22-448:2.
201 See Art. 2.1.2, Exh. C–221; Art. 2.1, Exh. C–223.
202 See Art. 2.4, Exh. C–223; Art. 2.3, Exh. C–225. See also Art.2.1.1, Exh. C–221. See Art. 2.1.2 Exh. C–226.
203 See also Art. 2.1.6, Exh. C–221;Art. 2.1, Exh. C–225.
204 Kanyazov WS II Attachment 5, Attachment 9.
205 Kanyazov WS II, Attachment 8, p. 3; see also Mikhailov WSIII ¶9.
206 Tr. 1610:1-3 (“I don’t think that if Mr. Chijenok wasworking at the Government in Uzbekistan, he had businessin molybdenum.”). See also Tr. 1606:8-12; 1603:11-14,1604:11-14.
207 Art. 2.2, Exh. C-223.
208 Art. 2.4, Exh. C-223.
209 Rosenberg WS III ¶25.
210 Kanyazov WS II, Attachment 4, pp. 9–15; Kanyazov WS II,Attachment 3, p. 3.
211 Tr. 1300:9-11; C-PHB 2 ¶27.
212 Kanyazov WS II ¶21.
213 Tr. 1636:10-1637-21.
214 Art. 2.2, Exh. C-225.
215 Art. 2.3, Exh. C-225.
216 Rosenberg WS III ¶25
217 Mikhailov WS III ¶¶15, 17, 18.
218 Mikhailov WS III ¶15.
219 Kanyazov WS II, Attachment 11, p.7; Attachment 10, p.3;Attachment 12, p.3.
220 Claimant’s letter of 28 February 2012, ¶2.
221 Reply M. n. 111.
222 Rosenberg WS III ¶25
223 Exh. C-221, Art. 1.1. and 2.1.3.
224 Exh. C-221, Art. 2.1
225 Exh. C-221, Art. 2.2.
226 Exh. C-221, Art. 3.3.
227 Exh. C-221, Art. 2.3.
228 Mikhailov WS III ¶15.
229 Tr. 1623:4-9.
230 Tr. 1645:12-14.
231 Tr. 1583:16-1584:6.
232 Exh. R-121, p. 118 (stating that “Feasibility study has beenprepared by” Bateman’s director, Mr. Gdalyakhu, Bateman’schief engineer, Mr. Jonathan, Claimant’s chief engineer, Mr.Sela, and Claimant’s chief examiner, Professor Tarakanov);Exh. R-20, p. 4 (stating that “[t]he feasibility study has beenconducted by” Mr. Jonathan, Mr. Gdalyahu, Mr. Sela, andalso Mr. Maimon).
233 Claimant’s letter of 30 April 2012.
234 Exh. C–228.
235 Kanyazov WS II Attachment 15, p. 9; Exh. R-679; seeKanyazov WS II Attachment 14, p. 35.
236 Kanyazov WS II Attachment 15, p. 9; Exh. R-679.
237 Exh. R-663, pp. 5, 7–10.
238 Exh. R-659, pp.1 and 5 bearing Mr. Chijenok’s signature.See also R-661.
239 Tr. 1592:10-14.
240 Aviv Report ¶9.
241 Exh. R-663, pp. 5, 7–10.
242 Arts. 2–3, Exh. R-664, p. 11.
243 Exh. R-664, p. 15; Exh. R-663, p. 14.
244 Exh. R-664, p. 1; see also Aviv Report ¶19.
245 Tr. 1586:10-18.
246 Tr. 1592:15-20.
247 Tr. 452:21-453:7.
248 Mikhailov WS III ¶9.
249 Exh. R-470.
250 Exh. R-17, pp. 2 and 3.
251 Exh. R-21, p.9.
252 Tr. 350:15-19.
253 Tr. 450:10-22.
254 Tr. 450:19-22.
255 See Exh. C–228 (showing last payment to MPC of USD182,054.50 on 4 April 2006 and its last payment to Lacey ofUSD 33,460.40 on 24 April 2006); see also Kanyazov WS IIAttachment 2, p. 25; Kanyazov WS II Attachment 1, p. 4.
