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The change in social norms in the Mafia's territories: the anti-racket movement of Addiopizzo

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 September 2020

Francesca Lipari Open the ORCID record for Francesca Lipari [Opens in a new window]  and
Giulia Andrighetto
Francesca Lipari*
Affiliation:
Grupo Interdisciplinar de Sistemas Complejos (GISC), Departamento de Matemáticas, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Leganés, Spain
Giulia Andrighetto
Affiliation:
Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, Italian National Research Council, Rome, Italy Institute for Futures Studies, Stockholm, Sweden Malardalens University, Vasteras, Sweden
*
*Corresponding author. Email: flipari@math.uc3m.es
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Abstract

Social norms pervade society and when they conflict with legal norms, the former undermine the latter making them ineffective. In this study, we propose that the extortion racket in Sicily has turned into a social norm and this is why recent top-down interventions have failed in stalling this socially undesirable activity. One exception is represented by Addiopizzo, a grass root movement that uses non-legal means to fight the racket phenomenon in Sicily. During the last 15 years, Addiopizzo was able to produce an effective reduction in the payment of protection money in the Sicilian city of Palermo by triggering, we suggest, among other things, a process of change in social norms. Acknowledging the importance of a change in social norms to achieve social change allows us to link the theory of institutions as ‘rules’ with the theory of institutions as ‘equilibria’.

Keywords

social normsformal institutionsinformal institutionsextortion racketsocial changeorganized crime
Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Institutional Economics , Volume 17 , Issue 2 , April 2021 , pp. 227 - 242
Copyright
Copyright © Millennium Economics Ltd 2020

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