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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 May 2009
Pressures to extend the activities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) into fields other than the military, or actually to shift the emphasis to political, economic, and cultural objectives, have been so strong in recent years that one wonders whether there has not been a growing tendency, particularly in Europe, to lose sight of the purpose for which NATO was established and which makes it vital to the United States. Essentially, NATO is a multilateral military alliance for the protection of western and southern Europe against Soviet conquest, a means of denying these areas and their resources to the Soviets. If the members of the alliance, on one side or the other of the Atlantic, were ever to reach the conclusion that the threat of military attack from the east had vanished or that it could not be countered effectively by common military effort, NATO would have lost its original raison d'être, though it might be continued for the sake of what today are secondary non-military functions, such as political conciliation and economic collaboration. It should be added that the primacy of the military purpose of NATO, as it exists today, does not preclude the desirability or even the necessity of extending its scope beyond purely military matters. As Ruth C. Lawson has pointed out, there is little hope for reliable military collaboration among countries ohat do not succeed in attaining a reasonable degree of harmony between their political aims and policies. Cyprus, Suez, and Algeria are symptomatic of the problems NATO faces in the political field.
1 Lawson, Ruth C., “Concerting Policies in the North Atlantic Community”, International Organization, Spring 1958 (Vol. 12, No. 2), p. 163–179CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
2 General Norstad, Lauris, speech at Ciocinnati, 11 12, 1957Google Scholar; text in NATO Letter, 12 1957 (Vol. 5, No. 12), p. 26–28Google Scholar.
3 The Economist, 12 22, 1956 (Vol. 181, No. 5913), P. 1057–1058Google Scholar.
4 Cf. a forthcoming paper on NATO strategies by Roger Hilsman to be presented at a January 1959 conference on NATO at Princeton University.
5 General Norstad, Lauris, “NATO—Deterrent and Shield”, address to the American Council on NATO, New York, 01 29, 1957Google Scholar; text in NATO Letter, 02 1957 (Vol. 5, No. 2), p. 27–30Google Scholar.
6 Bundestag Record, February 25, 1955, p. 3736. Cf. Speier, Hans, German Rearmament and Atomic War, White Plains, New York, Row, Peterson and Company, 1957, p. 168Google Scholar.
7 Even if defensive forces of half th e strength of the attacker might prove effective eventually, it does not mean they could stop him on the line of attack. It has been suggested that the Shield could do so by means of atomic interdiction, thereby cutting off the Soviet armies at the front from their supplies and reinforcements. One wonders, however, how much advantage the NATO defenders would gain from such tactics if the Soviets reciprocated with the same kind of atomic interdiction. Presumably they would be in as good a position as NATO to pile up near the front whatever supplies the fighting forces would need to advance.
8 Hoag, Malcolm, “NATO: Deterrent or Shield”, Foreign Affairs, 01 1958 (Vol. 36, No. 2), p. 284CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
9 Ridgway, General Matthew B., SACEUR, Second Annual Report to the Standing Group NATO, 05 30, 1953Google Scholar.
10 Speech in the House of Commons on defense policy, March 1, 1955; text in U. S. News and World Report, 03 11, 1955 (Vol. 38, No. 10), p. 74–78Google Scholar.
11 Wolfers, Arnold, “Could a War in Europe be Limited”, Yale Review, Winter 1956 (Vol. 45, No. 2), p. 214–228Google Scholar.
12 See, for instance, Miksclie, Ferdinand Otto, Der Atomkrieg findet nicht statt, Stuttgart, Friedrich Vorwerk Verlag, 1958Google Scholar.
13 See Churchill's comments on the Defense White Paper of 1954, H. C. Debates, 03 2, 1954 (Vol. 524), cols. 1135–1136Google Scholar.
14 “Interview with General Lauris Norstad,” NATO Letter, 12 1, 1956 (Vol. 4, No. 12), p. 34–37Google Scholar.
15 The idea that with its tactical nuclear weapons NATO could interdict the Soviets from reinforcing their armies at the front and thereby gain a great defensive advantage is not likely to make limited nuclear war more palatable to Continentals. There is nothing to prevent the Soviets from matching the destruction wrought through interdictory bombardment by NATO of a zone in east Germany and Poland by applying the same treatment to a zone across western Europe for the same purpose of interdiction.
16 For critical examination of the argument that this Whould be the nature of a limited nuclear War in Europe, see King, James E. Jr, “Limited Annihilation” (Part II of a review of Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, by Kissenger, Henry A.). The New Republic, 07 15, 1957Google Scholar.
17 Kaufmann, arguing against Kissinger about limited nuclear war, states that “we must also anticipate that rather few countries will volunteer to be defended by these means”. Kaufmann, William W., “The Crisis in Military Affairs”, World Politics, 07 1958 (Vol. 10, No. 4), p. 579–603CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
18 Statement on Defence, 1954. Cmd. 9075, February 1954.
19 See, however, Marshal, Field the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, “The Panorama of Warfare in a Nuclear Age”, The Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, 11 1956 (Vol. 101, No. 604), p. 503–520Google Scholar.