256 R-PHB 1 ¶308 citing EDF (Services) Ltd. v. Romania,ICSID Case No. ARB/05/13, Award, 8 October 2009(hereafter “EDF”), ¶221; ICC Case No. 8891, Final Award,1998, reprinted in 4 Journal du Droit International 1076,1079 (2000).
257 R-PHB 1 ¶¶308–309.
258 R-PHB 1 ¶¶304, 306 citing Marvin Feldman v. Mexico,ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, Award, 16 December 2002,¶178; Europe Cement Investment & Trade SA v. Turkey,ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/07/2, Award, 13 August 2009(hereafter “Europe Cement”), ¶152.
259 R-PHB 1 ¶300.
260 R-PHB 1 ¶301 citing Bin Cheng, General Principles of Lawas Applied by International Courts and Tribunals 324 (1953).
261 R-PHB 1 ¶303 citing AAPL v. Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No.ARB/87/3, Award, 27 June 1990, ¶56 and R-PHB 2 n. 26citing Oostergetel v. The Slovak Republic, UNCITRAL FinalAward, 23 April 2012 (hereafter “Oostergetel”), ¶303.
262 R-PHB 2 n. 4 citing Tokios Tokele˙s v. Ukraine, ICSID CaseNo. ARB/02/18, Award, 26 July 2007, ¶124; Fraport AGFrankfurt Airport Services Worldwide v. The Republic of thePhilippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25, Award,16 August2007, ¶399.
263 R-PHB 1 ¶307; R-PHB 2 ¶2 citing World Duty Free v.Kenya, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, Award (hereafter “WorldDuty Free”), 4 October 2006.
264 C-PHB 1 ¶117 citing EDF ¶221.
265 C-PHB 1 ¶117 citing Himpurna California Energy v. PTPerusahaan Listruk Negara, Award, 4 May 1999, ¶169.
266 C-PHB 2 ¶8 citing R-PHB 1 ¶300–10, 324–33.
267 C-PHB 2 n. 38.
268 See e.g. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and againstNicaragua, I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 437, ¶101.
269 Tr. 353: 15-18.
270 Tr. 348: 16-21.266
271 Tr. 1300: 9-11.
272 World Duty Free ¶52.
273 World Duty Free ¶166.
274 Oostergetel ¶303.
275 See Waste Management v. Mexico II (Additional Facility),Award, 30 April 2004, ¶30; also Europe Cement ¶152.
276 Claimant’s letter of 30 April 2012.
277 See e.g. Art. 2.7, Exh. C-223.
278 See e.g. Art. 9, Exh. C-222.
279 See e.g. Art. 2.5, Exh. C-223.
280 See e.g. Art.3.1, Exh. C-224.
281 Claimant’s letter of 30 April 2012; Rosenberg WS III ¶1.
282 Rosenberg WS III ¶13 (referring to “[t]he invoices Metal-Tech received” from MPC); ¶25 (referring to joint invoicesfrom the Consultants “instruct[ing] Metal-Tech to payLacey”).
283 Arts. 2.1.2, 2.1.4, 2.1.5, Exh. C–221, pp. 1–2.
284 Mikhailov WS III ¶30.
285 See e.g., Exh. R-25, 26, 140, 151, 161, 38, 39, 43, 192, 45,47, 64; Exh. C–167.
286 Art. 2.3, Exh. C–221; Art. 5.3, Exh. C–221 (“[t]he presentagreement and all its annexes and other documents forming apart of it are strictly confidential.”).
