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The Nonproliferation Treaty: Its Negotiation and Prospects

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 May 2009

E. L. M. Burns
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Extract

The Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC) devoted its major efforts from the endof July 1965 until April 1968 to negotiating the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, spending little time on other arms control measures in the sessions throughout this period. In May 1968 the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics jointly presented the draft treaty to the First (Political and Security) Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. After lengthy debate and acceptance of several amendments to meet the wishes of nonnuclear states the Treaty reached its final form on May 21, 1968, and was “commended” in General Assembly Resolution 2373 (XXII) of June 12, 1968.

Type
Research Article
Information
International Organization , Volume 23 , Issue 4 , Fall 1969 , pp. 788 - 807
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 1969

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References

1 The earlier negotiations on the Treaty were described in my article “Can the Spread of Nuclear Weapons be Stopped?”, International Organization, Autumn 1965 (Vol. 19, No. 4), pp. 851–868Google Scholar. For a complete history from the United States' viewpoint see International Negotiations on the Treaty for the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Publication 48) (Washington: United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1969)Google Scholar.

2 UN Document DC/225.

3 For an analysis of the general trend of the discussions on nonproliferation in the 1965 meetings of the Disarmament Commission see Burns, , International Organization, Vol. 19, No. 4, pp. 862–864Google Scholar.

4 Of course, such prohibitions would have forced the abandonment of the existing arrangements of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) under the “doublekey” system (see below) and so could not be accepted by the West.

5 The multilateral force proposal was to create a fleet of some twenty or more surface ships of destroyer or frigate size which would be armed with Polaris missiles. Each ship would have a crew made up of nationals of several of the NATO states. The force would be under the NATO command, But no nuclear missiles could be used without the order ofthe President of the United States. The plan went through several transformations. For a comprehensive history and criticism of the MLF project see Kissinger, Henry A., The Troubled Partnership (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), Chapter 5Google Scholar.

6 Some of the political and military drawbacks of the scheme are cited in my book Megamurder (New York: Pantheon Books, 1967), pp. 223–226Google Scholar.

7 Security Council Resolution 255 (1968), June 19, 1968.

8 ENDC Document ENDC/152. This document also appears in UN Document A/6390.

9 ENDC Document ENDC/164. This document also appears in UN Document A/6390.

10 ENDC Document ENDC/152/Add. I. This document also appears in UN Document A/6390.

11 See p. 793 above.

13 Expounded in McNamara, Robert S., The Essence of Security: Reflections in Office (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), pp. 33–47Google Scholar.

13 For the texts of these drafts see ENDC Documents ENDC/192 and ENDC/193. These documents can be found in UN Document A/7072/Add.I.

14 UN Document A/6858.

15 The texts of these two draft treaties, revised versions of die August24, 1967, treaties, are contained in ENDC Documents ENDC/192/Rev. I and ENDC/193/Rev. I, which may be found in UN Document A/7072/Add. I.

16 ENDC Document ENDC/152.

17 General Assembly Resolution 2028 (XX) of November 19, 1965.

18 Anyone interested in the development of these “balancing provisions” may study them in the successive drafts of the Treaty given in the documentary appendix to International Negotiations on the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

10 For the text of the final version of these articles see UN Document A/C. I/L. 42I/Rev. 2/Add. I.

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid.

22 See p. 792 above.

23 Quoted to the Disarmament Commission by Adlai Stevenson. (DisarmamentCommission Official Records, 73rd meeting, April 26, 1965, pp. 7–8.)

24 ENDC Document PV/329, p. 10.

25 These declarations were read out by the representatives of the SovietUnion, the United Kingdom, and the United States at a Security Council meeting on June 17. SeeUN Document S/PV. 1430.

26 General Assembly Resolution 2153 B (XXI) of November 17, 1966.

27 For the text of the resolution see UN Document A/CONF. 35/10, p. 8.

28 See ibid., pp. 8–9. Such discussions would be what the American authorities have named strategic arms limitation talks (SALT).

29 The New York Times, February 25, 1969, p. 42.