¹ See Man's Impact on the Global Environment: Assessment and Recommendations for Action, Report of the Study of Critical Environmental Problems (Cambridge, Mass: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1970);Google ScholarEnvironmental Quality: The Second Annual Report of the Council on Environmental Quality, together with the President's Message to the Congress (Washington: Government Printing Office, 08 1971);Google Scholar and Anderson, Walt, ed., Politics and Environment: A Reader in Ecological Crisis (Pacific Palisades, Calif: Goodyear Publishing Co., 1970).Google Scholar

² United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Population Prospects as Assessed in 1963 (Population Studies, No. 41) (United Nations Publication Sales No: 66. XIII. 2 [UN Document ST/SOA/Ser. A/41]) (New York, 1966), p. 6.Google Scholar

³ Shelesnyak, M. C., ed., Growth of Population: Consequences and Controls: Proceedings of the First Conference of Population Held at Princeton, New Jersey, September 27–30, 1968 (New York: Gordon & Breach, Science Publishers, 1969), p. 57.Google Scholar

⁴ United Nations, Population Division, World Population Prospects, 1965–1985 as Assessed in 1968 (Working Paper, No. 30) (New York, 1969), p. 7.Google Scholar

⁵ In this regard see United States House of Representatives, Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, The Effects of Population Growth on Natural Resources and the Environment, Hearings, 91st Cong., 1st sess., 09 15–16, 1969, p. 5.Google Scholar

⁶ United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Proceedings of the World Population Conference, Belgrade, August 30-September 10, 1965 (United Nations Publication Sales Nos: 66.XIII.2–5 [UN Documents E/CONF. 41/2–5]) (New York, 1966), Vol. 3:Google ScholarSelected Papers and Summaries of the Papers for Meetings, p. 421.

⁷ K. M. Malin, “Food Resources of the Earth,” in ibid., p. 390.

⁸ Landsberg, Hans H., Natural Resources for U.S. Growth: A Look Ahead to the Year 2000 (Baltimore, Md: Johns Hopkins Press [for Resources for the Future, Inc.], 1964), pp. 173–174.Google Scholar

⁹ Victor-Bostrom Fund and Population Crisis Committee, Population and Family Planning in the People's Republic of China (Washington, Spring 1971), pp. 12–13.Google ScholarPubMed This is an estimate of total annual fertilizer needs.

¹⁰ The effects of the Green Revolution are not to be denied. But implications in the context of related factors, such as population growth and technological growth (or lag), are more ambiguous. See Jones, Graham, The Role of Science and Technology in Developing Countries (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971).Google Scholar

¹¹ For a summary of recent findings see North, Robert C. and Choucri, Nazli, “Population and the International System: Some Implications for United States Policy and Planning” (Paper prepared for the National Commission on Population Growth and the American Future, 08 1971).Google Scholar

¹² Ackerman, Edward A., “Population and Natural Resources,” in The Study of Population: An Inventory and Appraisal, ed. Hauser, Philip M. and Duncan, Otis Dudley (Chicago, 111: University of Chicago Press, 1959), pp. 637–638.Google Scholar

¹³ Ehrlich, Paul R. and Holdsen, John P., “Impact of Population Growth,” Science, 03 26, 1971 (Vol. 171, No. 3977), p. 1212.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁴ Statement of Watt, E. F., The Effects of Population Growth, Hearings, 09 15, 1969, p. 33.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Daddario, Emilio Q., “Technology and the Democratic Process,” Technology Review, 07-08 1971 (Vol. 73, No. 9), p. 20.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Weiner, Myron, “Political Demography: An Inquiry into the Political Consequences of Population Change,” in Rapid Population Growth: Consequences and Policy Implications (Baltimore, Md: Johns Hopkins Press, 1971), pp. 567–617.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ See, for example, Hibbs, Douglas Albert, “Domestic Mass Violence: A Cross-National Causal Analysis” (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin, 1971).Google Scholar

¹⁹ Sauvy, Alfred, General Theory of Population (New York: Basic Books, Publishers, 1969), p. 516.Google Scholar

²⁰ The Correlates of War Project, under the direction of J. David Singer, University of Michigan, and the Studies in International Conflict and Integration, under the direction of Robert C. North, Stanford University, both report this same absence of direct link between population (density) and war.