287 Rosenberg WS III ¶15.
288 Rosenberg WS III ¶14.
289 See e.g., Exh. R-20, p. 144; Exh. R-129, p. 1; Exh. R-132, p. 1.
290 See e.g., Exh. C–139, 155, 162.
291 Exh. C-229-248.
292 Claimant’s letter of 30 April 2012.
293 Exh. C-229.
294 Tr. 1583:16-1584:6.
295 Rosenberg WS III ¶10(l) citing Exh. C–232.
296 Rosenberg WS III ¶10(c).
297 Rosenberg WS III ¶15.
298 Rosenberg WS III ¶26.
299 Tr. 1664:8-10.
300 Rosenberg WS III ¶12.
301 Rosenberg WS III ¶13.
302 See e.g., Claimant’s letter of 16 May 2012, 27 March 2012;Tr. 337:6-340:2.
303 Tr. 1589:13-20.
304 Tr. 349:13-350:8; 481:8-15.
305 See Rosenberg WS I ¶9.
306 Rosenberg WS III ¶6.
307 Rosenberg WS III ¶¶10(a), 10(b), 10(c).
308 The Claimant should have begun drafting its FeasibilityStudy in December 1998 (Exh. R-20, p.136). In the samemonth, the Cabinet of Ministers resolved to include theClaimant’s proposed investment project in molybdenum inthe approved investment program (Exh. R-17). The Claimantprepared and revised its Feasibility Study for eight months,until August 1999 (Exh. R-20, p.3). From September 1999 toDecember 2000, the Claimant negotiated with the Ministryof Finance and the National Bank, the bodies responsible fordeciding whether to finance the project (Exh. R-20, pp.180–189, Exh. R-133, Exh. R-474).
309 Tr. 448:17-21.
310 Tr. 477:21-478:4.
311 Tr. 351:2-22; See also Tr. 351:17-352:5 (“they were actuallythe initiator of all the structure of the Uzmetal, and so theywere really very helpful in actually building the Uzmetalcompany”).
312 Tr. 478:20-22-479:1. The Claimant also conceded during itsclosing argument at the January Hearing that “the work forwhich these gentlemen were being compensated extendedback to 1998” and that they “were helping put this dealtogether” (Tr. 1299:19-1300:3).
313 Tr. 348:18-21.
314 Exh. C–221. According to the Claimant, this was the firstcontract with the Consultants (Tr. 1599:11-16).
315 Art. 2.1.3, Exh. C–221, p. 1.
316 See n. 309.
317 Tr. 478:13-19 (emphasis added).
318 Rosenberg WS III ¶4 (emphasis added).
319 See Tr. 1688:14-19; 1694:14-18.
320 Tr. 1750:20-1751:6.
321 Art. 3, Kanyazov WS II Attachment 30, p. 6.
322 First Witness Statement dated 23 May 2011, Second WitnessStatement dated 16 November 2011 and Third WitnessStatement dated 14 May 2012.
323 Tr. 1685:18-1686:3.
324 Tr. 1686:19-1687:5.
325 R-PHB 1 ¶12.
326 R-PHB 1 ¶10.
327 R-PHB 1 ¶10.
328 R-PHB 1 ¶11.
329 R-PHB 1 ¶16.
330 Kanyazov WS II, Att. 29, p.4, 5.
331 Art. 3, Kanyazov WS II Attachment 30, p. 6.
332 R-682, p. 15–16. See also Resolution No. 19 of the Plenumof the Supreme Court of Uzbekistan, Art. 1, Kanyazov WS IIAttachment 30, p. 6 (“As the subject of this crime [ofbribery] those officials should be also recognised who,though they did not have the authority to perform certain actsfor the benefit of the briber but by virtue of their officialposition were able to take action to commit these acts byother officials for a bribe”) and Exh. R-681, p. 16.
333 R-682, p. 15–16. See also Exh. R-681, p.15 (“The scopes ofbribe may be transferred both directly to the official — takerof bribe and with his knowledge to the members of thefamily and other persons close to him and may be transferredto the bank to the account of the bribe-taker. The way ofbribetaking and the form of its externalization are of noimportance for the qualification.”)
334 Exh. R-682, p. 20 (“[O]ffering the [government] officialmaterial values or property benefits, posting these in a letteror a parcel and even transferring to his/his relatives or a2015] METAL-TECH LTD. V. REPUBLIC OF UZBEKISTAN (ICSID) 267mediator, if not followed by the acceptance of the bribe bythe person, should be qualified not as a completed offencebut as attempted bribery.”). See also Resolution 19 of thePlenum of the Supreme Court of Uzbekistan, Art. 3, 5,Kanyazov WS II Attachment 30, p. 6 (“If the alleged bribehas not been received or rejected by the official, the action ofa person who tried to give a bribe, should be qualified asattempted bribery.”), Kanyazov WS II n.2 (“Under the lawsof the Republic of Uzbekistan, it is unlawful to give or toaccept a bribe (or to attempt to do so), personally or throughan intermediary” inter alia relying on Article 25 of the UzbekCriminal Code (“Preparation for Crime and CriminalAttempt”) (Attachment 29)).
