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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 15 September 2015
page no 933 note 1 Young, pp. 263-309, and 92–114. These two discussions of this matter could profitably have been combined.
page no 933 note 2 Ibid., pp. 115-156 and 349-399. Chapter 4, pp. 115–156, is concerned primarily with the impact of me postwar international system on the UN as a whole and does not focus a great deal on its impact on the office of the Secretary-General. Chapter 9, pp. 349–399, touches at various points on the probable impact of future international systems on the office.
page no 933 note 3 See pp. 948–950.
page no 935 note 4 Young, pp. 212–213. For Haas’s, Ernst B. views see Beyond the Nation-State: Vunctionalism and International Organization (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1964), pp. 119–125Google Scholar.
page no 937 note 5 See pp. 946-948.
page no 938 note 6 Gordenker, p. 176; Cox, p. 211. It should be noted that Young’s study implicitly attributes primary importance to the character of conflicts and to the nature of the international system.
page no 938 note 7 Gordenker states that the political conditions in the world should definitely take precedence over the characteristics of the Secretary-General and the precedents established by past incumbents when seeking to explain the activities of the Secretary-General (p. 176). Leland M. Goodrich has stated that the international political environment should be viewed as a more important causal factor than UN Charter provisions, the nature of the Organization, and the personalities of the incumbents. See Goodrich, Leland M., “The Political Role of the Secretary-General,” International Organization, Autumn 1962 (Vol. 16, No. 4), p. 728CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
page no 939 note 8 Dag Hammarskjold deliberately cultivated good personal and diplomatic relations with important political and diplomatic leaders from the Member States, and these contacts proved to be valuable supports for his diplomatic activities and influence.
page no 940 note 9 Gordenker, p. no; Cox, pp. 214-221.
page no 942 note 10 Kay, David A., “Secondment in the United Nations Secretariat: An Alternative View,” International Organization, Winter 1966 (Vol. 20, No. 1), pp. 63-75CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Reymond, Henri, “The Staffing of the United Nations Secretariat: A Continuing Discussion,” International Organization, Autumn 1967 (Vol. 21, No. 4), pp. 751–767CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
page no 941 note 11 It should be pointed out that the interaction between the Secretariat and me national missions to me UN tends to perform a similar function to that of secondment.
page no 941 note 12 See pp. 948–950.
page no 942 note 13 Gordenker, p. 323; Cox, p. 227.
page no 943 note 14 Three authors have discussed the impact of the structure of the international system on the UN .as a whole: Haas, Ernst B., Collective Security and the Future International System (The Social Science Foundation and Graduate School of International Studies, Monograph Series in World Affairs, Vol. 5, Monograph No. 1, 1967–1968) (Denver, Colo: University of Denver, 1968), Chapter 2Google Scholar; Kaplan, Morton A., System and Process in International Politics (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1957), Chapter 2Google Scholar; and Hanrieder, Wolfram F., “International Organization and International Systems,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, September 1966 (Vol. 10, No. 3), pp. 297–313CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Young has also supplemented his views set forth in Chapter 9 of The Intermediaries in “The United Nations and the International System,” International Organization, Autumn 1968 (Vol. 22, No. 4), pp. 902-922.
page no 943 note 15 Cox, p. 229; Young, pp. 152–155. While Young’s discussion pertains to the UN as a whole and not just to the Secretary-General, it can be viewed, at least in part, as relevant to that office.
page no 944 note 16 Young, pp. 23–24. The present author is now engaged in a study which is examining, among other things, the relevance of the alignment patterns of conflicting parties to I) whether the UN acts in a conflict and 2) the types and/or intensity of UN activity in a conflict. The major revision of Young’s categories is derived from the division of Young’s category of “bloc states” into “bloc members” (North Adantic Treaty Organization and Warsaw Treaty Organization members) and “bloc associates” (non-members of the blocs which are “aligned” with mem).
page no 946 note 17 Barros writes:
The office of Secretary-General, though it can, in the right hands, sometimes play an important role in maintaining the peace, can also, in the wrong hands, play a dangerous role in exacerbating the tensions of the world community. Using Avenol’s tenure as an example it would appear that the latter more than cancels out any advantages to be gained from the former.
(Barros, p. 264.) See also the entire final chapter (pp. 259-265).
page no 947 note 18 See Zacher, Mark W., “The Secretary-General and the United Nations’ Function of Peaceful Settlement,” International Organization, Autumn 1966 (Vol. 20, No. 4), pp. 724–749CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
page no 948 note 19 The following prescriptions are discussed throughout Chapters 6, 7, and 8 of Young’s study.
page no 949 note 20 Lie was rebuffed in his brief attempt to influence the Berlin crisis of 1948 and was treated politely but without any real encouragement when he went around with his “ten point peace plan.” Hammarskjöld made one attempt to intervene in the Soviet-American disarmament dialogue in April 1958, and his initiative was met with a Soviet reprimand and American silence. Generally Hammarskjöld stayed away from direct Soviet-American conflicts as if they were me plague. U Thant played a minor diplomatic role in the Cuban missile crisis and did receive some real cooperation from the superpowers. Otherwise, he has not been involved in any direct superpower conflicts. As far as this author knows, neither the United States nor me Soviet Union has ever sought out the Secretary-General to mediate its conflicts with the other.
page no 950 note 21 See footnote 20.
page no 950 note 22 Zacher, Mark W., Dag Hammarskjöld’s United Nations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970). PP. 54-58Google Scholar.
page no 950 note 23 In the past the lack of careful comparative analyses has led to unrealistic suggestions that the practices of the heads of certain international organizations be adopted by the Secretary-General. Suggestions that the Secretary-General of the League could have followed the model of Albert Thomas of ILO are numerous. For a more modern parallel see John J. McCloy’s statement (quoted in Schwebel, Stephen M., The Secretary-General of the United Nations: His Political Powers and Practices [Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1952], p. 208CrossRefGoogle Scholar) that the UN Secretariat should formulate and press for its own proposals in the same manner as the staff of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) has done.
