¹ Hopkins, Raymond F. and Puchala, Donald J., “Perspectives on the international relations of food” and “Toward innovation in the global food regime,” International Organization 32, 3 (Summer 1978): 581–616 and 855–868CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Page references to this volume are given in parentheses in the text.

² I adopt the definition of the global food system applied in the International Organization volume—i.e., production, distribution, and consumption of food and the transactions connecting them (Hopkins, and Puchala, , “Perspectives,”) p. 597Google Scholar.

³ Many different definitions of power could be applied here. I prefer the simple one: “A” has power over “B” to the extent that ”A” controls something (some good) and “B” wants. The basic goods in the food system are food supplies, controlled by the exporting countries and grain trading TNCs, and the large food import markets mainly in the rich countries, the access to which is controlled by the respective national authorities. The distribution of these goods, which can be symmetrical or asymmetrical among the actors, constitutes the system's power structure. The main purpose of introducing this variable is to facilitate identification of the sources of control in the global food system. The regime concept describes the “rules of the game” in the system, but it does not adequately explain the origin of these rules.

⁴ The developing countries in 1973 relied on the three large Western exporting countries for 85 percent of their external supplies (total imports less intragroup trade), up from 71 percent in 1969, whereas the developing country import market made up 34 percent (36 percent in 1969) of the total sales of these exporting countries. Calculated from the Yearbook of International Trade Statistics 1974, vol. 1 (New York, N.Y.: United Nations, 1975), pp. 27–29Google Scholar.

⁵ In sum, Western Europe, Japan, and the USSR made up over 50 percent of the total exports from the United States, Canada, and Australia in 1972–73. The proportion has been very stable since 1969. (Source see note 11.) In addition, these importing countries have a general economic strength, reflected in such indices as shares in world trade and foreign exchange reserves, comparable to that of the exporting countries. These factors are also important to understanding the distribution of political and economic strength in the world food system. I have elaborated on this elsewhere, see Bergesen, Helge Ole: “When interdependence doesn't work. A study in world food politics,” Magister degree thesis in political science, published by the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Oslo, 1977, in particular part II, pp. 21–69Google Scholar.

⁶ “Free market” or market economy orientation is a somewhat misleading term, since it evokes an image of the ideal market situation consisting of a large number of small independent producers and consumers. This is far from the case in the world food economy. So the term should not be given that interpretation. What it is meant to signify is a system of international transactions determined by market forces (ability to buy and sell) and in certain situations the unilateral use of political or economic leverage. This version of international laissez-faire is in striking contrast to the strict political regulation of food production and food prices within most countries, whether capitalist or communist. Domestically, no government dares to leave the distribution of such a vital good as food to the working of the market forces. The quote is from Hopkins, and Puchala, , “Perspectives,” p. 615Google Scholar.

⁷ “At times “global norms” have entailed little more than universal acceptance of a major participant's unilateral policies” (ibid., 605).

⁸ These efforts are analyzed in detail in Bergesen, , op. cit., pp. 129–141Google Scholar.

⁹ The World Food Problem, proposals for national and international action. UN World Food Conference, E/CONF. 65/4, p. 236. The original sponsor was, not surprisingly, Bangladesh.

¹⁰ An illustration of the emasculation of the WFC is the way in which it has been squeezed out of the negotiations on a world food security system which has been referred to the talks on a new international wheat agreement within the International Wheat Council: during the first session the WFC stated its prime responsibility for the implementation of a new security system, (cf., Report of the World Food Council on its First Session (WFC/13, 1975), pp. 10–11). At the second session the secretariat presented an ambitious plan for a security system (see note 11), which was simply ignored by the rich country delegations. Finally, the insignificant role of the WFC in this vital matter seems to have been accepted at the fourth session (in 1978), where the Council in fact contents itself with expressing “the hope for an early conclusion of a new international agreement to replace the International Wheat Agreement of 1971” (Report of the World Food Council on the work of its fourth session, UN General Assembly, Thirty-third Session Supplement 19 (A/33/19), (New York, 1978), p. 32)Google Scholar.

¹¹ Cf., the proposal made by the WFC secretariat (International System of Food Security: Report by the Executive Director of the World Food Council, WFC/22 (12 04 1976)Google Scholar. The scheme consists of three elements: an emergency reserve, a coordinated set of national reserves for food aid (which implies a commitment to continuing provision of food aid, even from national reserves) and a tightly managed international food security reserve, which is described as a common insurance plan.

¹² Nau, Henry R., “The diplomacy of world food: goals, capabilities, issues, and arenas,” International Organization 32, 3 (Summer 1978): 806CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹³ Nau sets the following goals for the world food regime: “1) Liberalize global agricultural trade. … 2) Coordinate or harmonize national agricultural policies. … 3) Integrate global policies and institutions for food.” Nau, , op. cit., pp. 806–808Google Scholar.

¹⁴ Report of the World Food Council on its Fourth Session, p. 3.