335 See Exh. R-681, p.16 (“the offer of material values orproperty benefit to a official, sending them by post in anenvelope or in a parcel, and also giving them to relatives orto a mediator, if the bribe is not taken, should be treated asan attempt to give a bribe”); see also Exh. R-683, p. 11 (abribe “can be overt corruption or disguised by suchapparently lawful actions as a gift, sale for nothing, theconclusion of sham employment contracts and payment asper these to the bribe taker, his/her relatives or otherauthorized representatives for jobs ostensibly made byhim/her, ostensibly rendered technical support, etc.”).
336 Oostergetel ¶141.
337 For example, Exh. R-682/C-255, p.3 states: “By issuing thiscommentary, the publisher would like to stress that certaincontroversial issues still require practical interpretation andthus legal practitioners, scientists and scholars are invited toexpress their opinion and wishes with regard to thispublication.”
338 World Duty Free ¶157. This approach was confirmed in therecent Niko decision (Niko Resources Ltd v. Bangladesh,Bapex and Petrobangla, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/11 andARB/10/18, Decision on Jurisdiction, 19 August 2013,¶¶431–433).
339 Woolf Committee Report on Business Ethics, GlobalCompanies and the Defence Industry: Ethical BusinessConduct in Bae Systems Plc 25–26 (2008).
340 The Tribunal has noted the Claimant’s objections that the redflags used by the Respondent post-date the impugnedconduct of the Consultants, i.e. the red flag lists upon whichthe Respondent relies were published after the conduct underscrutiny. However, the red flag lists merely assemble anumber of factors which any adjudicator with good commonsense would consider when assessing facts in relation with acorruption issue whether now or in 1998. This was forinstance the approach used in ICC cases No. 6497 and 8891.
341 R-PHB 1 ¶¶48-54.
342 R-PHB 1 ¶48 citing Tr. 348:22-349:9.
343 R-PHB 1 ¶49 citing Tr. 349:10-12.
344 R-PHB 1 ¶49 citing Tr. 349:13-350:12.
345 R-PHB 1 ¶49.
346 R-PHB 1 ¶50 citing Tr. 447:8-12.
347 R-PHB 1 ¶50 citing Tr. 447:13-448:7.
348 R-PHB 1 ¶50.
349 R-PHB 1 ¶50 citing Tr. 448:10-12.
350 R-PHB 1 ¶50 citing Tr. 448:13-21.
351 R-PHB 1 ¶51.
352 R-PHB 1 ¶53 citing Tr. 475:18-476:11.
353 R-PHB 1 ¶53 citing Tr. 476:12-15.
354 R-PHB 1 ¶53 citing Tr. 476:19-477:1.
355 R-PHB 1 ¶53 citing Tr. 477:2-16.
356 R-PHB 1 ¶53 citing Tr. 477:21-478:8.
357 R-PHB 1 ¶54.
358 R-PHB 1 ¶¶65–69.
359 R-PHB 1 ¶68 citing Tr. 1696:1-14.
360 R-PHB 1 ¶58 citing Tr. 1612:10-14 and 1611:15-17.
361 R-PHB1 ¶58 citing Rosenberg WS III ¶1 (“14 years havepassed since many of these events occurred”); Tr. 1596:17-18 (Mr. Rosenberg testifying that “certainly my memoryfails after so many years”).
362 R-PHB 1 ¶69.
363 R-PHB 1 ¶33.
364 R-PHB 1 ¶41.
365 R-PHB 2 ¶7 citing Exh. R-682, p. 16 (“When an official didnot possess the powers to perform an action in the interestsof the briber but owing to the official position was able totake steps towards the performance of such an action byother officials, the act should also be qualified as bribetaking.Such people may be advisors, reviewers, secretaries,assistants to high-ranking officials, chiefs of offices, etc., aswell as other officials achieving an action or inactiondesirable for the briber by means of the position they fill orthe working connections they enjoy.”); Exh. R-683, p. 12;Exh. R-681, p. 16; Kanyazov WS II Att. 30, p. 6.
