There were three good reasons why Edward II hastened to secure papal help within the first year of the pontificate of John XXII (1316-17). A number of important bishoprics were vacant to which the king hoped to secure his candidate, he needed fiscal help for defence purposes, and the weight of papal condemnation to fall on his enemies. Within the year he had secured a satisfactory degree of papal support in each of these three desiderabilia, and the cooperation of pope and king touched Irish affairs at some important points.

The general reasons why the king should wish to arrange episcopal succession to his liking are well known. There was particular reason for securing politically reliable bishops in Ireland. As Edward himself was to explain to John, the ‘fraudulent machinations and malicious and false collusion’ of some Irish prelates against royal power had been a major factor in the risings connected with Edward Bruce’s invasion. At this time both Dublin and Cashel were vacant, and Edward took all measures to ensure their filling by men acceptable to him. There were two candidates in the field at Cashel, nominees of a split in the chapter. In August of 1316, Edward wrote to eight cardinals impressing on them the necessity of having an English archbishop, and urging the candidature of a Franciscan, Geoffrey of Aylsham.

When the Irish rebellion broke out in October 1641, Charles I was in Scotland, where, closely watched by agents of his dissident English parliament, he was attempting, by a policy of tardy retreats and unwonted largesse, to make of the Scottish kirk a pillar of the throne, and to transform wily old enemies like Argyle, Hamilton and Leslie into trusty retainers. Accordingly, when the Scottish estates—then in close liason with Westminster—suggested that the English parliament be entrusted with the management of the Irish war, Charles quickly agreed and sent a message to that effect to London.

In the house of commons, on November 1, the radicals, aware that Ireland formed a common focus of interest for the Scots, the London merchants and many of their supporters in the house, received the news of the rising with ‘smooth brows’. The well-known London interest in Ulster had long been shared by the Scots who had, indeed, attempted to supplant the Londoners in 1638. Hamilton himself appears to have fancied himself as Strafford’s successor.

The second World War was to find Germany and Italy as allies in a conflict in which their initial opponents were Britain, France and Poland. Italy did not immediately enter the war, but by the terms of the ‘pact of steel’ of 22 May 1939 she was to become a belligerent. The war broke out over the invasion of Poland on 1 September 1939. The circumstances under which it arose were peculiar in one particular point, namely in that Great Britain entered the conflict directly and immediately as an ally of a power in eastern Europe. She had entered the wars of 1914 and of 1793 in a secondary manner—as an ally of powers already at war and over commitments which related primarily to western and central Europe. It was novel therefore that she should have become involved directly in a conflict relating to eastern Europe.

If one had tried to predict, in 1919, the circumstances under which Britain would fight another war with Germany, few would have hazarded the opinion that she would choose the crossing of the Polish frontier as a casus belli. In addition, if one had, in 1938, tried also to predict Britain’s ally in an eventual conflict, Poland would have come towards the end of the list. Since 1934, Poland had generally been regarded as a power which was endeavouring to keep out of conflicts between Germany and the western powers—at least in the early stages of such a war. The relations between Berlin and Warsaw were, as from their agreement of 26 January 1934, surprisingly cautious; and the personal relations between leading Germans and Poles reflected—or so it appeared—the existence of such friendly relations. However, within a very short period after the Munich agreement of 30 September 1938, Britain was to become deeply involved in the defence of a frontier which British public opinion had previously regarded as the most open to criticism and revision of all the arrangements concluded at Versailles.

On 26 May 1315 an expeditionary force from Scotland landed on the north-east coast of Ireland, not very far from Larne, under the command of Edward Bruce, who was intent on gaining by the sword a kingdom for himself in Ireland after the fashion in which his brother, Robert, had recently won a crown in Scotland. By September 10 he had overthrown the too confident ‘Red Earl’, Richard de Burgh, and was lording it over the east of Ulster save at one point: the royal castle of Carrickfergus, placed impregnably on a rocky headland jutting out into Belfast Lough. The town itself could not, of course, resist, but the castle defied assault for a whole year before it found it wise to surrender on terms.

We have little information about what happened during the siege and are almost wholly dependent upon a few chroniclers and annalists, who are often merely repetitive and are usually writing long after the events they record. Their evidence can be briefly summarised.