¹ By “other contemporary critics” I am referring to non-dependency writers like Samir Amin, Arghiri Emmanuel, Johan Galtung, or Immanuel Wallerstein and to the groups of scholars that have developed around their respective institutes. Although they are concerned with different regions, different time periods, and often employ different analyses of the contemporary international system, these critics all prescribe variants of disengagement or restructuring that are central components of self-reliance.

² According to many contemporary critics, free trade disguises unequal exchange and foreign investment distorts economic development and domestic class structure. Since self-reliance reduces and alters traditional trade and investment relationships, it identifies specific policies designed to eliminate the basis of underdevelopment.

³ For a more extended discussion see my “Regulation or Self-Reliance? Alternative Strategies for Dealing with Transnational Corporations in Nigeria and Tanzania” delivered at the 1977 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington D.C., 09 1977Google Scholar.

⁴ A country's situation of dependence is defined by the extent to which its significant economic, social, and political developments are (and have historically been) conditioned by (or contingent upon) developments in the industrial countries. Since most proponents of self-reliance contend that excessive dependence is the cause of the most significant structural distortions of underdeveloped countries, the reduction of dependence they prescribe in a strategy of self-reliance will necessarily promote development. Development is generally described as “self-generating” or “autocentric.” It is defined as the process whereby a highly integrated economy and society is created which is capable of substantially providing for the basic needs of the masses of its population. The dual objectives of avoiding dependence and promoting development are thus integrally related, and self-reliance becomes a logical prescription of the dependency literature from which it is at least partially derived.

⁵ A comprehensive strategy of national self-reliance need not necessarily follow a strict pattern of disengagement followed by restructuring. Restructuring can also precede disengagement or simultaneously accompany it. The separation between the phases is made in part for analytical purposes and to emphasize the relationship between these essential components of self-reliance. Disengagement usually precedes international and domestic restructuring and is therefore presented first in the text.

⁶ Cooperation Against Poverty, paper submitted by the United Republic of Tanzania at the Conference of Non-aligned States. Lusaka, 1970. Reprinted in Mbioni, 9 (1971): 6.

⁷ Amin, Samir, “The Theoretical Model of Capital Accumulation and of the Economic and Social Development of the World Today,” Mimeo. This paper is a summary of his L'accumulationaL'echellmondiale, (IFAN-ANTHROPOS: Paris, 1970)Google Scholar.

⁸ Terrill, Ross, “China and the World: Self-Reliance or Interdependence?” Foreign Affairs, 55, 2 (01 1977): 297CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed.

⁹ Heymann, Hans Jr, “Self-Reliance Revisited: China's Technology Dilemma” Stanford Journal of International Studies (Spring 1975): 34Google Scholar.

¹⁰ “The Arusha Declaration” reprinted in Julius K. Nyerere's Ujamaa—Essays on Socialism (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 34.

¹¹ Galtung, Johan, “Self-Reliance: Concepts, Practice, and Rationale,” unpublished manuscript, (Geneva: Institut d'études du développement, 1976) p. 8Google Scholar.

¹² For example, the First Five-Year Plan (1964–1969) emphasized the use of import barriers (disengagement), control of primary product exports, export market diversification, and regional integration (aspects of international restructuring). See Tanganyika, , First Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development, 1964–1969 (Dar es Salaam, 1964) Volume 1Google Scholar.

¹³ Other related factors were also important in Tanzania's transition to national self-reliance. The international reaction to its rejection of West German aid over invocation of the ‘Hallstein doctrine’ and its break in diplomatic relations with Great Britain over relations with Rhodesia also contributed to Tanzania's decision to alter relations with its traditional industrial trading partners.

¹⁴ “Arusha Declaration,” p. 16.

¹⁵ The list of nationalized export-import activities included Smith Mackenzie and Co. Ltd., Dalgety (E.A.) Ltd., International Trading and Credit Company of Tanganyika, Co-operative Supply Association of Tanganyika Ltd., A. Baumann and Co. (Tanganyika) Ltd., Twentsche Overseas Trading Co. Ltd., African Mercantile Co. (Overseas) Ltd., and Wigglesworth & Co. (Africa) Ltd.

¹⁶ Tanzania, , Second Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development (1969–1974), Volume 1 (Dar es Salaam, 1969), p. 133Google Scholar.

¹⁷ Julius K. Nyerere, speech introducing the Second Five-Year Plan, p. xviii.

¹⁸ The average growth of GDP (in current prices) did exceed the growth of export receipts (also in current prices) during the 1970–77 period. GDP increased at an average annual rate of 17.6 percent, while the value of export receipts increased at an average annual rate of 15.5 percent. In real terms, of course, Tanzania did not exhibit such a significant growth during the period. Real GDP (in constant, 1975 prices) grew in annual terms at a much more modest 4.7 percent during the same period. See Table 2 for further details.