366 R-PHB 1 ¶174.
367 C-PHB 1 ¶115.
368 C-PHB 1 ¶115.
369 C-PHB 1 ¶132 citing Exh. C-236.
370 C-PHB 1 ¶128 citing Rosenberg WS III ¶¶8, 18.
371 C-PHB 1 ¶129 citing Rosenberg WS III ¶¶8, 18.
372 Tr. 1588:8-12.
373 C-PHB 1 ¶129 citing Tr. 1601:8-16.
374 Claimant’s letter of 27 March 2012, pp. 4–5.
375 C-PHB 1 ¶128.
376 C-PHB 1 ¶136.
377 C-PHB 1 ¶138 citing Kanyazov WS II, Attachment 5.
378 C-PHB 1 ¶138 citing Kanyazov WS II, Attachment 12.
379 C-PHB 1 ¶138.
380 C-PHB 1 ¶142.
381 C-PHB 1 ¶141.
382 C-PHB 1 ¶¶137–143.
383 C-PHB 1 ¶140.
384 C-PHB 1 ¶141.
385 C-PHB 1 ¶142.
386 C-PHB 1 ¶17.
387 C-PHB 1 ¶142.
388 C-PHB 1 ¶143.
389 C-PHB 1 ¶139 citing Tr. 1692:14-15.
390 citing Tr. 1692:19-21.
391 Claimant’s letter of 27 March 2012, p. 5.
392 Tr. 348:22-349:3 (“Q. Would you tell the Tribunal when youfirst became acquainted with [the Parties to the 28 February2005 Agreement]? A. It’s beginning to my brain, but it’sabout 1998.”).
393 Tr. 477:21-478:4.
394 Tr. 447:8-12.
395 Tr. 446:11-447:1.
396 Tr. 447:2-6.
397 Tr. 447:7.
398 Tr. 1601:7-11.
399 Tr. 1606:3-6.
400 Tr. 453:13-464:14.
401 C-PHB 1 ¶128.
402 Tr. 346:15-347:1.
403 Exh. C–236.
404 Tr. 1612:10-14 (“I didn’t say that my memory is refreshedby documents. I said my memory, what I can recall with mymemory, and my memory can recall that I met him [Mr.Chijenok] at about 2003 . . . “); Tr. 1611:15-17 (“Q. Thetime between 1998, which was the prior testimony, and yourtestimony today about 2003. I’m saying: Is there anything inwriting that would support the clarification you’re offeringtoday? A. I don’t have any documents, nor [do] I have anyrecollection of any of anything prior to 2003. That’s what Idon’t have.”).
405 Tr. 1596:14-18 (“Q. And are you saying that your memorymay not be perfect and you prefer to rely oncontemporaneous documents? A. Certainly my memory failsafter so many years.”).
406 Exh. R-663, pp. 5, 12; Exh. R-659, pp. 1 and 5 bearing Mr.Chijenok’s signature. See also R-661.
407 Tr. 353:15-354:6.
408 Tr. 1697:13-18.
409 Tr. 1300:9-11.
410 Rosenberg WS III ¶18.
411 Rosenberg WS III ¶12.
412 Kanyazov WS II Attachment 5.
413 Kanyazov WS II Attachment 5, Attachment 12.
414 Kanyazov WS II, Attachment 8, p. 3; see also Mikhailov WSIII ¶9.
415 Tr. 452:21-453:7.
416 Mikhailov WS III ¶9.
417 Exh. R-470.
418 Kanyazov WS II Attachment 7, pp. 23–24; Kanyazov WS IIAttachment 5, p. 3.
419 R-PHB 1 ¶96.
420 R-PHB 1 ¶¶104-105.
421 R-PHB 1 ¶99 citing Tr. 1636:13-15, 1636:19-20, 1637:6-7.
422 R-PHB 1 ¶98.
423 R-PHB ¶100.
424 Rosenberg WS III ¶3.
425 R-PHB 1 ¶102 citing Rosenberg WS III ¶15.
426 R-PHB 1 ¶103.
427 R-PHB 2 ¶7.
428 R-PHB 1 ¶¶317–320. In support of this argument, theRespondent relies on the commentaries filed on 20 July2012, which, it asserts, stand for the proposition thatpayment to a relative of a government official may constitutea bribe even if it is not transferred to the official.Respondent’s letter of 20 July 2012, at 7 (citing Exh. R-681and R-682).