²¹ Nazli Choucri and Robert C. North, “Dynamics of International Conflict: Some Policy Implications of Population, Resources and Technology,” World Politics, supplementary issue on Theory and Policy in International Relations, forthcoming.

²² Nazli Choucri, with the collaboration of Robert C. North, “In Search of Peace Systems: Scandinavia and the Netherlands, 1870–1970,” in War, Peace and Numbers, ed. Bruce M. Russett, forthcoming.

²³ Lagerstrom, Richard P. and North, Robert C., “Germany and Japan: A Comparative Application of a Model of Expansion” (Paper prepared for the Western Political Science Association Meeting, 04 8–10, 1971).Google Scholar

²⁴ Choucri and North, in World Politics, forthcoming. Also see Robert C. North and Nazli Choucri, Nations in Conflict: Prelude to World War I, in preparation.

²⁵ Daddario, , Technology Review, Vol. 73, No. 9, p. 20.Google Scholar

²⁶ Hubbert, M. King, “Mineral Resources and Rates of Consumption,” in Proceedings of the World Population Conference, 1965, Vol. 3, p. 318.Google Scholar

²⁷ Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Energy Policy: Problems and Objectives (Paris, 1966), p. 143.Google Scholar

²⁸ See United Nations Statistical Office, World Energy Supplies (UN Documents ST/STAT/Series J, Nos. 4–12) (New York, 1961-1969).Google Scholar

²⁹ Manners, Gerald, The Geography of Energy (London: Hutchinson and Co., 1964).Google Scholar Because the correlation between energy consumption and economic activity is so close, one is often used to estimate the other.

³⁰ Brown, Harrison, Bonner, James, and Weir, John, The Next Hundred Years: Man's Natural and Technological Resources: A Discussion Prepared for Leaders of American Industry (New York: Viking Press, 1963), p. 10.Google Scholar

³¹ Brown, Harrison, “Science, Technology and the Developing Countries,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 06 1971 (Vol. 27, No. 6), p. 11.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³² Vavra, Zdenek, “Projections of World Population (Distinguishing More Developed and Less Developed Areas at Present),” in Proceedings of the World Population Conference, 1965, Vol. 2:Google ScholarSelected Papers and Summaries: Fertility, Family Planning, Mortality, pp. 49–53.

³³ Statement by Cloud, Preston E. Jr., The Effects of Population Growth, Hearings, 09 15, 1969, p. 6.Google Scholar

³⁴ United States Bureau of Mines, Mineral Facts and Problems, 1970 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 13.Google Scholar The 1970 edition of this volume places great emphasis on prediction and forecasting. In view of the interdependence between economic, techonological, and other factirs it has been deemed necessary to develop alternative predictions based on contingency forecasting techniques. See pages 9–11 of the 1970 edition for a description of method, assumptions, and caveats. For each mineral resource the Bereau of Mines presents a “high,” “median,” and “low” preditction of demand and supply in 2000. Contingencies and caveats are clearly spelled out. The 1965 edition relies on more inflexible trend extrapolation techniques.

³⁵ Ibid., p. 19.

³⁶ Between now and whenever the new technologies achieve effective output there will be a difficult period during which the countries of the world will be relying heavily upon oil, coal, and other traditional resources. Thus, in a technical sense the energy crisis is not imminent. Yet many social and political implications are already manifest, and many more can be foreseen in decades to come. The eventual technological capability to build fast breeder reactors is not in question despite uncertainties concerning their timing for commercial purposes. Once breeders do become operational on a large scale, they would supply a large part of the world's energy demands for several centuries to come. At efficient rates of uranium usages it is estimated that the date of depletion of the energy stock would be prolonged to at least a millenium. See Thirring, Hans, Energy for Man: Windmills to Nuclear Power (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1958).Google Scholar

³⁷ These comparisons are, strictly speaking, not exactly comparable. But as one expert puts it:

Unless we find a lot more uranium, or pay a lot more money for it, or get a functioning complete breeder reactor or contained nuclear fusion within ten or fifteen years, the energy picture will be far from bright. There is good reason to hope that the breeder will come, and after it contained fusion, if the U²³⁶ and helium hold out–but there is no room for complacency. (Preston E. Cloud, Jr., “Realities of Mineral Distribution,” in The Effects of Population Growth, Hearings, p. 225, reprinted from Texas Quarterly, Summer 1968 [Vol. 2, No. 2], pp. 103–126.)Google Scholar Estimates and calculations are wildly approximate and are complicated even further by the factor of delay between discovery and exploitation of deposits. There is also the possibility that if poorer ores are usable, as they presumably would be with breeders, the supply of uranium should not be an immediate constraint.