¹⁹ Nyerere, p. xix.

²⁰ Tanzania, , The Economic Survey and Annual Plan 1970–71 (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1970) p. 57Google Scholar.

²¹ Loxley, John, “Financial Planning and Control in Tanzania,” Board, Uchumi Editorial, eds., Towards Socialist Planning (Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1972) p. 58Google Scholar.

²² Nyerere, p. xix.

²³ See especially the discussions of the sources of these setbacks in Joel Samoff and Rachel Samoff, “The Local Politics of Underdevelopment” Politics and Society, 1976, and in Lofchie, Michael F., “Agrarian Socialism in the Third World” Comparative Politics (04 1976)Google Scholar.

²⁴ Msekwa, Pius, “Self-Reliance as a Strategy for Development: The Meaning of Self-Reliance” Economic Research Bureau, Paper 76.6 (University of Dar es Salaam, 09 1976) p. 21Google Scholar. A continued commitment to agricultural self-sufficiency by 1980 was also emphasized by several high-ranking Tanzanian officials in interviews with the author during June and July of 1977.

²⁵ Second Plan, p. 141.

²⁶ Tanzania, , The Annual Plan for 1972/73 (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1972), p. 31Google Scholar.

²⁷ Nyerere, Julius K., “Tanzania Ten Years After Independence” The African Review, 1 (06 1972): 40Google Scholar.

²⁸ Tanzania, , Report by the Government of Tanzania for the East African Consultative Group Meeting on Tanzania (held in Paris, 23 and 24 05 1977)Google Scholar.

²⁹ Second Plan, p. 136.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 142.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid., p. 133.

³³ Ibid., p. 141.

³⁴ Rweyemamu, Justinian, Underdevelopment and Industrialization in Tanzania (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1973) pp. 45–46Google Scholar.

³⁵ Nyerere, Julius K., The Arusha Declaration Ten Years After (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1977) p. 25Google Scholar.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 27.

³⁷ Tanzania, , The Economic Survey 1970–1971 (fn. 18) pp. 93–96Google Scholar. See also Seidman, Ann, Comparative Development Strategies in East Africa (Nairobi; 1972) p. 219Google Scholar.

³⁸ Tanzania, , Annual Plan 1971–72 (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1971) p. 41Google Scholar.

³⁹ Second Plan, pp. 42–50.

⁴⁰ The actual production of cashew nuts has also increased only slightly during this period. With 1970 as a base year equal to 100 units, the 1966–7 production was 73.7. This compares with a 1975–6 figure of 74.6. Source: Bank of Tanzania,Economic Bulletin, IX, 3 (12 1976)Google Scholar.

⁴¹ Nyerere, “The Arusha Declaration Ten Years After,” p. 50.

⁴² Second Plan, p. 141.

⁴³ This is also an increase in real terms, from about 600 million shillings in 1967 to about 875 million shillings in 1975(1969 = 100).

⁴⁴ Maeda, Justin, “Popular Participation, Control and Development: A Study of the Nature and Role of Popular Participation in Tanzania's Rural Development” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Political Science, Yale University, 1976)Google Scholar.

⁴⁵ See especially Lofchie, Michael F., “Agrarian Crisis and Economic Liberalisation in Tanzania,” Journal of Modern African Studies, 16, 3 (1978): 460–475CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Sylvan, David J., “The Illusion of Autonomy: State ‘Socialism’ and Economic Dependence” (Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Political Science, Yale University, 1979) pp. 128–133Google Scholar.

⁴⁶ See especially Maeda.

⁴⁷ See especially Coulson, Andrew, “Agricultural Policies in Mainland Tanzania” Review of African Political Economy 10 (09–12 1977): 96Google Scholar.

⁴⁸ The distinction between foreign and domestic policy is obviously blurred in this case, since the extent of agricultural self-sufficiency and the diversification of export commodities are determined by changes in domestic agricultural output.

⁴⁹ Research interviews conducted by the author during 1977.

⁵⁰ Tanzania, Bureau of Statistics, Analysis of Accounts of Parastatals, 1966–1975 (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 01 1977), p. 3Google Scholar.

⁵¹ Shivji, Issa G., Class Struggles in Tanzania (Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1975), pp. 79–99Google Scholar.

⁵² This has been shown in numerous empirical studies of regional integration efforts. For a recent illustration see especially, Mytelka, Lynn K., “Regulating Direct Foreign Investment and Technology Transfer in the Andean Group,” Journal of Peace Research, XIV, 2 (1977): 155–184CrossRefGoogle Scholar.