429 C-PHB 1 ¶115.
430 C-PHB 1 ¶144.
431 C-PHB 1 ¶¶115, 151, 162.
432 C-PHB 1 ¶147.
433 C-PHB 1 ¶147.
434 Rosenberg WS III ¶¶10(a), 10(b), 10(c).
435 C-PHB 2 ¶19.
436 C-PHB 2 ¶20.
437 C-PHB 2 ¶20.
438 C-PHB 2 ¶22.
439 C-PHB 2 ¶22.
440 C-PHB 2 ¶23.
441 C-PHB 2 ¶23.
442 C-PHB 2 ¶24.
443 C-PHB 2 ¶24.
444 Respondent’s letter of 16 March 2012, p.3.
445 Cabinet of Ministers Resolution No. 15 dated 18 January2000, Art. 17 (Exh. R-21, p. 9) (“The Minister of theRepublic of Uzbekistan, U.T. Sultanov, shall be responsiblefor monitoring the implementation of this Decree.”); seeCabinet of Ministers Resolution No. 29-F dated 18 January2000 (Exh. R-22, p. 3) (bearing Prime Minister Sultanov’sseal).
446 Tr. 349:18-350:1 (emphasis added).
447 Tr. 350:13-21 (emphasis added).
448 Tr. 448:1-7 (emphasis added).
449 Tr. 450:10-17 (emphasis added).
450 Tr. 1606:8-12 (emphasis added). See also 1603:11-14, 1604:11-14, 1607:1-12, 1608:17-1609:5.
451 Tr. 478:16-19 (emphasis added).
452 Tr. 480:9-12 (emphasis added).
453 Tr. 1637:17-21.
454 Tr. 1607:9-12, 1609:21-22.
455 Kanyazov WS II, Attachment 4, pp. 9–15; Kanyazov WS II,Attachment 3, p. 3.
456 Tr. 349:18-20.
457 Tr. 349:18-350:12.
458 Tr. 448:1-7.
459 Tr. 969:11-970:9.
460 Tr. 1045:1-11.
461 Rosenberg WS III 10(a); see e.g., Tr. 451:11-12; id. 477:13-16.
462 Exh. C-229.
463 Exh. R-121, p. 118 (stating that “Feasibility study has beenprepared by” Bateman’s director, Mr. Gdalyakhu, Bateman’schief engineer, Mr. Jonathan, Claimant’s chief engineer, Mr.Sela, and Claimant’s chief examiner, Professor Tarakanov);Exh. R-20, p. 4 (stating that “[t]he feasibility study has beenconducted by” Mr. Jonathan, Mr. Gdalyahu, Mr. Sela, andalso Mr. Maimon).
464 Tr. 1636:10-1637:8.
465 Tr. 1636:22-1637:7.
466 Kanyazov WS II Attachment 4, pp. 9–15.
467 Tr. 1300:4-11.
468 Exh. R-470.
469 Tr. 1639:15-19.
470 Tr. 350:15-19.
471 Rosenberg WS III ¶7.
472 Exh. R-472.
473 Exh. R-21.
474 See Kanyazov WS II Attachment 2, p. 25 and Exh. R-110.
475 Tr. 350:15-19 (emphasis added).
476 Tr. 450:10-22 (emphasis added), see also Tr. 1635:22-1636:6.
477 Tr. 351:7-16.
478 Rosenberg WS III ¶7 (emphasis added). Further, when askedhow Mr. Sultanov could have performed services forClaimant if he was living abroad, Mr. Rosenberg testifiedthat “[h]e had the connections which were required” (Tr.1635:22-1636:6). The Claimant also submitted that theConsultants were mainly paid for “access to the relevantGovernment officials they afforded and, quite frankly, fortheir ability to influence those Government officials.” (Tr.1300:4-9).
479 R-PHB 1 ¶165 citing Tr. 355:16-356:7.
480 R-PHB 1 ¶166.
481 R-PHB 1 ¶169 citing Exh. R-620.
482 R-PHB 1 ¶169.
483 R-PHB 1 ¶169 citing Rosenberg WS II ¶10.
484 R-PHB 1 ¶168.
485 R-PHB 1 ¶¶172–173.
486 R-PHB 1 ¶168.
487 Reply M. ¶310.
488 Reply M. ¶310.
489 C-PHB ¶123.
490 C-PHB ¶115.
491 See C-PHB 1 ¶123 citing CE-229.
492 C-PHB ¶115 citing Tr. 1433:13-17.
493 Tr. 355:21-356:1; Exh. R-620 (“As per past agreements, theconsultant is entitled to 15% of Metal-Tech’s net profit”).