³⁸ Minerals, Facts and Problems, 1970, pp. 2–5.

³⁹ Cloud, Preston E. Jr., “Realities of Mineral Distribution,” Texas Quarterly, Summer 1968 (Vol. 2, No. 2), pp. 103–126.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ In this regard see Minerals, Facts and Problems, 1970.

⁴¹ See the appendix for discussion of the dependency index measure and for problems and caveats. See Nazli Choucri and Dennis L. Meadows, with the research assistance of Laird, Michael and Bennett, James P., “International Implications of Technological Development and Population Growth: A Simulation Model of International Conflict” (Cambridge, Mass: Department of Political Science and Alfred P. Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 09 1971),Google Scholar for an earlier, briefer version of this comparative discussion of mineral resources in four states. The dependency index measure ranges from +1 to −1 in cases in which stockpiles are excluded; otherwise the measure may exceed +1. A quotient closer to +1 signifies greater reliance on external sources; conversely, one closer to −1 signifies greater dependence on internal sources. See the appendix for sources of data cited below and the period over which computations are based.

⁴² Conversely, the United States is a net exporter of molybdenum, tungsten, vanadium, coal, gold, helium, sulfur, and magnesium. For other key minerals, such as iron ore, copper, petroleum, and natural gas, there has been no trend toward increasing United States reliance on foreign sources since 1958.

⁴³ Ewell, Dr. Raymond, “U.S. will Lag U.S.S.R. in Raw Materials,” Chemical and Engineering News, 08 24, 1970 (Vol. 48), pp. 42–46.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴⁴ Wilbur, Charles K., The Soviet Model and Underdeveloped Countries (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969).Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Several earlier studies have uncovered the same basic trend noted here. See Ewell, , Chemical and Engineering News, Vol. 48, pp. 42–46;Google ScholarRousch, G. A., Strategic Mineral Supplies (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1939);Google Scholar and Park, Charles F. Jr.,Affluence in Jeopardy (San Francisco, Calif: Freeman, Cooper and Co., 1968).Google Scholar A Fourth study rated eleven state according to self-sufficiency regarding 26 industrial minerals; see Leith, C.K.,Furness, I. W., and Lewis, Cleona,World Minerals and World Peace (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1943).Google Scholar A table comparing the eleven countries according to degrees of self-sufficiency is presented on page 45.

⁴⁶ By contrast the Soviet Union is a major exporter of chromium to the United States.

⁴⁷ I am grateful to James P. Bennett for assisting in formalizing these distinctions.

⁴⁸ In this connection see Grad, Frank P., Rathjens, George W., and Rosenthal, Albert J., Environmental Control: Priorities, Policies and the Law (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971).Google Scholar

⁴⁹ At this point it is difficult to say whether the congruence thesis has much validity; considerable research is still to be done.

⁵⁰ The extensive body of statistical data compiled by the United Nations since its inception is only one case in point.

⁵¹ See Forrester, Jay W., “Counterintuitive Behavior of Social Systems,” Technology Review, 01 1971 (Vol. 73, No. 3), pp. 52–68;Google ScholarForrester, Jay W., Principles of Systems (Cambridge, Mass: Wright-Allen Press, 1968);Google Scholar and Meadows, Dennis L. et al. , “The Limits of Growth: A Global Challenge” (Cambridge, Mass: Alfred P. Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 07 9, 1971).Google Scholar (Mimeographed.)

⁵² See Raiffa, Howard, Decision Analysis: Introductory Lectures on Choices under Uncertainty (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1968).Google ScholarPubMed

⁵³ See Schultze, Charles L. et al. , Setting National Priorities: The 1972 Budget (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1971).Google Scholar

⁵⁴ In this connection it becomes imperative to broaden our concept of cost to incorporate other than direct monetary considerations. For persuasive arguments see Rivlin, Alice M., Systematic Thinking for Social Action (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1971).Google Scholar

⁵⁵ See Choucri and Meadows, “International Implications of Technological Development and Population Growth.”

⁵⁶ Schultze et al.

⁵⁷ For a discussion of these issues from a United States perspective see North and Choucri, “Population and the International System: Some Implications for United States Policy and Planning.”