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Medicaid Waivers: Courts Must Step in When the Exception Becomes the Rule
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2021
Abstract
Section 1115 of the Social Security Act is misconstrued as a mechanism to foster state flexibility, when in fact it is a narrow pilot program authority. HHS has exceeded the scope of this authority to approve harmful projects. Courts will not grant the agency broad deference when reviewing this abuse of authority.
- Type
- Symposium Articles
- Information
- Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics , Volume 46 , Issue 4: Next Steps in Health Reform , Winter 2018 , pp. 892 - 896
- Copyright
- Copyright © American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics 2018
References
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