494 Minutes of Negotiations between the Uzbek and the IsraeliParties on Matters of Processing Heaped Tailings andMolybdenum Middlings of AGMK dated 5 December 1998(Exh. R-20, p.136) (reflecting attendance by Mr. Ibragimovon behalf of Metal-Tech); Letter from AGMK to the Cabinetof Ministers and Metal-Tech dated 26 June 1999 (Exh. R-128, p.1) (recording that Mr. Ibragimov was present at ameeting held with officials from AGMK on 25 June 1999concerning creation of a JV for molybdenum middlingsprocessing); Fax from Almalyk Mining and Smelting Worksto Mr. Rosenberg (care of Mr. Ibragimov) dated 14 July1999, proposing a joint venture to organise the production ofmolybdenum from molybdenum middling (Exh. R-20,p.139).
495 Rosenberg WS II ¶10.
496 Rosenberg WS II ¶10.
497 The July 2003 Agreement was mentioned in the Metal-TechProspectus dated 9 May 2005 (Exh. R-101, p. 107).
498 Tr. 1433:11-17.
499 R-PHB 1 ¶174.
500 Id.
501 C-PHB 2 n. 67.
502 Exh. R-42.
503 Usmanov WS I ¶21–25; Exh. R-74; Mem. J. ¶¶90 –93.
504 Mem. M. n.314 (acknowledging that “[b]ecause the relevantnorms are subsumed within Uzbekistan’s BIT obligations,the Tribunal need not determine liability for violations ofcustomary international law separately from its considerationof Metal-Tech’s treaty claims.”).
505 Mem. M. ¶200.
506 The Tribunal notes that in its Request for Arbitration, theClaimant mentioned several violations of Uzbek Law:Articles 9, 10 and 19 on the Law on Foreign Investments,Articles 3 and 5 of the Law on Guarantees and ResolutionNo. 548 (RA ¶36). In its later submissions, the Claimantadded a claim concerning violation of Article 18 of the Lawon Foreign Investments, and did not pursue and/or establishits claims concerning Articles 9, 10 and 19 of the Law onForeign Investments, Article 5 of the Law on Guarantees orResolution No. 548 (Mem. M. ¶¶200-205 (footnote 378,however refers to Articles 9 and 10 Law on ForeignInvestments and 3 and 5 Law on Guarantees); Reply M.¶¶246 and 253; C-PHB 1 ¶¶108–109). In fact, the Claimantdid not specifically object to the Respondent’s position thatthe Claimant had abandoned all its Uzbek law claimsexcluding the claims in respect of Article 3 of the Law onGuarantees and Article 18 of the Foreign Investment Law(C-Mem. M. ¶560). Thus, the Tribunal understands that thereare only two Uzbek law bases for claims advanced by theClaimant: Article 3 of the Law on Guarantees, and Article 18of the Foreign Investment Law.
507 Mem. M. ¶280.
508 C-Mem. M. n.1736.
509 Although the Claimant cites Exh. R-15, which contains thetext just quoted, the Claimant reproduces Article 10 in ashorter version, which differs from the longer version forreasons which the Tribunal has not been able to elucidate: “Ifthe parties are not able to reach an amicable resolution, sucha dispute shall be resolved by the Economic Court of theRepublic of Uzbekistan, or by arbitration in accordance withthe rules and procedures of the international agreements(treaties and conventions) on settlement of investmentdisputes into which the Republic of Uzbekistan has entered.”(Mem. M. ¶280).
510 See also Mobil Corp. and others v. Bolivarian Republic ofVenezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/27, Decision on270 [VOL. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 54:Jurisdiction, 10 June 2010; CEMEX Caracas Investments BVand CEMEX Caracas II Investments BV v. BolivarianRepublic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/15,Decision on Jurisdiction, 30 December 2010 (bothinterpreting Article 22 of the Venezuelan Foreign InvestmentLaw of 1999 which provides: “Disputes arising between aninternational investor whose country of origin has in effectwith Venezuela a treaty or agreement on the promotion andprotection of investments, or disputes to which theprovisions of [ICSID] are applicable, shall be submitted tointernational arbitration according to the terms of therespective treaty or agreement, if it so provides, withoutprejudice to the possibility of making use, when appropriate,of the dispute resolution means provided for under theVenezuelan legislation in effect”).
