When we think of criminal proceedings, we ordinarily have in mind judicial process, that is a process in which decisions are made by a judge, and, typically in the United States, a jury. Over the course of the past century in the United States, however, certain decision-making aspects of felony criminal proceedings have been handed over to administrative agencies. Examples have been the involvement of administrative agencies in the determination of the sentence to be served in felony cases and the creation of the United States Sentencing Commission with authority to promulgate guidelines that limit the discretion of judges in determining the sentence. Nor are the examples limited to the latter stages of the criminal process. In some jurisdictions, prosecutors have behaved exactly like ordinary administrative agencies by promulgating internal policy in the manner of rulemaking.

Since 1992, the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty has been in force in Israel. Its purpose according to sec. 1 is: “to protect human dignity and liberty, in order to anchor in a Basic Law the values of the state of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state”. In sec. 2 and subsec. it guarantees: preservation of life, body and dignity (sec. 2); protection of property (sec. 3); protection of life, body and dignity (sec. 4); personal liberty (sec. 5); leaving and entering Israel (sec. 6) and privacy (sec. 7). The guarantees in sec. 2 and subs. might thus be seen as a concretization of art. 1. Here we have already an interesting parallel to constitutional theory in Germany. Human dignity is the article with which our constitution begins. The following guarantees may be seen — as Dürig already pointed out in the 1950's — as an emanation of human dignity with its main aspects of freedom/liberty (Art. 2 German Basic Law [GBL]) and of equality (Art. 3 GBL).

The constitutional aspects of criminal law and criminal procedure only began to receive serious attention in Finland in the 1990s. The remarkable change in legal thinking and practice in this respect was connected to two major legislative reforms: firstly, Finland ratified the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) in 1990 and, secondly, new provisions on fundamental (basic) rights were incorporated in the Finnish Constitution in 1995. A fully revised new Constitution of Finland was enacted in 1999 (to be entered into force on 1 March 2000), but the substance of fundamental rights and freedoms was confirmed already in the constitutional reform of 1995.

Those aspects had not, however, been completely overlooked before. Most of the relevant human rights treaties were eventually ratified in Finland (e.g., the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, CCPR) and, when ratified, they were incorporated into the domestic legal order. Nevertheless, courts or administrative authorities very seldom referred to human rights treaties or constitutional rights before the late 1980s; a tradition of invoking constitutional rights in the courts was lacking. Instead, human rights treaties and constitutional rights were primarily regarded as binding the legislator.

The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms enacted in 1982 set off a “constitutional revolution” with profound effects on criminal justice. A criminal lawyer who left the country in 1982 would find that the law has changed dramatically in less than two decades. A system based on legislative supremacy and judicial reluctance to exclude evidence because of unfairness outside of the courtroom has evolved into one based on judicial review and the judicial application of standards of due process or adjudicative fairness at all stages of the criminal process. The law reports and reviews are now dominated by Charter jurisprudence whereas previously they focused on common law, statutes and legislative law reform. American notions of Miranda warnings, warrant and disclosure requirements and the exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained evidence have taken root in Canadian law. This paper will outline some of the major changes brought about by the Charter.

The ultimate stage of the criminal justice system — that of pardon, as well as amnesty, clemency, sentence reduction and early release — is one of the most neglected areas of criminological and penological concern. Indeed, there is a paradoxical symbolism in the fact that this final stage of the punitive process remains at the margins of academic concern. Essentially, for many prisoners, the actual penalty that they will serve is determined at this stage. The phenomenon of pardon is a variegated one, with many diverse expressions, and there is a pressing need for an overall integrative analysis.

The European Convention on Human Rights is one of the manifestations of the Council of Europe, an organisation of European states founded in 1949 with the aim of strengthening the common democratic heritage. It is an international treaty which binds the contracting States to respect the list of human rights and freedoms it proclaims. An enforcement mechanism exists in the form of the European Court of Human Rights (in this paper called ‘the Strasbourg court’).

In brief, these rights and freedoms are the right to life (art. 2); freedom from torture or inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment (art. 3); freedom from slavery or forced labour (art. 4); the right to liberty (art. 5); the right to a fair trial (art. 6); freedom from retrospective criminal laws (art. 7); the right to respect for private and family life, home and correspondence (art. 8); freedom of thought, conscience and religion (art. 9); freedom of expression (art. 10); freedom of peaceful assembly (art. 11); and the right to marry and found a family (art. 12). Over the years, this initial list of rights has been expanded by a series of additional Protocols — not all of which have been ratified by all the Member States. The First Protocol, which Britain has ratified, guarantees the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions, education, and free elections.

In March 1992, Israel's Parliament, the Knesset, enacted Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. Some believe that this Basic Law has created a constitutional revolution in Israel, while others feel this view to be exaggerated. In any event, there is general agreement that the Basic Law, with its 13 brief sections, has effected many significant changes in numerous areas of law.

It is well known that criminal procedure and some parts of the law of evidence are particularly sensitive to constitutional changes. To what extent is this also true in Israel as a consequence of the Basic Law and interpretations given to it?

More particularly, what precisely does the Basic Law say, and what has the Supreme Court inferred from the principles of human dignity and liberty beyond the express provisions of the Basic Law? What influence does the Basic Law exert on new legislation and indeed on legislation preceding the enactment of the Basic Law itself? May one expect that the Supreme Court will adopt the idea that the Basic Law embodies an exclusionary rule of evidence obtained in breach of a constitutional right? These, and other relevant questions, will be discussed below. First, however, we shall refer briefly to the legal and social background of the Basic Law.

The purpose of this short essay is to examine how the constitution could contribute in the area of substantive criminal law. We should distinguish between two levels: the theoretical level and the realistic level. From a theoretical point of view, a lot could be expected from judicial review. The reason is the very broad gap between the principles of criminal law and the norms and real life of criminal law. Judicial review can function as a guardian — perhaps the guardian of the principles of criminal law.

To exemplify the gap between criminal law in theory and criminal law in practice, it is sufficient to mention three issues: Criminal law in theory is an instrument of last resort, but the reality of criminal law is that it is often an instrument of first resort. Secondly, in theory, the most basic principle of criminal law is the principle of legality, of prior warning, but when we read the statutory provisions of criminal law we understand that the citizen is not the real addresee of these norms. When we read case law in criminal law, we find out that real interpretation in criminal law has very little to do with prior warning.