¹⁵ Opinions on the U.S. “food weapon” seem to have shifted rapidly from an initial, crisisinspired overestimation to the present underestimation. Nau, for example, seems to write off the use of this weapon completely. (Nau, , op. cit., p. 803Google Scholar). In my view, the pendulum has swung too far.

¹⁶ The interests of the exporting countries in market stabilization are explained by Nau, , op. cit., p. 804Google Scholar.

¹⁷ This is estimated as 25–35 percent of major exporters' available exportable quantities ((World Food Council, op. cit., pp. 6–7).

¹⁸ Nau, , op. cit., p. 796Google Scholar.

¹⁹ World Food Security: Evaluation of the adequacy of current and prospective carryover stocks of cereals with special reference to rice. CCP: RI 76/12, FAO (February 1976) pp. 9–10.

²⁰ Cf., the data referred by Nau, , op. cit., p. 785Google Scholar.

²¹ Report of the World Food Council on its Fourth Session, p. 3.

²² These are treated in detail in Bergesen, , op. cit., pp. 94–116Google Scholar.

²³ Draft text of an International Agreement to replace the International Wheat Agreement, 1971, as extended, UNCTAD, TD/WHEAT.6/R.5 (19 February 1979).

²⁴ This includes farming, processing, production of inputs, distribution, and marketing of food products.

²⁵ This reasoning and its consequences are elaborated in Helge Ole Bergesen, “Economic interests in the politics of food. An explanation of the stalemate in world food politics in terms of national economic interests and a discussion of possible redefinitions of interest,” paper presented to the ECPR Joint Session of workshops, Grenoble, 1978, forthcoming in Cooperation and Conflict.

²⁶ This variable defines the level of economic interactions in the system and their importance to the various actors. It corresponds to what Keohane and Nye call the vulnerability dimension of interdependence: “Vulnerability can be defined as an actor's liability to suffer costs imposed by external events after policies have been changed.” Keohane, Robert O. and Nye, Joseph S., Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, Brown&Co., 1977), p. 13Google Scholar.

²⁷ Nau, , op. cit., p. 776Google Scholar.

²⁸ Exactly how fast economic interdependence in food has increased over the last two decades depends on how it is measured. The increased export orientation of the large exporting countries is evident both in absolute and relative terms (exports relative to total production). Their total exports have more than doubled in these years. As to import dependence, the figures vary widely from one group of importing countries to another: Western European imports have been fairly stable in absolute terns (with the exception of a large increase in 1976/77) and falling in relative terms (relative to total consumption), whereas Japanese imports have quadrupled in absolute terms and increased relatively from 25 percent to 63 percent. The large, but variable purchases of the USSR in recent years are well known. The developing countries (excluding Argentina) have more than doubled their net imports, but the proportion to total consumption remains around 10 percent. (These figures are further discussed in Bergesen, , “When interdependence doesn't work,” pp. 40–57Google Scholar. Data taken from World Agricultural Situation, 12 (Economic Research Service, USDA, 12 1976) p. 18Google Scholar.

²⁹ Interestingly, a similar tendency is discernible in the world oil system: very rapidly increasing economic interdependence in this area has certainly not been conducive to international political management. Global policy coordination is even more nonexistent here than in the food system. Not even formal international forums for discussion between exporters and importers have been set up.

³⁰ I assume that in such a case the states will be more willing to sacrifice short-term benefits for a long-term common good. At least it will be much easier for the political leaders to make general appeals to that effect.

³¹ This is why the rest of this discussion is limited to possible policy changes within these countries. So, the following observations on internal policy making are only meant to apply to democratic countries.

³² Cf., for example, Eckholm, Erik and Record, Frank, “The two faces of malnutrition,” Worldwatch paper 9 (Washington, D.C., 12 1976)Google Scholar.

³³ One reservation may be required at this point: my argument does not imply that if only the affluent would cut back their meat consumption, the world hunger problem would suddenly be solved. There is no automatic, or direct link here, but, as I have argued, the former can be seen as one of several necessary preconditions for the latter.

³⁴ World Food Conference Resolution V on policies and programs to improve nutrition states that “overconsumption among the affluent not only impairs their health but also contributes to reducing the food availability for less advantaged groups.” Report of the World Food Conference, p. 9.Google Scholar

³⁵ Bergesen, H., “When interdependence doesn't work,” pp. 83–85Google Scholar.

³⁶ Seevers, Gary L., “Food markets and their regulation,” pp. 721–74Google Scholar, Johnson, D. Gale, “World Food institutions: a liberal view,” pp. 837–854Google Scholar, and Christensen, Cheryl, “World hunger: a structural approach,” pp. 745–774Google Scholar in International Organization 32, 3 (Summer 1978)Google Scholar.

³⁷ It should be emphasized in this connection that world grain stocks are no larger in relation to consumption today than they were just before the 1972–74 food crisis. (Cf. Report on the World Food Council, p. 32.)