511 Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd v. United Republic ofTanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Award, 24 July 2008(finding that Section 23.2 of the Tanzania Investment Actwhich provided that “A dispute between a foreign investorand the [Tanzania Investment] Centre . . . may be submittedto arbitration in accordance with any of the followingmethods as may be mutually agreed by the parties, that is tosay – (b) in accordance with the rules of procedure forarbitration of the International Centre for the Settlement ofInvestment Disputes” did not constitute a standing unilateraloffer to arbitrate.)
512 RA ¶33.
513 Letter from Claimant to the Tribunal dated 28 July 2010 at4-5 (stating that this case differs from Newmont USA Limitedand Newmont (Uzbekistan) Limited v. The Republic ofUzbekistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/20, where “thejurisdiction of the ICSID tribunal was based on a domesticinvestment law, not on a bilateral treaty”).
514 C-Mem. M. ¶2. See also R-PHB 1 ¶594; R-PHB 2 ¶36.
515 Rej. M. ¶432, citing Saluka v. Czech Republic, Decision onJurisdiction over the Czech Republic’s Counterclaim of 7May 2004 (hereafter “Saluka”), ¶39.
516 C-Mem. M. ¶565.
517 Id.
518 R-PHB 1 ¶592.
519 Rej. M. ¶433.
520 R-PHB 1 ¶585.
521 R-PHB 1 ¶¶588–590 citing Amco Asia v. Indonesia, ICSIDCase No. Arb/81/1, Resubmitted Case, Award, 5 June 1990.
522 R-PHB 1 ¶588.
523 R-PHB 1 ¶594.
524 C-PHB 1 ¶180.
525 C-PHB 1 ¶180 citing Rej. M. ¶444.
526 C-PHB 1 ¶181 citing Hamester ¶184.
527 Reply M. ¶258 citing C-Mem. M. ¶565.
528 Reply M. ¶¶258–259.
529 Reply M. ¶260.
530 Summary Record of Proceedings, Geneva ConsultativeMeeting of Legal Experts, February 17–22 1964 in Historyof the ICSID Convention, Vol. 2 (ICSID 1970) 367, 422.
531 Saluka ¶39 (holding that the dispute resolution clause (“alldisputes . . . concerning an investment”), was “wide enoughto include disputes giving rise to counterclaims, so long, ofcourse, as other relevant requirements are also met.”).
532 Spyridon Roussalis v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/1,Award, 7 December 2011, ¶866 (“It is not disputed thatRespondent expressed its consent to arbitration in the BITand that Claimant accepted Romania’s offer to arbitrate.Contrary to Claimant however, Respondent considers thatsuch consent included consent to arbitrate counterclaims.Whether it is so must be determined in the first place byreference to the dispute resolution clause contained in theBIT. The investor’s consent to the BIT’s arbitration clausecan only exist in relation to counterclaims if suchcounterclaims come within the consent of the host State asexpressed in the BIT.”)
533 Antoine Goetz and Consorts and another v Republic vBurundi, ICSID Case No ARB/01/2, Award, ¶276 et. seq.While Goetz refers to the BIT conditions of consent, and inparticular to the definition of investment under the BIT,towards the end of its analysis it appears to endorse thedissenting opinion of Professor Reisman in Roussalis,according to whom “[w]hen the States Parties to a BITcontingently consent, inter alia, to ICSID jurisdiction, theconsent component of Article 46 of the WashingtonConvention is ipso facto imported into any ICSID arbitrationwhich an investor elects to pursue” (Spyridon Roussalis v.Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/1, Declaration of Prof.Reisman, 28 November 2011). The Tribunal understands theendorsement of the Goetz tribunal to refer to a situation inwhich the dispute settlement clause only grants the right tobring claims to the investor.
534 C-CB 1 ¶26.
535 Id. ¶27.
536 R-CB 2 ¶19.
537 C-CB 2 ¶20.
538 See e.g., Plama ¶¶321–322.
